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ABSTRACT

Tarbert, Hanna. M.A., Department of Political Science, International and Comparative
Politics Program Graduate, Wright State University, 2015.
Self-Determination in the People’s Republic of China: Elite Responses, 1949-2012.

This work addresses the historical response of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to
perceived irredentist threats in its contested territories. This is assessed through a
comparative case analysis. The four cases are Taiwan, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and
Tibet. The response of the first four generations of CCP leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng
Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, are analyzed through a framework that evaluates
domestic and international priorities, domestic self-determination sentiment, strength of
domestic self-determination movements, and the status of self-determination. The
findings of this framework are used to project the response of current CCP leader and
President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, to separatist threats.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Introduction:
This research attempts to answer the question of how the central leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has responded to perceived irredentist threats, and
utilizes these past precedents to create a model, with the potential to forecast future
responses of the CCP to irredentist threats. In addition to shedding light on some of the
very important domestic challenges facing the CCP, this research is particularly pertinent
in the former Soviet states, especially given the current situation in Crimea and the
Ukraine, as well as previous Russian reactions to Georgian and Chechen separatist
movements. These findings may be potentially relevant to numerous territorial and
national conflicts in other regions with multi-national populations living under
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule.
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the 1st of October
in 1949, national unity and territorial integrity have been problematic for the ruling CCP.
The CCP’s domestic and international policies have undergone some dramatic shifts,
particularly after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Throughout the years, the CCP has
successfully mitigated most internal elements that propose radical and far reaching
changes to its Leninist leadership style. Activists asserting their self-determination rights
in Taiwan, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet are among the greatest challenges posed
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to the stability and legitimacy of CCP rule. Therefore, they are the four cases I use to
conduct my historical analysis.
I undertake a comparative historical case study in order to establish an analytical
framework to assess CCP actions from the founding of the PRC until 2012. The historical
legacy of national humiliation weighs heavily on CCP decisions and will continue to do
so in its pursuit of national unity, which impacts the ability of Tibetans, Uyghurs,
Mongolians, Taiwanese, and others to express their rights to self-determination.
Thesis:
My argument is that the CCP will consistently employ a two-pronged approach of
propaganda and repression to address irredentist threats, regardless of their tangibility.
The CCP’s approach, while consistent throughout the different generations of leaders,
will slightly vary due to differences in leadership personality and priorities.
Hypothesis One: The CCP’s initial response to perceived irredentist threats will
be to devise extensive propaganda efforts designed to bolster the idea of national unity
and divert attention from domestic challenges to international disturbances instead.
Propaganda has been a key component of CCP strategy in fostering national unity
and garnering popular support for its other initiatives. The early 1950s was a period of
minority acceptance and celebration on the part of the CCP, especially in comparison to
later policies regarding the PRC’s nationalities.1 This practice of diverting attention away
from CCP faults through demonizing lead activists remained consistent throughout the
history of the PRC, especially in the areas heavily populated by minorities. For example,

1

Iredale, Robyn. Naran Bilik, and Wang Su. Contemporary Minority Migration, Education, and Ethnicity
in China. Edward Elgar. 2001. Print. 56.
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the CCP blames the Dalai Lama and the so-called “Dalai Lama clique” for discontent in
Tibet and Rebiya Kadeer for unrest in Xinjiang.
Hypothesis Two: While the CCP, from the mid-1950s until 1989, was less
restrained in using force to quell internal separatist threats, it will became more restrained
in authorizing force due to attempts to integrate with the international community and
attract foreign investment.
Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the PRC was relatively isolated from the
international community. However, the CCP began to integrate the PRC into the
international community and, consequently, appeared to focus more on controlling its
image abroad instead of just domestically. The CCP will strive to avoid conflict, but this
does not always equate to a conciliatory approach to resolving disputes as is evident by
the use of force in the ethnic minority regions. The CCP will attempt to increase efforts to
control the story abroad to justify its use of force, just as it does domestically. The rise of
social media and the increased access to China for foreigners will make this increasingly
difficult, especially in the international context.
Hypothesis Three: The potential for the central leadership to endorse meaningful
political reform that would grant actual autonomy to the people of contested territories
will be absent from every case across all five generations of leadership. There will be a
lack of reform that truly empowers the majority of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongolians, and
Taiwanese to access their rights to self-determination in a meaningful way under CCP
control.
Throughout the CCP’s history, it has been and remains, a Leninist Party dedicated
to maintaining a unified nation-state under one-party rule. The lack of meaningful
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political competition provides substantial evidence of this. While the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was designed to function as China’s
“broadest possible patriotic front organization” to represent other “patriotic” nonopposition political parties outside of the CCP, the CPPCC is still subject to CCP
leadership and lacks real authority.2 The substantial human rights violations committed
by the CCP are often undertaken in order to preserve one-party rule as granting of human
rights can be perceived as threatening to the status quo.3 As a result, it is likely that the
CCP will conduct higher levels of human rights violations against groups with a history
of self-determination and separatist inclinations. The likely exception to this is Taiwan,
which has never been under the direct administration of the CCP. As a result, in the case
of Taiwan, the CCP will more likely rely on propaganda rather than repression due to its
lack of power over daily Taiwanese affairs.
Methodology:
I analyze four cases: the semi-autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang
and Tibet, as well as Taiwan, to assess the policy decisions and actions of the CCP’s
central leadership. While the nature of the separatist groups is briefly examined, the
subject of analysis is the CCP central leadership and not groups with potential, or
existing, separatist inclinations. For the CCP, these remain the greatest internal threats to
national unity and as such harbor the greatest potential for separatism.

“Nature and Position.” The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference. Electronic. 3 July 2012. Accessed 6 May 2015.
3
“World Report 2015: Events of 2014.” Human Rights Watch. 2015. PDF. 155.
2
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Justification of the Cases:
Taiwan, among the four cases examined here, is the most resistant to being
assimilated into the CCP administered state. Taiwan’s status as a procedural democracy
poses the most tangible secessionist threat to the CCP, especially since Taiwan receives
military support from the United States. Taiwan is the last major territory the CCP needs
to formally incorporate in order to achieve national unity, no matter how tenuous
reunification might be. The status of Taiwan after the Mao era became a central
component of the CCP’s legitimacy, in addition to economic growth and prosperity.
Consequently, any threat to further distance itself from the Mainland will be swiftly and
fiercely handled by the CCP and People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) was established in the spring
of 1947, prior to the founding of the PRC.4 The CCP enjoyed close relations with
Mongolian Communists, especially in resistance to foreign occupation during the first
half of the twentieth century.5 Of the four cases, it is the least likely to threaten CCP
power and PRC territorial integrity. Ethnic Mongolians, especially in the early twentieth
century, were divided across different political groups and opinions. There were many
who were loyal to the CCP, and in comparison to many other minority nationalities,
Mongolians were among the most loyal and easily recruited. Simultaneously, Mongolians
also had a great history of resistance to Chinese rule. Some Mongolians opposed the
CCP, especially elites within the Mongolian monastic establishment and aristocracy.
These divisions are examined in chapter three.

4

Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford
CA: Stanford University Press. 2004. Print. 182.
5
Ibid
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Inner Mongolia was incorporated into the PRC with the support of Mongolian
cadres and CCP members. The current status of the IMAR (where the Han
overwhelmingly outnumber the Mongolians, the latter comprise 17% of the IMAR’s
population) is considered by CCP members as an ideal outcome for Tibet and Xinjiang.6
The Mongolians are a minority, but ethnic tensions remain prevalent in the region,
creating the potential for the legitimacy of the CCP’s regional autonomy system to be
questioned. The presence of an ethnically similar democracy, Mongolia, immediately on
the border of the IMAR also poses a challenge to the anti-democratic tendencies of the
CCP. While the IMAR poses little actual threat, the CCP perceives it as harboring
potential threats, and therefore, the IMAR is a necessary and appropriate case for
analysis.
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established in October of
1955.7 Prior to the establishment of the XUAR, the territory was under the shaky
administration of Chinese leaders, whether they were Qing officials or Chinese warlords.
Throughout the Qing Administration (1644-1911), the region proved difficult to govern,
and some officials contemplated relinquishing control of the region, viewing it as more of
a burden than an asset.8 For the CCP, the XUAR presents a triple threat of “splittismseparatism-fundamentalism.”9 The Uyghurs are the largest ethnic group in the XUAR and
the majority practice Islam, which the CCP considers threatening to their authority in

“Inner Mongolia.” Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations. 25 March 2008. Electronic.
Accessed 10 January 2015.
7
Zhao. Op. cit., 182.
8
Bovingdon, Gardner. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press,
2010. Print. 32-33
9
“People’s Republic of China Uighurs Fleeing Persecution as China Wages its ‘War on Terror’” Amnesty
International. Electronic. Accessed 6 January 2015.
6
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Xinjiang and to state unity. The CCP has interests in the vast resources of Xinjiang, in
addition to alleviating population pressures in the east of China through Han migration.
The historical justification of the CCP’s claim to Tibet, also known as Xizang, is
controversial and problematic. Contested history aside, the separatist concerns of the
CCP regarding Tibet are rooted more in events since the founding of the PRC than
ancient history. When the CCP “liberated” Tibet in 1950 it was through intimidation by
the PLA. The PLA mobilized at the border of what is known as Central Tibet, but it had
already entered and occupied Eastern Tibet in areas such as Amdo and Kham.10 The
Tibetan government, under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, failed to win international
support, and its delegates signed the “Seventeen Point Agreement” (elaborated on in
chapter five), which became increasingly controversial in future decades.11 The CCP
encouraged its cadres to employ a cautious approach in Tibet, but still managed to
alienate the majority of Tibetans. By 1958 and 1959, citizens in portions of Tibet were
rising up against CCP rule, and in March of 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India.12 The
Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was founded in 1965, with “Greater Tibet,” or Eastern
Tibet, incorporated into numerous other territories outside of the TAR.13
The weak administrative hold of previous Chinese governments prior to the
founding of the TAR, the rise of the Dalai Lama as a charismatic international figure, and
border tensions with India, make Tibet an international issue for the CCP. Domestically,
the religious and cultural differences of the majority Tibetan population from the Han and

Smith, Warren W. China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 2008. Print. 19.
11
Smith. Op. cit., 20.
12
Smith. Op. cit., 45-51.
13
Zhao. Op. cit., 182
10
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increasing ethnic tension between the Tibetans with the Han, Hui and other ethnic groups
are all causes of concern for the CCP. The CCP also has interests in Tibet regarding
resource extraction, border security, and alleviating population pressures on the east
coast.
Sources:
Since I assess the policies and actions of central leadership within the CCP, I rely
on comments made by each leader, and the actions taken by policy making organs under
their leadership. I analyze State Council Decisions and publications for all four cases. In
the case of Taiwan I will use documents from the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council of the PRC. I employ data from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
regarding self-determination. I use sources from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization, which was founded by representatives from Taiwan, Tibet and East
Turkestan (Xinjiang) in 1991.
Historical Overview:
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the CCP has been dominated by
strong personalities. The CCP’s four highest leaders from 1949-2012 are Mao Zedong,
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Each leader faced irredentist threats of some
variety. While their reactions to irredentist threats were often similar, their styles of
leadership, and political objectives were distinct as the political situation of the CCP and
the daily administrative needs of the Chinese state changed.
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
Mao Zedong rose to power within the CCP’s central leadership prior to the
creation of the PRC. Mao’s style was unquestionably revolutionary, which led to

8

catastrophic mistakes, most notably the Great Leap Forward (GLF), famine from 19591961, and the Cultural Revolution from 1966-1976. For Mao, party ideology and
mobilization of the Chinese people were critical to governance. Mao relied on his
personality cult to push measures forward, including his advocacy for continuous
revolution. This made him an excellent revolutionary, but a poor statesman. Mao focused
heavily on political ideology and class struggle, often at the expensive of effective
governance and development.
Among Mao’s political ideals was that of a unified China. Mao was shaped by
China’s “Century of Humiliation” and Chinese nationalist movements of the early
twentieth century.14 Beginning with the Opium Wars of the mid-1800s, the Qing Dynasty
was increasingly subjected to the will of foreign nations.15 The Qing Dynasty lost
territory to numerous foreign powers, including Japan and Great Britain, and China
endured increasing turmoil as the “last dynasty” weakened and warlord rule prevailed.16
The most insulting of “unequal treaties” were the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 (which
ceded Taiwan to the Japanese), and the Treaty of Versailles (which ceded Shandong to
the Japanese, and served as the Japanese base for the invasion of China during the
1930s).17 These losses were viewed as a betrayal of the Chinese people by the
international community and became a rallying point for Chinese nationalist movements
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The end of this humiliation,

14

Wachman, Alan. Why Taiwan?: Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2007. Print. 122.
15
Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign
Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012. Print. 40.
16
Bovingdon. Op. cit.,. 35.
17
Wang. Op. cit., 60.
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according to Mao and other Chinese leaders, was only possible through the defeat of
foreign imperialist powers and the creation of strong, unified Chinese state.18
The CCP was heavily influenced by the often paternalistic support of the Soviet
Union, but it strived to make its own unique policies. The Soviet model identified a
national minority group if it shared a common language, territory, economic life, and
culture.19 Minorities were supposed to be granted federal republics with selfdetermination rights, including secession, within this structure.20 This model, like the
CCP’s, had the ultimate goal of assimilating each minority nationality within the Soviet
system.
Mao’s articulation of what constituted a unified China changed as the CCP
became more powerful and influential. In the 1920s and 1930s the CCP’s position was
that national unity could be loosely maintained through a federal structure, in a manner
similar to the Soviet model.21 However, as the CCP gained more authority it focused
primarily on autonomy, which rejected the Soviet system of federal republics, rather than
self-determination as the basis for empowering the minority nationalities. As the Party
gained more power within China, Mao and other members of CCP leadership no longer
promised greater freedoms to minority nationalities. Rather, Mao and the CCP focused on
limiting the freedoms and power of minority nationalities through the autonomy system
as part of the CCP’s plan to achieve its greater goal of state unification. From the early

18

Wang. Op. cit., 85-87.
Heberer, Thomas. China and Its National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation? Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe. 1989. Print. 32
20
Connor, Walker. That National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: NJ. 1984.
Print. 30-34
21
Xia Chunli. “From Discourse Politics to Rule of Law: a Constructivist Framework for Understanding
Regional Ethnic Autonomy in China.” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights. 2007. PDF.
406
19
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1940s onward, the ideas of autonomy propagated by Mao regarding national unity
became increasingly strict, and evolved from Soviet ideas of self-determination to Maoist
conceptions of autonomy.22
Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
Whereas Mao Zedong was an idealist, Deng Xiaoping was a pragmatist. Deng’s
leadership perspective was an amalgamation of different philosophies, capitalist and
socialist, in order to address the needs of both the Chinese nation and state. Deng was a
strong advocate for reform, even if he never promoted liberalization. Rather, he
advocated for pursuing the “Four Modernizations” in the fields of agriculture, industry,
national defense, and science and technology. He was open to learning from different
models, but remained a Leninist, and as such never acted in a manner that would
compromise one party rule in the CCP. Deng was dedicated to national unity. In 1980 he
identified his three top priorities for the CCP during the 1980s: containing hegemonism,
reunification, and economic modernization.23
Mao and Deng were similar in their pursuit of national unity. Deng, like Mao,
advocated for China’s territorial integrity. Deng endorsed reform so long as it preserved
national unity, upheld China’s territorial integrity, and maintained the political monopoly
of the CCP, especially with regards to reincorporating territories such as Taiwan and
maintaining territories such as Tibet. When reform was deemed too threatening to
national unity, it was abandoned. National unity and territorial integrity remained top
priorities, especially after the calamitous events that occurred in the summer of 1989.

22

Xia. Op. cit., 409.
Chang, Parris H. “Beijing’s Unification Strategy toward Taiwan and Cross-Straits Relations.” The
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. Vol. 26, No. 3. September 2014. Print. 299-300.
23
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Expressions of free speech, such as posting large character posters, were no longer
tolerated. The Deng era concluded with his advocacy of “Patriotic Education,” so that
younger generations could truly understand how China used to be and understand the
monumental successes the Chinese people achieved under the leadership of the CCP.24
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
If not for the volatile events in Beijing and many other major cities in 1989, Jiang
Zemin might not have become the General Secretary of the CCP, or President of the
PRC. A former CCP leader in Shanghai, Jiang was favored by members of the more
conservative faction of the CCP, who were disenchanted with the legacy of Hu Yaobang
and the actions of Zhao Ziyang during the 1980s.25
Jiang continued many of Deng’s actions to open up China to the outside world
and grow the Chinese economy. Among his most notable achievements is the accession
of the PRC to the World Trade Organization in 2001. Jiang’s foreign policy resulted in
more foreign investment in China and improved relations with the United States. He was
still criticized by Party members for being too soft on the West and on the issue of
Chinese territorial integrity, especially with regard to Taiwan. Jiang was domestically
conservative and opposed political reforms. He developed “Patriotic Education”
campaigns to foster popular support for the CCP and Chinese nationalist sentiment in
order to avoid dramatic political reform to maintain CCP legitimacy. Like Deng, he had a
practical side, incorporating lessons from other models, including fusing socialist and
capitalist approaches.

24

Wang. Op. cit., 96.
Vogel, Ezra. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge: MA, Belknap Press. 2011.
Print. 644.
25
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Jiang sought to restructure the Party to ensure its survival, in addition to his own,
through his “Three Represents Campaign.”26 Jiang advocated for the Three Represents as
part of his efforts to transform the CCP into a party comprised of “the firmest, the most
thoroughgoing patriots.”27 The Three Represents are: advanced productive forces,
orientations of an advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming
majority of the people of China.28 Promotion of these values, in Jiang’s view, would help
ensure the CCP regained and maintained high levels of popular support.29
Jiang advocated for national unity under the conservatorship of the CCP. This
united identity includes all of the 56 formally recognized nationalities, but leaves little
room for opposing the CCP. Communist ideology was emphasized less by the Jiang
regime in favor of state loyalty and national unity. The Patriotic Education campaigns
highlighted in the CCP’s Central Committee’s “Outline on Implementing Patriotic
Education” were implemented in the autonomous regions during the Jiang era.30 This
involved creating Patriotic Education bases, including patriotic themes in all forms of
media and emphasizing patriotic themes in entertainment.31
The greatest threats to state unity perceived by Jiang were separatism and
splittism. Any attempts to access greater self-determination rights, which can be as
simple as calls for genuine or greater autonomy, resulted in brutal suppression because
they were a challenge to CCP rule. For Jiang, national unity was to serve the needs of the
CCP, not the minority nationalities.

26

Wang. Op. cit., 125.
Wang. Op. cit., 124.
28
“What is ‘Three Represents’ CPC Theory?” China Internet Information Center. Electronic. Accessed 12
May 2015.
29
Ibid.
30
Wang. Op. cit., 102-104.
31
Wang. Op. cit., 108.
27
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Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
Hu Jintao rose to prominence after his actions in Tibet in 1989 caught the
attention of Deng Xiaoping. Hu Jintao’s former patron was Hu Yaobang, one of Deng’s
protégés. Hu Jintao’s career could have derailed due to the patronage he received from
Hu Yaobang, but his suppression of pro-independence and religious freedom
demonstrations in Tibet in 1989 secured his future within the central leadership.32 His
assignment in the restive and remote province was originally intended as a punishment
for not turning on his former mentor, Hu Yaobang.33 However, his commitment to order
and his willingness to resort to violence in Tibet, while still being a reform-minded
bureaucrat, piqued Deng’s interest in Hu Jintao.
Hu Jintao was sent to Tibet in 1988 after the fall of Hu Yaobang in 1987.34 Unrest
in Tibet was rising since 1986, and within the first few months of Hu Jintao’s arrival,
anti-Han views resulted in the worst uprising of the 1980s in March of 1989.35 Hu
lobbied Beijing to declare martial law within three days of the uprising and ordered the
police to suppress the revolt.36 Prior to suppressing the rebellion in 1989 he had been
viewed as too soft, but, after images of Hu in anti-riot gear and the successful suppression
of the rebellion, this opinion within the party changed.37 Similar methods for handling
Tibet would be applied to Hu’s handling of future nationalities affairs; any potential for
separatism or pro-independence must be harshly suppressed.

32

Wo-Lap Lam, Willy. Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges. Armonk:
NY; London: England. M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2006. Print. 8.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Wo-Lap Lam. Op. Cit., 9.
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Hu Jintao may have been depicted as a reformer by some, but similar to the
leaders before him, he was a loyal and devoted Party member with a Leninist approach to
self-determination (I define this Leninist approach in what follows). Hu prioritized the
survival of the CCP above all else.38 Hu made frequent appeals to Chinese national pride
and furthered the nationalistic Patriotic Education campaigns started under Jiang
Zemin.39 Hu began to emphasize “red tourism,” expanding the Jiang era Patriotic
Education campaigns.40 Many Patriotic Education bases actually became hot spots for red
tourism trips.41 Hu’s approach to policy and governance was a blend of Deng Xiaoping’s
pragmatism with Jiang Zemin’s patriotism and nationalism.
Historical Overview, Concluding Remarks:
Historically, the most consistent feature of CCP leaders is their commitment to
one-party rule under the CCP. Mao and Deng relied on the success of the revolution for
support from the masses. By the end of the Deng era, the memory of the revolution had
faded and the Party sought to maintain loyalty through Patriotic Education campaigns,
which emphasized the legacy of national humiliation. However, the legacy of the
revolution and national humiliation resonated with Han Chinese more than the minority
nationalities. While the Party has been successful in maintaining the loyalty of the Han
majority, its methods are less effective in the autonomous regions of Inner Mongolia,
Xinjiang, and Tibet. They also have no effect on Taiwan, due to a lack of CCP authority
over Taiwanese affairs.
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Literature Review:
The scholarship regarding decolonization provides the necessary background to
fully understand the Chinese, particularly the CCP, situation regarding selfdetermination. The majority of scholarship concerning self-determination focuses on
greater self-determination: the right of a nation or group of people to independent
statehood. Yet it is more than that: self-determination is a right that is afforded to both
individuals and collectives. Which groups are entitled to self-determination, and which
are not, has yet to be resolved.
Omar Dahbour’s 2003 work, Illusion of the Peoples is a critical piece concerning
the rights of nations and groups to self-determination. Dahbour captures one of the most
vexing realities of the current discourse: it is confused at best.42 This is, in large part, due
to the context from which the modern self-determination discourse emerged.
V.I. Lenin and Woodrow Wilson were the two primary proponents (or “fathers,”
as Dahbour calls them) of the modern self-determination discourse: the eastern socialist
conception of self-determination and the western liberal conception of selfdetermination.43 It is the former that would most influence CCP notions of selfdetermination and nationality policies as well as the nationalities policies of its rival, the
Guomindong (GMD). Wilson and Lenin were, to some degree, in agreement that selfdetermination rights were entitled to groups or nations under imperial rule, including the
right to independent statehood.44 Dahbour also notes one of the first emerging
contradictions of self-determination rights during this era—namely, a nation can only
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access its right to statehood at the expense of other nations.45 A state has an established
boundary, whereas nations may be affiliated with particular territories but exist across
multiple territories and alongside different nations.
Walker Connor elaborates on how Lenin and his successors viewed selfdetermination, with regard to the rights of nations or groups, as a means to an end.
Lenin’s understandings were actually influenced by his successor Josef Stalin, who was
heavily involved in nationality affairs several years prior to Lenin’s interest.46 For this
reason, Leninist and Stalinist conceptions of self-determination rights and nationality
politics possess many similarities.
For Lenin, national self-determination included the right of nations to secede.47
Lenin’s actions were more in line with Stalin’s definitions and ideas regarding nation and
national self-determination, which also includes the right of the nation to secede, but was
not as limited by it.48 While the contradictions in Lenin’s theory, and between theory and
actions, may appear problematic, Connor observes that a more elaborate understanding of
Lenin’s ideas concerning the purpose and function of self-determination rights explains
the contradictions. Lenin did not believe nations would act against their own economic
self-interests, nor that self-determination would yield the formation of numerous small
states.49
Connor summarizes Lenin’s self-determination position in three points. First,
prior to the assumption of power, all nationalities were to be promised the right of self-
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determination, extending even to secession.50 Second, after assuming power, the ruling
party begins the process of assimilation and denies self-determination rights in practice
but not rhetoric.51 Third, the party must remain centralized and free of nationalist
tendencies.52 It is this model of governance that would be utilized by the Chinese,
especially during the Mao era.
Connor also elaborates on the Stalinist conceptions of self-determination and
nation. Stalin articulated the rights nations possess. He viewed nations as sovereign and
equal.53 Nations were able to arrange their lives according to their own will, which
included the right to secession.54 By 1938, Stalin’s nationalities policies were
assimilationist and violations of self-determination rights were rampant.55 By the end of
WWII, the national self-determination discourse had gained popularity in colonial
holdings, fusing the movement for decolonization with self-determination throughout
colonial holdings.
According to Roland Burke’s Decolonization and the Evolution of International
Human Rights, it was the Afro-Asian block, particularly those active at the Bandung
Conference of 1955, and the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN), which
elevated self-determination into the modern human rights discourse.56 At the Bandung
Conference, delegates could rally around the common cause of decolonization, even if
the Chinese participants led by Premier Zhou Enlai voiced opposition to the suggestion
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that self-determination should be considered a human right.57 However, all participants
were able to rally around the common cause of de-colonization. The issue of human
rights divided many of the Afro-Asian delegations at Bandung.58 As controversial as
human rights were at this conference, it was the efforts of the Afro-Asian block, notably,
that elevated the right of self-determination as fundamental to the enjoyment of other
rights, and that national self-determination would further individual freedom.59 Burke
calls self-determination the “nexus between decolonization and human rights.”60 This
argument was popular among members of the Afro-Asian block because of the
paternalistic attitude of the Europeans regarding their colonial subjects as too unprepared
and underdeveloped to enjoy human rights.61 However, similar to the Soviets before
them, the Afro-Asian block determined national self-determination would no longer be
relevant after colonialism was overthrown.62
Valerie Epps notes that while self-determination entered the international political
discourse in 1918, it was not until the drafting of the “Charter of the United Nations” in
1945 that it became enshrined as an integral part of the international legal landscape.63
The right to self-determination increased in prominence after the passage of the 1960
General Assembly decision, “Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples” followed by the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” and the
“International Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights.”64 However, it was not
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until the 1970s that the right of all peoples to self-determination was guaranteed by
international law with the passage of the General Assembly’s “Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations.”65
Suisheng Zhao assesses the rise of nationalism and policy changes in the PRC in
the post-Cold War era after the fall of the Soviet Union. Zhao purports that nationalism in
this time fostered two different strains of state-seekers: old and new.66 Old state-seekers
try to re-establish states that already exist or have existed.67 The new-state seekers use
nationalism to construct new nation-states.68 In this regard, the CCP is both a new and old
state-seeker as it tried to re-establish a Chinese state using the boundaries of the Qing
Empire, which was still distinct from the imperial Chinese dynasties of the past.
The CCP followed the Leninist three step approach to national self-determination,
both before and after it assumed governing power. This approach is identified by Robyn
Iredale as “Chinese-Stalinist.”69 Chinese nationality policy was not a carbon copy of
Soviet policy, in large part due to the controversial events of the 1950s, when Soviet
scholars claimed that not one of China’s ethnic groups were developed enough, in a
Marxist Leninist sense, to be considered a nationality.70 As a result, not all the
requirements for nationality status are met by some of China’s fifty-six recognized
nationalities.71 This inconsistency has fueled ambiguities and contradictions with the
Chinese political system regarding ethno-national and territorial disputes.
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Sow Tok asserts Chinese sovereignty, as understood by the power holders in
Beijing, is the product of historical experiences and political discourses.72 According to
Tok, the different levels of Beijing’s foreign policy analysis have yet to capture its
reality: Beijing’s view of sovereignty differs from the standard view of sovereignty. 73 It is
a view that allows for different power arrangements, such as “One country, Two
systems,” so long as the ultimate sovereignty of Beijing is not fundamentally
challenged.74 Beijing’s understanding of sovereignty accommodates different rights for
different regions, depending on the reality of Beijing’s circumstances.75
Sovereignty is a dynamic and multi-faceted concept.76 The most basic
understanding of sovereignty is a form of “supreme authority.”77 However, Tok purports
that the Beijing model violates this notion with regard to Hong Kong and Taiwan.78 As
Epps notes, current understandings of sovereignty fail to explain the Chinese situation
adequately. After all, the CCP asserts its absolute sovereignty over Taiwan, although it
has never exercised direct jurisdiction over the island.79 According to Wu Guogang, the
CCP conceptualizes sovereignty in a manner that allows the central government to
monopolize all “possessions” of the nation and exclude the sovereignty of peoples.80 This
enables the CCP, on the basis of sovereignty claims, to determine who is, and what it
means to be, Chinese.81
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The laws promulgated by the CCP regarding autonomy, especially in the minority
areas, are criticized for being vague, overly general and, at the same time, for being
neither properly implemented, nor supervised.82 The concept of autonomy was introduced
by Mao at a time when the CCP was altering its policies on self-determination and the
rights of nations in a manner that was distinct from the Soviet system.83 Autonomy
eventually replaced self-determination in the CCP focus on creating national unity.84 This
system, with a few alterations, is still employed today in the PRC’s five autonomous
regions, 30 autonomous prefectures and 113 autonomous counties.85 CCP conceptions of
autonomy also have relevance within the Special Administrative Regions of the PRC and,
consequently, influence CCP policy regarding Taiwan.86
Within PRC government structures, autonomous government units are headed by
the titular minority of a designated region, and legislative measures are in place to
maintain the culture and language of that minority, but there is no comparable system
applied to the CCP’s structure, which is the true source of authority.87 Regional autonomy
is a central and fundamental policy of the CCP, according to Xia Chunli.88 Xia claims
that autonomy is the political instrument employed by the CCP to integrate minority
nationalities into mainstream Chinese society.89 The only exception was during the
Cultural Revolution when autonomy was suspended during the most assimilative period
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of the CCP’s history.90According to the CCP and Mainland Chinese legal scholars,
Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan is well established in both law and in the historical
record.91 The “unequal treaties” of the “Century of Humiliation” were no longer binding
to China as early as 1924, when Sun Yatsen declared his intent to abolish them.92 The
peace treaty between the ROC and Japan in 1952, although not signed by the legitimate
government of China, still represented the policy of the legitimate Japanese government,
and its loss of Taiwan.93 Therefore, the territory of Taiwan would revert back to the
Chinese government, now under the control of the CCP, whose defeat of the GMD was
not a secession of state, but a secession of government.94 The actions of nearly every
sovereign state also reaffirm the CCP claim to sovereignty over Taiwan as recognition of
the One China Policy as a precondition for entering into diplomatic relations with the
PRC.95
The CCP uses nationalism in its state building enterprises. However, nationalism
is not solely used by state leaders, but also the leaders of other self-determination
movements seeking greater autonomy. According to Adrian Hastings, nationhood forms
from a vast vernacular of literature and can be shaped by prolonged conflict.96 In order to
further its political goals, nations employ nationalism as a practice, which often results in
efforts to create a nation-state.97 The Chinese nation created a nation-state by fostering
nationalist sentiment from the early twentieth century in resistance to imperialism, most
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notably against the Japanese. The nationalist sentiment in the four cases examined is
shaped by struggle against the CCP. Tibetan activists seek greater autonomy, and, in
some cases, independence for Greater Tibet. The World Uyghur Congress and other
Uyghur self-determination movements seek independence for East Turkestan. Inner
Mongolian democracy activists advocate for the recognition of “Southern” or Inner
Mongolia. The people of Taiwan seek to remain outside the direct administration of the
CCP through democratic elections and international support.
Analytical Framework and Chapter Organization:
In the pages that follow, each chapter is broken down by CCP leader, providing
an assessment of how each responded to separatist challenges. Real or perceived
irredentist threats in each case have peaked at different points throughout the PRC’s
history. While the focus is on the CCP central leadership, it is necessary to discuss
existing separatist groups and regional leadership. This helps analyze the CCP responses
more comprehensively, even if they are not the primary focus of each chapter.
In the case of Taiwan, the GMD was the greatest contender to the CCP during the
early decades of the PRC. However, as Taiwan democratized, pro-independence political
parties emerged, most notably the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in the mid-1980s.
As Taiwanese democracy advanced throughout the 1990s, the GMD became aggressive
toward the CCP again. Taiwan’s evolving democracy continues to shape the discourse
between the CCP leadership and the Taiwanese.
The case of Inner Mongolia will have heavy emphasis on the perceived threat of
the Inner Mongolian People’s Party during the Cultural Revolution, the democracy
movement of 1980, and the political unrest by pastoralists over the past decade,
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especially the outbreak of violence in 2011. The Mongolians of the IMAR are a minority
and the region receives less attention from many scholars as well as media outlets.
However, it is still a priority for the CCP, especially in the Party’s efforts to develop its
minority nationalities policies.
The Xinjiang case will have numerous areas of focus including the following: the
liberation of Xinjiang and establishment of the XUAR in the 1950s, the Baren Rebellion
of 1990, the unrest of 1997, the impact of the Global War on Terror in 2001, as well as
the unrest from July 2009 to the present. Throughout these different periods the CCP was
concerned over Muslim nationalism, Soviet and other foreign influences, and religious
extremism.
Tibet will be the most extensive case as it has perhaps the largest volume of
irredentist threats perceived by the CCP. The Tibet case will focus on the rebellion of
1959, the establishment of the TAR in 1965, the actions of Red Guards in the Cultural
Revolution, the period of unrest squashed by Hu Jintao from 1986-1989, and the Beijing
Olympics to the present day. The CCP has been concerned with lamaist groups, foreign
influences, and the ever threatening international presence of the Dalai Lama.
Throughout the extensive history of interaction and conflict between Tibet and the CCP,
the CCP has credited the “Dalai Lama Clique” and “western interference” for creating
irredentist threats in Tibet.
I apply the analytical framework for understanding self-determination movements
in the PRC at the conclusion of chapters two through five. This framework summarizes
the domestic and international priority each leader assigned to each case during their
leadership, the level of nationalist sentiment by the titular nationality of the region, and
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the relative strength of the self-determination movement(s) of the titular nationality, if
any exist.
CCP priorities, similar to that of any political party, are dynamic. The four cases
present an interesting intersection between domestic and international politics. Therefore,
the CCP may attach a low priority to a territory domestically, but a much higher priority
internationally. There are four designations for CCP priorities: high (H), moderate (M),
low (L), and none (N). High priority is when the CCP demonstrated a sense of urgency to
eliminate separatist threats, followed by intense actions, military or otherwise. Moderate
priority means the CCP responded but lacked urgency, and the CCP response was
minimal. Low priority means the CCP was not concerned about reaching an immediate
resolution to the threat but not completely dismissive of events occurring within the
territory.
For separatist threats, I assess if a threat or strong sense of nationalism or national
identity existed. There are three possible designations for this category: weak (W),
moderate (M), and strong (S). A strong sense of national identity does not mean an
individual group will advocate for self-determination or seek increased autonomy from
the state. A group may express its national identity through other means; however, a
political self-determination movement is possible. This is why the existence and strength
of a regional self-determination movement is also assessed, but given its own category.
This can be through the formation of political parties, popular demonstrations,
spontaneous organizations, etc. The designation for this category is also weak (W),
moderate (M), and strong (S).
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The final category ranks the CCP’s policy and practices concerning whether or
not it respects and upholds the self-determination rights of the titular minority nationality
of each case study. A designation of 1 means that self-determination was relatively
respected, that the CCP used available resources and, when possible, acted to promote
minority interests, included minorities in the political apparatus, and perhaps most
importantly, the CCP did not interfere in the economic and political livelihoods of the
minority nationalities. In short, a 1 means the CCP administration of that leader was more
accommodating, and a 5 ranking means it was assimilationist. However, a 3 does not
necessarily mean neutral; in some cases this rank is used to indicate a mixed record.
If a leader’s administration had the intention to violate self-determination rights
through policies, but simply lacked the capacity to implement any such violation, the
ranking would be higher than if the administration never planned to violate selfdetermination rights because intent matters, and vice versa. If the CCP respected selfdetermination rights in the areas of culture and education, but violated them in the areas
of political participation and economic freedoms, the ranking would be toward the middle
of the five point scale depending on the degree of respectful actions and violations,
respectively. Figure 1.1 details an example of the chart that will be used at the end of
each chapter:
Figure 1.1 Self-determination Analytical Framework

Leader

Domestic
Priority

International
Priority

Domestic Self
Determination
Sentiment
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Determination
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Determination
Status
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W, M, S
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Chapter Two: Taiwan
Introduction:
Taiwan is a poignant reminder to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the
inequities imposed upon the Chinese nation by foreign powers, and it is the most visible
impediment to national unity. The Qing Empire (1644-1911) forfeited the territory of
Taiwan to the Japanese in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, which, according to the
Chinese, was one of many “unequal treaties” during the Century of Humiliation.98 After
World War II (WWII), the Japanese returned Taiwan to the Republic of China (ROC)
and renounced its claims to numerous other territories in the Treaty of San Francisco,
which was then governed by the Guomindang (GMD). The GMD, after recovering the
island, increasingly used it as its base of operations during the civil war against the
CCP.99 In 1949, the GMD and its supporters fled to Taiwan and used it to prepare to
retake the Mainland.100 CCP policy regarding Taiwan changed as the CCP consolidated
power during the 1940s. The GMD’s escape to Taiwan, and Cold War international
politics heavily influenced CCP policy. Since the foundation of the PRC, the CCP has
adamantly claimed its sovereignty over Taiwan and the inviolable nature of the “One
China” principle.
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The status of Taiwan has been problematic for CCP central leadership. The CCP’s
end-goal when addressing other territorial disputes has been to develop a model for
reunification with, and governance of, Taiwan. The Hong Kong model of “One country,
Two systems,” implemented since 1997, was originally designed for Taiwan and its
application is carefully watched by Taiwanese as an indicator of what may happen under
CCP rule.
The CCP was not always committed to Taiwan being a part of Greater China. The
Taiwanese Communist Party, which was active on mainland China and collaborated with
the CCP, advocated for Taiwan’s independence.101 Mao Zedong made statements during
the 1930s which categorized Taiwan as similar to Korea and Vietnam, asserting that
Taiwan was critical in the anticolonial struggle against Japan, but Taiwan was not a part
of China.102 Due to their adherence to Leninist theories of self-determination, and
because of the influence of the Soviet Union, Mao and other CCP leaders viewed selfdetermination in Taiwan as a means to overthrow colonialism. Afterward, Mao assumed
the people of Taiwan would ultimately choose to act in their best interests and join the
Chinese state. Resistance to Japan dominated the political agendas of both the GMD and
CCP, and the notion of Taiwan as an integral part of China was not heavily scrutinized by
either party until the early 1940s.
The CCP’s policy shift regarding Taiwan coincided with the CCP distancing itself
from the Soviet Union’s Communist International, or Comintern, in 1942, bringing to an
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end the paternalistic relationship that the CCP accepted, often begrudgingly, out of
necessity.103 Furthermore, the defeat of Japan in WWII emboldened both the CCP and
GMD to assert Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.104 The Cairo Declaration of 1943,
issued by the United States, Great Britain and China (represented by Chiang Kaishek of
the ROC), was a critical aspect of the CCP’s justification for Chinese sovereignty over
Taiwan. The Cairo Declaration relinquished numerous colonial holdings from Japan.105
Figure 2.1 Map of Taiwan

The fact that the CCP did not represent
the “China” that entered into the arrangement is
not problematic according to Mainland Chinese
legal scholars and the CCP, because it is the
state, not the ruling government that matters.106
Since Japan withdrew its claim to Taiwan, sovereignty would revert back to the Chinese
from whom it was originally taken in “unequal treaties.”107 Indigenous Taiwanese
independence movements existed after the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Chinese forces on
Taiwan resisted the Japanese occupation; after the military was defeated, guerilla warfare
continued.108 Since that time indigenous Taiwanese movements have pressed for racial
equality, independence, or greater autonomy.
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Figure 2.1, accessed from the UNPO, shows how narrow the distance between
Taiwan and the Mainland is. Due to Taiwan’s location it is also prominent in other CCP
territorial disputes in the East China Sea that are not discussed in this thesis. However, it
is important to note that Taiwan has a role in other territorial disputes involving the CCP.
Of the four cases analyzed in this thesis, Taiwan has the greatest potential to
involve the international community in a military capacity. The CCP and the
government of the United States have both enacted measures, which will be analyzed
later, establishing the basis for which military action will be taken regarding Taiwan.
Therefore, Taiwan has the potential to spark a Great Power war during the twenty-first
century.109 While it has the greatest potential for causing a Great Power war, the
likelihood of war, at least in the first half of the twenty-first century, is minimal,
according to most analysts.110
Internal Situation, 1947-2012:
Even without the enormous specter of the CCP looming over Taiwanese affairs,
the social and political situations of the island are complicated. The ethnic divisions
within Taiwan’s population include Fujianese (70%), Hakka (15%), Mainlander (13%)
and Indigenous groups (2%).111 The ethnic composition of the island has an enduring
legacy that complicates Taiwan’s cultural and political landscape, which was exacerbated
by the mass exodus of 1.5 million GMD supporters and other Mainland refugees in
1949.112 While the “Mainlander” population was, and continues to be, a minority in
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Taiwan, it held a preponderance of power under the GMD, especially from the 1940s to
the 1990s. This lasted during the first few decades as part of a brutal authoritarian system,
until the death of Chiang Kai-shek and transition of power to his son, Chiang Chingkuo,
in 1987.113
As the CCP grew stronger on the Mainland during the early 1940s, the GMD was
forced to rely on Taiwan. GMD supporters and others who fled the CCP frequently came
into conflict with the Hakka, Fujianese, and indigenous residents of Taiwan.114 GMD
corruption and preferential treatment of the Mainland elite resulted in the abuse and
exploitation of the majority of Taiwan’s population.115 Tension between the Mainland
elite and Taiwanese population erupted in an island-wide revolt known as the “2-28
incident,” beginning on 28 February 1947, when local Taiwanese protested the shooting
death of a civilian by the police.116 Chiang Kaishek sent 50,000 troops to Taiwan in order
to put down the revolt, killing 10,000 to 20,000 people.117 This began a period of martial
law, often referred to as the “White Terror,” of long distrust between the Mainland elite
and Taiwanese population. During the “White Terror,” the self-determination rights of
the Taiwanese people were suppressed by the authoritarian GMD regime.
The alienation of Taiwan’s non-Mainland residents toward GMD rule,
exacerbated by the 2-28 incident, only increased as the GMD permanently resettled there
in 1949. The GMD launched campaigns privileging the culture and language of the
Mainland, despite the fact that the majority of the population did not speak Mandarin and
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already possessed a distinct culture, in order to assimilate the majority of the island’s
residents.118 The GMD declared martial law in May of 1949, and undertook efforts to
identify and eliminate perceived communists. This resulted in severe and brutal treatment
of the island’s residents, including some members of the Mainland exodus.119 By the
1980s, many residents of Taiwan were thoroughly disenchanted with the brutal
authoritarian regime that was led by Chiang Kaishek’s son, Chiang Chingkuo.
The GMD enjoyed greater international support in comparison to the
diplomatically isolated CCP. This changed in the 1970s when some members of the
international community began to recognize the CCP, based in Beijing, as the legitimate
leadership of China and the PRC became the Chinese representative to the United
Nations. Taiwan’s economy also declined during the 1970s, and domestic discontent
increased on the island as the state of affairs, both domestic and international,
deteriorated. If not for this increasing diplomatic isolation and economic crisis, the GMD
would not have embarked on its only option for survival: dramatic political and economic
reform.120
In the 1980s, economic liberalization and political reform (most notably the end
of martial law in 1987) under Chiang Chingkuo spurred rapid democratization on the
island, which was continued by his successor Lee Teng-hui.121 As Taiwan democratized
it was able to reestablish its international presence and join organizations not requiring
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statehood. Taiwan even founded the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization in
1991, where it is represented by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.122
Political reforms from the 1980s onward were key to Taiwan’s ability to remain
outside of the direct administration of the CCP. Events from the 1980s to the 2000s
created stability at the domestic level. The transition of power in 1988 to the Taiwan-born
Lee Tenghui began to ameliorate the discontent of the non-Mainland population.123
Lee is Hakka (although he never learned the dialect) and was the first president of
Taiwan to be born on the island.124 He received an extensive Japanese education on
Taiwan, served in the Japanese military and even admitted to viewing himself as
Japanese until he was 22.125 Lee also attended college in the United States obtaining a
doctoral degree from Cornell in 1968.126 He joined the GMD in 1970, beginning his
career in politics.127 After completing his education in the United States he returned to
Taiwan and worked for the Division of Rural Economics, until he met Chiang Chingkuo
and became a minister in his cabinet in June of 1972.128
Events in the 1990s further established Taiwan as a democratic entity. The
presidential election in 1996, and the cessation of the “Period of National Mobilization
for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion” in 1991, resulted in conditions where
Taiwanese businesses and individuals could easily enter into cultural and economic
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exchanges, especially with other democracies.129 The presidential election of 2000, which
resulted in the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) candidate, Chen
Shui-bian, strengthened the legitimacy of Taiwan’s democracy due to the transition of
power from the GMD to another political party for the first time. While democratization
and economic reform fostered domestic stability, Cross-Strait relations remained
complicated.
The DPP is well known as Taiwan’s most substantial pro-independence party, but
this position was not added to the DPP’s platform until 1991, largely in response to the
more reform oriented measures pursued by the GMD, and the suppression of prodemocracy protests in Beijing in 1989.130 The DPP formed in 1986, while martial law
was still in place, by members of a political movement known as Dangwai, which means
“outside the party.”131 They challenged the GMD on issues of corruption, human rights,
and self-determination, which was a large source of the Dangwai and DPP’s appeal to
Taiwanese voters.
As of 2012, Taiwan’s democracy remains successful despite issues with
corruption and ethnic tension.132 Taiwan’s economy has managed to survive significant
challenges and recover from periodic setbacks. Taiwan has also managed to exercise
international influence without recognized statehood. Self-determination on Taiwan
remains contentious as the pro-independence and pro-status quo factions compete for
support from the Taiwanese public. The most significant threats to Taiwan’s status quo is
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from the PRC under the administration of the CCP, or international isolation if it declares
independence.
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
Mao Zedong’s position regarding Taiwan dramatically transformed after the
founding of the PRC. A military solution to Taiwan was the dominant idea of the Mao
era, but there was not a sense of urgency to “liberate” Taiwan.133 From 1950 until the end
of his life in 1976, Mao consistently claimed that the liberation of Taiwan could take
place decades into the future.134 The Taiwan Mao faced was substantially different from
the Taiwan confronted by the CCP after 1996. The GMD had been soundly defeated on
the Mainland and, unless aided by the United States, posed little threat to the power of the
CCP. The GMD vehemently opposed forming an independent state during the Mao era
because it sought to regain control of Mainland China, and brutally repressed any proindependence sentiment.135
For Mao, the role of Taiwan was more pertinent to Cold War politics with the
United States than to domestic socialist revolution and national unification. The defeated
GMD had fled and was making its last stand, and Mao was confident the island would
return to Mainland rule. The “national humiliation” rhetoric that was so critical in
spurring mass support prior to the founding of the PRC was absent during the Mao era of
the PRC from 1949-1976.136 CCP legitimacy was not based on the “liberation” of
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Taiwan. Rather, CCP legitimacy was grounded in the Civil War victory and Mao’s cult of
personality. This is not to suggest that Mao was completely dismissive of the Taiwan
issue, but his motivations for action regarding Taiwan, such as the continuous shelling of
Jinmen (1958-1979), must be understood in the realm of foreign, rather than domestic,
politics.
In 1949, Mao ordered his military leadership to plan to retake the island in early
1950, but the onset of the Korean War became a more pressing matter for the CCP.137
The Korean War presented an opportunity to fight against “imperialist” foreign
aggressors during the Cold War, and consequently was of far greater importance than
Taiwan.138 While Taiwan was downgraded by Mao, small clashes orchestrated by the
CCP continued through the 1970s.139 This was part of Mao’s ambivalent policy toward
the island as part of his overall strategy to create “an atmosphere of war, not war.”140 The
CCP need to “liberate” Taiwan was augmented by the United States’ position to protect
and support the GMD on Taiwan, and was more an issue of international and not
domestic politics.141
Mao Zedong viewed Taiwan more in the realm of international politics than
domestic affairs. If the GMD had not fled to Taiwan toward the end of the Chinese Civil
War, his prior position regarding Taiwan might have remained the same. However, the
Korean War still would have caused the island to be a high international priority for Mao
even if the GMD did not relocate there. The combination of the Korean War and the
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GMD fleeing caused Mao to view a military solution as the best option for Taiwan.
However, the “liberation” of Taiwan was not an immediate concern for Mao, so there is
little to discuss concerning the application of Mao’s self-determination policies for
Taiwan.
Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
Deng Xiaoping’s ascension to the highest positions of both CCP and PRC
leadership marked a drastic shift in CCP policies about many issues, including Taiwan.
The Deng era began the transition from revolution to nationalism as the source of CCP
legitimacy, which influenced its Taiwan policy. Deng ended the continuous shelling of
Jinmen in 1979, initiating a less confrontational policy stance toward Taiwan.142 Not only
did the CCP transform its position toward Taiwan, but Taiwanese leaders after Chiang
Kaishek also softened toward the Mainland, as discussed above.
The policy “One country, Two systems” became another major deviation from the
Mao era during the early 1980s. While the system was first applied in Hong Kong, in the
eyes of the CCP it served as, and continues to function as, a pilot project for reunification
with Taiwan. The CCP position regarding Taiwan changed from hostile to
accommodating during the Deng era.143
The promulgation of the 1982 PRC Constitution was a component of Deng’s
strategy to move away from military solutions (while never completely abandoning the
option) toward its contested territories. The preamble to the Constitution states that
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Taiwan is, and always has been, a part of the PRC.144 Article 31 of the 1982 Constitution
entrusts the state to create Special Administrative Regions (SAR) when necessary, and
grants these SARs the ability to pursue capitalist economies.145 The Constitution and the
“One country, Two systems” policy exemplify the pragmatic and nationalist position of
Deng—namely, it was not the system used that mattered but a unified Chinese state.
Deng’s Taiwan policy remained influential after 1992, as all leaders who followed
him advocated for a “One country, Two systems” solution to the Taiwan question.
Deng’s “Six Conceptions for Peaceful Reunification,” or the “Six Conceptions,” which
he articulated when he met with representatives from the United States, define this
position.146 Deng claimed that common ground existed between the GMD and CCP as
both parties want reunification.147 While only One China existed, this did not prevent the
use of different systems on Taiwan and the Mainland, but Taiwan would not be allowed
absolute autonomy.148 Post-reunification Taiwan would be a SAR with control over
legislative, judicial, and to some extent, military matters.149 The best manner to pursue
reunification, according to Deng, was through peaceful negotiations between the CCP
and GMD without foreign interference.150 Deng also reiterated the CCP’s commitment to
“One country, Two systems” in 1984 when discussing Hong Kong.151
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Deng reshaped the CCP discourse concerning Taiwan. During the Deng era,
“peaceful reunification” supplanted “liberation” by military means, as it was a more
practical solution for reunification during the more optimistic and conciliatory period of
Cross-Strait relations after the deaths of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kaishek. While this is
clearly the preferred method for the CCP, Deng made it clear to all that reunification did
not eliminate the use of force, but rather that force was now the last option once all other
peaceful options had been exhausted.152 Deng appealed to the Taiwanese people on the
basis of a shared Chinese nationality on both sides of the Strait. He also asserted that the
Chinese were capable of administering their own affairs both in Taiwan and Hong
Kong.153 Deng articulated the bottom-line of CCP policy concerning Taiwan: there is
only one China and the reunification of Taiwan is a domestic issue to be resolved by the
“patriots” of the Chinese nation.154
Deng also recognized the reality that reunification would not be quick. Deng
asserted, “If it cannot be accomplished in 100 years, it will be 1,000 years.”155
Nevertheless, Deng listed reunification as one of the “three great tasks” the CCP wanted
to achieve during the 1980s, even if he ultimately remained realistic about the likelihood
of realizing this goal.156 Like Mao, Deng also lacked a sense of urgency for reunification
with Taiwan.
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In the spring of 1989, Taiwanese leaders and citizens were mortified by the CCP’s
response to the protests in Beijing and other cities157. The expansion of Taiwan’s
democracy movement occurred when the CCP was suppressing pro-democracy
movements in territories and provinces already under its direct administration. The CCP
was struggling to resolve the Chinese people’s crisis of confidence with CCP rule without
embracing dramatic political reform. Unlike Taiwan, the CCP was unwilling to
democratize in order to survive.158 Consequently, both sides of the Strait viewed actions
on the opposite side with deep concern.
The CCP and GMD both tolerated, and to some extent supported, the formation of
organizations during the early 1990s to discuss Cross-Strait relations.159 With the passing
of Chiang Kaishek in 1975 and Mao Zedong in 1976, the CCP and GMD were less
hostile toward each other.160 The mutual softening on both sides of the Strait created the
conditions necessary to produce the 1992 Consensus and Wang-Koo Talks, without
threatening the legitimacy of either governing body. While these meetings were groundbreaking, the option to discuss meaningful political matters was not allowed and as such
the resolution of the Taiwan question was not possible.161
The 1992 Consensus continued to influence Cross-Strait relations for decades. For
the CCP, the 1992 Consensus reaffirmed the mutual agreement of both the CCP and
GMD to the “One China” principle.162 For the CCP, abandoning the 1992 Consensus
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became the equivalent of refuting the “One China” principle, which was the basis of all
possible negotiations with Taiwanese representatives.163 The Taiwanese, particularly
members of the GMD, accepted the 1992 Consensus and the One China principle, but
argued that there is a different understanding of what “One China” entails on both sides
of the Strait.164 For the GMD, it entailed maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of
China on Taiwan, which the CCP viewed as creating two Chinas.165
Despite the concerns over Tiananmen Square and the suppression of other prodemocracy movements, the end of the Deng era was a time when relations between the
CCP and Taiwan were cordial, cooperative, and steadily improving. The 1992 Consensus
provided a framework for meetings between both sides of Strait and affairs between them
were able to be discussed even though they were not conducted by actual government
organizations. In the opinion of the CCP it also reaffirmed Taiwan’s recognition of the
One China principle. However, this status would not last long after the end of the Deng
era, as Taiwan gained new international status and its democracy strengthened.
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
The Dengist period of improved PRC-Taiwan relations ended during the Jiang
era. The optimistic period of Taiwan relations drew to a close beginning in 1993, when
the Taiwanese government stated its intent to seek greater diplomatic recognition through
international organizations and from individual states.166 Taiwan had recovered from
economic and political stagnation. The international isolation of the 1970s had waned and
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Taiwanese politicians decided to assert the island through economic partnerships and
participation in international organizations. The actions of Taiwan’s leaders throughout
the early 1990s created a Taiwan that posed a considerable challenge to Jiang, as the PRC
emerged into the enormous power vacuum left by the fall of the Soviet Union. Jiang
shifted the focus of CCP legitimacy from socialist ideology toward nationalism, with the
implementation of Patriotic Education campaigns, as well as CCP restructuring. While
Patriotic Education was approved under Deng, it was not until the Jiang administration
that the measure was fully implemented throughout China. Patriotic Education was
focused on creating a Chinese citizen, whereas his predecessors had focused on creating
more of a communist or socialist citizen. The Patriotic Education campaigns were
designed to instill a sense of unity and loyalty to the CCP; to be truly Chinese was to
support the CCP and oppose all forces that would subvert national unity. These actions
only strengthened the CCP’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, as the island was the last
remaining Chinese territory to remain outside the Party’s control.
Jiang also embarked on restructuring the CCP to face the challenges of the
modern world through the Three Represents, which were discussed previously.167 Jiang’s
motivations were both personal and professional. Jiang needed to assert his power within
the CCP as he lacked revolutionary credentials.168
Differences between Taiwanese culture and Mainland Chinese culture were
heightened by the 1990s as the former became increasingly educated, middle class,
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Western-oriented, and democratic.169 It was apparent by the 1996 presidential elections
that Taiwan’s democracy was growing in strength, which was confirmed in the 2000
presidential elections with the defeat of the GMD. This deepened the political and
cultural disconnect between Taiwan and Mainland China as Taiwanese politicians and
people alike began to assert their self-determination rights.
Jiang embarked on several major policy initiatives to consolidate the CCP’s
position regarding Taiwan. Military operations in the Strait in the 1990s were indicative
of the CCP’s steadfast position regarding its sovereignty over Taiwan. Domestic
developments on Taiwan were enough to prompt this, but the increased attention the
United States paid to the Taiwan issue, and the passage of a United States aircraft carrier
in January of 1996 in the Taiwan Strait, increased the priority of enhancing the capacity
of the PLA to resolve the Taiwan question.170 The Politburo and PLA embraced
escalating military preparations in 1999 as Taiwanese politics became increasingly
opposed to reunification.171
Jiang’s Taiwan policy is known as Jiang’s “Eight Points.”172 These reiterated
Deng’s position of accepting the ‘One China’ principle as a pre-condition for peaceful
reunification.173 Any statement or action that violated this principle violated China’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty, which was viewed as unacceptable.174 Jiang claimed
that the Taiwanese government and individual Taiwanese could have ties with
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nongovernmental and cultural entities so long as those activities did not “expand its
living space internationally” or were “aimed at creating ‘Two Chinas’ or ‘One China,
One Taiwan.’”175 Jiang emphasized the necessity for Chinese patriots on both sides of the
Strait to oppose Taiwanese independence.176 Jiang purported that Chinese history both
supports the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic nation-state of China, and validates CCP
claims to Taiwan.177 These points are in line with the Patriotic Education campaigns
enacted by Jiang that were intended to resolve the crisis of confidence of the Chinese
people toward the CCP that was prevalent during the Deng era.
Jiang’s “Eight Points” shifted the dynamic of Cross-Strait relations from a
hierarchical to a more equal status between the two negotiating entities.178 However, they
were issued in March 1995 in an environment that had appeared more optimistic,
although somewhat strained, toward peaceful reunification.179 The “Eight Points”
embodied Jiang’s ideal image for Cross-Strait relations, but the policy was not his only
possible course of action. Events after March 1995, especially increased military
activities from 1996 to 1999, highlight the bottom-line of Jiang’s policy—specifically,
the CCP would not provide a guarantee of non-violent means.
Peaceful negotiation remained the preferred mode of interaction with Taiwanese
political parties, so long as negotiations were not used in an attempt to violate Chinese
territorial integrity.180 The CCP refused to make any guarantee not to employ force
against Taiwan. Peaceful means though economic integration and cooperation (by the end
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of the Jiang era the PRC would comprise approximately 42% of Taiwan’s outward
investment) remained the preferred method, but this approach coexisted with the
possibility of military intervention.181 According to Jiang, “the 21 million Taiwan people,
whether born there or in other provinces, are Chinese and our own flesh and blood,” and
the CCP was confident that they would be sensible, and desire to rejoin the Mainland.182
Finally, like Deng, Cross-Strait cultural exchanges were welcomed, but foreign influence
in affairs on either side of the Strait was condemned.183
The mid-1990s was a time of serious decline in Cross-Strait relations. Tensions
between Taiwan and the Mainland were increased by President Lee’s actions, especially
when the United States government approved a personal visa for President Lee Teng-hui
to visit America in June of 1995, an act that prompted the PRC to recall its ambassador to
the United States.184 The leadership of the PLA was furious with the actions of the United
States government, and demanded that Jiang, as the leader of the CCP, respond
appropriately.185 Jiang was unwilling to lose the support of the PLA, but did not want to
engage Taiwan militarily. Instead, Jiang approved a series of military drills and missile
launches to send a strong message to the international community.186
The missile tests in June of 1995, 85 miles north of Taiwan, and the war games
during August of that year, were warnings to the United States of the possible
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consequences of interference with Chinese domestic affairs.187 The far more aggressive
military acts of 1996, such as the missile tests close to Taiwan’s busiest ports and the
over 150,000 PLA troops participating in war games, were intended to warn the people of
Taiwan what would happen if Taiwan declared independence.188
Comments by President Lee Tenghui further agitated Jiang when Lee stated, in
1999, that relations between the Mainland and Taiwan should be one a “state-to-state”
basis, as the civil war was over and both were legitimately in control of the territories
they administered.189 Reunification, according to Lee, was still possible, but only if the
Mainland embarked on democratic reforms.190 The shift in rhetoric shocked the CCP,
PLA, the United States, the international community, and many Taiwanese, as many
high-level government officials were not informed of the change in rhetoric.191 The CCP
had already approved moving missiles toward Taiwan prior to the comments by Lee.192
Perceiving Lee’s comments as agitation, the CCP continued to pursue increasing its
military capabilities by testing a missile with the ability to reach the United States.193
Now, Lee was viewed as a separatist who sought to undermine the territorial integrity of
the PRC.
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This message was, as is frequently the case with Taiwan-Mainland affairs,
intended to warn the United States about the bottom-line of Beijing’s Taiwan policy and
what would happen if either party challenged this policy.194 The CCP was incensed by
the actions of the international community, especially the United States’ approval of
Lee’s visit to Cornell in 1995, causing CCP leadership to deem it necessary to send a
strong message regarding the consequences of international interference. The comments
by Lee, the Patriotic Education campaigns, and actions taken by the CCP, fed the
growing domestic nationalist sentiment of the 1990s, and validated the “us-versus-them”
attitude of Chinese citizens toward the international community, especially the United
States. The actions of the United States were a slight that struck at the core of Chinese
patriotism, and reminded them of the “century of humiliation” when foreign powers
divided the Chinese nation.
Overall, the 1990s was a period of decline in Taiwan-Mainland relations, as
mutual suspicion grew. The CCP reaffirmed its commitment to one-party rule, at the
same time that Taiwan’s democracy emerged. Jiang’s period of leadership altered Taiwan
relations, but the more conciliatory approach proffered by the “Eight Points” was negated
by Taiwan democracy and international events. While the CCP adamantly maintained
foreign influence would not be tolerated in Chinese affairs, it was the protection of the
United States over Taiwan that prevented the CCP from employing military force to
retake the island.
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Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
Hu Jintao inherited a Taiwan situation saturated with mutual distrust and
hostility.195 He had become heavily involved in Taiwan affairs in 1999, just as mutual
suspicion supplanted CCP-GMD compromise, and Lee Tenghui was depicted as an
adversary to the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait.196 Hu’s direct experience
working in Taiwan affairs was shaped in an environment of hostility and military
escalation prior to 2002.
Hu Jintao encountered a Taiwan whose central leadership was no longer under
GMD control. The election of the DPP’s Chen Shuibian served to only further deteriorate
already declining Cross-Strait relations, as Chen frequently antagonized the CCP much to
the disdain of the CCP and international community. The DPP, which initially gained
popular support as an anti-corruption party during the 1980s, had introduced proindependence language to their Party platform after both the events of Tiananmen in
1989 and the shift of the GMD to emphasize political reform. Chen failed to win a
majority of votes in the 2000 presidential election, but his victory was a result of a GMD
that was divided between the former Taiwan governor James Soong and vice-president
Lien Chan.197 While Chen Shui-bian had the most votes, he only had 39.3% of the vote
total.198 This did not assuage CCP concerns, as it still had to deal with a political party
that had Taiwanese independence as a part of its political platform.

195

You. Op. cit., 176. Bush. Op. cit., 17.
Shen. Op. cit., 1102-1103.
197
Copper, John F. The KMT Returns to Power: Elections in Taiwan 2008-2012. Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books. 2013. Print. 14.
198
Ibid.
196

49

Hu Jintao’s policy toward Taiwan formed during a period of intense hostility and
antagonism, which greatly influenced his “Four Points” regarding Taiwan. Hu announced
his “Four Points” at an advisory panel about the status of Taiwan in 2005.199 Hu
continued the position of Deng that the CCP must “never sway” from the One China
principle.200 Additionally, Hu maintained Jiang’s policy that both sides of the Strait must
adhere to the 1992 Consensus.201 Peaceful reunification remained the preferred method of
reconciliation.202 The CCP claimed it was committed to the principle and placed its hope
on the people of Taiwan for peaceful reunification.203 Hu took a hardline stance to never
compromise on opposing Taiwanese secessionist activities.204
The results of Taiwanese elections in the early Hu era disturbed the CCP,
especially since its own legitimacy, by this time, was inextricably (but not solely) linked
to Taiwan and a pro-independence political party had won. The Patriotic Education
campaigns of the Jiang era, implemented even in the distant Western provinces, had
instilled a sense of nationalism in the Han majority. If the CCP failed to prevent Taiwan’s
independence, it would be perceived as a betrayal to the Chinese nation by the party.
The DPP’s Chen was narrowly re-elected in 2004, much to the disdain of the
CCP. Chen’s re-election indicated, at the very least, a tolerance of Chen’s antagonistic
actions toward the Mainland. However, the 2004 election was not an overwhelming
victory for Chen Shui-bian. A very suspicious election-eve assassination attempt against

“Four-point Guidelines on Cross-Strait Relations set Forth by President Hu (full text)” Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council PRC. 4 March 2005. Electronic. Accessed 9 November 2014.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
199

50

Chen and Vice-President Annette Lu is credited with motivating voters who, due to high
levels of dissatisfaction with Chen, otherwise would not have voted.205
Hu responded by ordering the PLA to place war preparations as its top priority, as
Cross-Strait relations plummeted.206 Hu employed legal means as part of the CCP’s war
preparation efforts, culminating in the Anti-Secession Law of 2005. This legislation
adamantly maintained the government of the PRC will protect Chinese sovereignty and
territorial integrity by pursuing reunification as stipulated in the 1982 Constitution of the
PRC.207
Reunification by law became “the sacred duty of all Chinese people,” including
the residents of Taiwan, and established the One China principle as the framework for
reunification.208 While the Anti-Secession Law was part of the war preparation effort, it
also emphasized that post-reunification Taiwan would be able to practice its “own
systems,” as a SAR, and that the PRC still had faith in the people of Taiwan to ensure the
Taiwan question could be resolved through non-violent means.209 The law concludes by
asserting that the “exhaustion” of peaceful means is the only reason the PRC would use
forceful means. However, if violent measures were utilized it would be in a manner that
protected the residents and property of Taiwan.210
With the passage of the Anti-Secession Law by the National People’s Congress in
March of 2005 (2,896 in favor with 2 abstentions), CCP policy regarding the use of force
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in Taiwan was legally viable.211 This was still an effort on Hu’s part to prevent war, but it
was a warning to the international community, and to Taiwan, that preventing the island’s
independence now took priority over peaceful reunification.212 Unlike his predecessors,
Hu Jintao came the closest to employing a military solution since the policy shifts of
1979. The United States government also reaffirmed its commitment to defending
Taiwan, but this did not deter Hu from his war preparation efforts. If Taiwan broke away,
and the CCP did nothing, its legitimacy would have been destroyed.
It was not until 2008 that Cross-Strait relations began to improve and optimism
about the future returned with the election of GMD candidate Ma Ying-jeou, an antiindependence activist. As part of his campaign for the Taiwanese presidency, Ma pledged
to expand commercial contracts with the Mainland, increase the number of tourists to
Taiwan, and reduce restrictions on Mainland investments.213 Ma also advocated the
“three nos” of no unification, no independence, and no use of force.214
The CCP’s renewed optimism regarding the future of Mainland-Taiwan relations
was evident in Hu Jintao’s speech: “Let Us Join Hands to Promote the Peaceful
Development of Cross-Straits Relations and Strive with a United Resolve for the Great
Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” (31 December 2008).215 The GMD victory was
certainly the most promising event regarding Taiwan during Hu’s leadership, presenting
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Hu an opportunity to advocate for reunification under the “One China, Two systems”
solution, rather than violence, which had never been the preferred option.
The possibility for military conflict across the Strait began to diminish, even
though the CCP continued to enhance the military capacity of the PLA.216 In 2011, Ma
reaffirmed his commitment to the 1992 Consensus, which affirmed his prior statements
supporting the “One China” principle.217 Cooperative agreements between the Mainland
and Taiwan increased after the election of Ma, with 16 major agreements occurring from
2008 to 2012. The most significant of these agreements was the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement of 2010, which was signed in Taipei and increased Cross-Strait
trade, tourism and investments.218 In addition to increased economic cooperation, tourism
and personal visits across the Strait became simpler and more frequent as promised by
Ma during his 2008 presidential campaign.219 However, these addressed economic
matters, rather than the more challenging political and security matters.220
By the end of the Hu era, Cross-Strait relations had immensely improved. The
2012 election of President Ma, who was more conciliatory toward China, resulted in
increased economic cooperation. The government of Taiwan appeared willing to
negotiate with the CCP and increase economic interdependence. However, this decision
is not without critics as Taiwanese desired to remain outside the direct administration of
the CCP. President Ma determined that cooperation was the best way to maintain the
status quo. While greater economic cooperation and tourism occurred, political disputes
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and security matters were unresolved due, in part, to different understandings of the One
China principle.
Conclusions:
From 1949-2012, the CCP priority given to Taiwan was dynamic. Attitudes
toward Taiwan changed based on domestic and international concerns of the CCP in
addition to leadership changes. The graphic below summarizes changing CCP approaches
toward Taiwan.
Figure 2.2 Taiwan Self-determination Framework
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Of the four leaders, Mao prioritized Taiwan the least in regard to domestic
politics. His approach was non-engagement politically backed with military might, at
least periodically. For Mao, the Cold War took priority over domestic issues. Jiang and
Hu both heavily prioritized Taiwan internationally, but Jiang sought to avoid military
conflict more than Hu, who was preparing for it. Indeed, Jiang’s actions were in part
motivated by assuaging PLA leadership that he was not soft on the Taiwan issue,
although he never actually wanted to employ a military solution. Deng prioritized Taiwan
on a moderate scale because, unlike the other three leaders, he lacked urgency both to
54

take a hard-lined stance internationally and domestically. Deng’s approach was one of
amicability with a tendency toward negotiation. However, Taiwan remained a component
of the new Chinese nationalism under Deng and was never a low priority.
Neither Mao nor Deng faced a Taiwan with a legitimate separatist movement. For
Mao, it was because the GMD was dedicated to suppressing separatist sentiment on
Taiwan. For Deng, it was because the bitterness of the Mao era ended with the deaths of
Chiang Kaishek and Mao Zedong, creating new possibilities for negotiation. Jiang and
Hu both faced separatist threats as Taiwan’s democracy grew and political expression
became possible on the island. The pro-independence movements, which were stifled
under the authoritarian GMD system before the 1980s, had organized and actively
participated in Taiwanese politics by the start of the Jiang era. This posed a threat to the
CCP. This shift happened during the Jiang administration, which accounts for why
Jiang’s approach to Taiwan dramatically changed from amicable with a tendency toward
negotiation to hostile after 1995. The reverse occurred during the Hu administration,
which began on hostile terms and ended more amicably, with a tendency toward
negotiation.
Deng was the only leader to enjoy amicable relations with Taiwan throughout his
entire tenure as the paramount leader. The other three endured periods of nonengagement or outright hostility. During the Mao era this was due to the bitterness
between the GMD and CCP regarding the civil war. During the Jiang and Hu eras this
was due to the pro-independence movement on the island, as well as the refusal of the
CCP to renounce its willingness to use force. The display of military strength to influence
Taiwanese elections during the Jiang and Hu eras is the reason why they received a
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ranking of 4 as the CCP sought to control the election results through intimidation.
Professing to believe in the people of Taiwan while still threatening to use force was also
not well received by Taiwan. This also caused policy approaches under all leaders, except
Deng, to be characterized by periods of hostility and non-engagement to periods of
amicable optimism, and cooperativeness.
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Chapter Three: Inner Mongolia
Introduction:
Inner Mongolia, of the four cases examined, receives the least attention from both
the media and scholars. However, the region is important to the CCP as it comprises 12%
of the PRC’s landmass and possesses an abundance of natural resources including coal,
natural gas, and rare earth elements.221 The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR)
is a matter of national security for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as it borders the
Soviet Union and later Russia. Inner Mongolia also served as a testing ground for early
CCP minority nationality policies during the 1940s, which had a profound influence on
the creation and implementation of future autonomy policies throughout the PRC. Figure
3.1 below shows the position of Inner Mongolia in a map, accessed from the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), in light gray relative to other
Chinese provinces, as well as bordering countries.
Figure 3.1 Map of Inner Mongolia

Mongolians were already a minority
within Inner Mongolia prior to CCP rule (the
Han to Mongolian ratio was 4:1), but migration
increased the Han percentage of the IMAR’s
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population after the founding of the PRC.222 As of 2008, the Mongolian population of the
IMAR was 4 million, whereas the Han population was approximately 20 million
residents.223 The legitimacy of the CCP’s claim to Inner Mongolia is not strongly
contested by Mongolians, but ethnic tension and other causes of discontent with the
CCP’s authoritarian regime remain.
Internal Situation, 1902-1949:
The division of Mongolia into Inner and Outer Mongolia was an administrative
decision made by Qing Dynasty rulers during the seventeenth century.224 Inner Mongolia
was under the direct administration of the Qing, whereas Outer Mongolia was granted far
greater autonomy under military governors.225 Han Chinese already lived in Inner
Mongolia, but it was not until 1902, when the Qing officially lifted the migration ban,
that the Han population greatly increased.226 After the fall of the Qing Empire, Chinese
warlords and the Guomindang (GMD) facilitated Han migration efforts to ensure the
Chinese did not lose control as other international forces, such as Japan, sought to expand
their influence and territorial holdings in Inner Mongolia.227 The Mongolian population
was already declining in Inner Mongolia toward the end of the nineteenth century and
during the first half of the twentieth century due to plague, venereal disease, and overall
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public health problems, which the CCP ameliorated during the 1950s when it improved
the region’s health infrastructure.228
After the Qing Empire fell, some Inner Mongolians attempted to establish an
independent state or unite with Outer Mongolia, but they failed and were subjected to
warlord and foreign rule.229 Outer Mongolia, with the support of the Soviet Union, was
successful in creating an independent state, the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) in
1921, but remained under heavy Soviet patronage.230 The Soviet Union did not support
the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia, and, therefore, unification of the two
territories was not pursued. Consequently, Inner Mongolia was divided between Chinese
warlords and the Japanese.231 The Japanese Empire administered its colonial holdings
through a puppet government headed by the Mongolian nationalist Prince
Demchugdongrub (Prince De).232 Prince De and other Inner Mongolian independence
advocates never succeeded in achieving Inner Mongolian independence, nor did they
garner enough domestic or international support to join the MPR. Many Mongolians did
not desire to separate from China, as they had become Sinicized under Qing rule.233
Strong nationalist sentiment and self-determination movements were present
throughout Mongolia even if they did not result in significant Mongolian independence
movements.234 Mongolian political movements were shaped by Japanese, czarist Russian,
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Soviet, CCP, and GMD influences.235 Mongolian nationalist and self-determination
movements aligned themselves with external influences they deemed most likely to
guarantee their survival and least likely to exert pressure to assimilate. The Chinese, both
the GMD and CCP, desired to maintain the Qing borders of China. In fact, the GMD was
extremely assimilationist in its pursuit of territorial integrity, which alienated many
Mongolians.236 In response to attempts by Mongolians to access their self-determination
rights in 1928, the GMD divided Inner Mongolia into three provinces: Jehol, Chahar and
Suiyuan.237 The Inner Mongolian People’s Party formed in 1925 and eventually became a
close affiliate of the CCP.238 Citizens from both Mongolias received varying levels of
Soviet assistance and training, as the Mongolian communists traveled to the Soviet Union
during the 1920s.239
CCP policy regarded Mongolians as a weaker nationality in need of assistance
and called for cooperation in order to resist foreign imperialism and capitalism.240
Cooperation with Mongolians was also pursued by the CCP for its own survival during
the 1930s on the Long March to rebuild and mobilize support against the GMD.241 Given
the harsh treatment of Mongolians and the division of Inner Mongolia by the GMD, the
CCP was viewed as a better alternative for survival by many Mongolian activists.242
The Mongolians were perceived as one of the ethnic groups within China most
likely to cooperate with the CCP, for numerous reasons.243 Many Inner Mongolians were
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heavily Sinicized in comparison to the other ethnic minorities (such as Uyghurs,
Kazakhs, or Tibetans) due to living under Qing administration.244 Mongolians had prior
exposure to communist ideology before encountering the CCP, due to past participation
in Mongolian communist movements and training initiatives in the Soviet Union.245 The
CCP was instrumental in organizing resistance to the Japanese, and recruited heavily and
successfully among the Mongolians, especially after 1938.246 The CCP embarked on
numerous joint Han-Mongolian guerilla operations against the Japanese, in addition to
creating Mongol led guerilla forces.247 For these reasons, and because of the need to
maintain Chinese territorial integrity, Mao attempted to appeal to Mongolians who felt
alienated by emphasizing the CCP’s respect for minority differences.
Mao condemned the GMD’s 1928 division in his 1935 “Declaration to the Inner
Mongolian People,” which promised to restore the boundaries of Inner Mongolia and
guaranteed racial equality under a CCP administered state.248 This statement was part of
Mao’s strategy to garner minority support for the CCP against the Japanese and the
GMD. Mao expressed his support for Inner Mongolian autonomy, which the GMD
actively violated.249 Mao promised the Mongolian people equality under a CCP
administered Chinese state, but withheld the option for secession.250 This was the
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beginning of the CCP’s consolidation shift from self-determination, as understood by the
Soviet Union, to autonomy as its policy toward minority ethnicities.251
The CCP’s successful partnership with the Mongolians resulted in the founding of
the IMAR in 1947.252 Among the most influential minority nationality Party members
was Ulanhu (birth name Yun Ze), an ethnic Mongolian who was sent to Inner Mongolia
in the early 1940s to organize efforts against the GMD and the Japanese and foster
Mongolian support for the CCP.253 Ulanhu was born to a noble Mongolian family.254 He
was fluent in Mandarin and educated at the Mongolian-Tibetan school in Beijing during
the 1920s and later in the Soviet Union.255 He began to play an active role in CCP
minority affairs in the early 1940s.
In retrospect, many factors contributed to the success of Ulanhu and the CCP in
the IMAR. The MPR was not interested in unification with Inner Mongolia due to a lack
of Soviet support for the integration.256 The majority of Inner Mongolians did not support
GMD or Japanese rule, which created opportunities for CCP recruitment as the best
alternative.257 The CCP even enacted projects such as building a memorial to Chinggis
Khan (Genghis Khan) in 1939 as part of the CCP’s efforts to show that, unlike the GMD,
it celebrated Mongolians.258 Importantly, even though wooing the Mongolians was a high
priority, they were still a minority to the Han Chinese.
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Under Ulanhu’s leadership, the CCP passed a resolution extending autonomy
rights and racial equality to the people of Inner Mongolia in 1946, but, in line with Mao’s
1935 Declaration, it denied Inner Mongolians the right to secession.259 The following
year the IMAR was founded, and Ulanhu became the Secretary of the Inner Mongolian
CCP Work Committee, one of his numerous Party and state positions.260 The CCP
recruited a strong cohort of Mongolian CCP members and asserted its authority over the
IMAR even before the founding of the PRC.
When Inner Mongolia was “liberated” by the CCP, many Mongolians were soon
designated as members of the exploiting classes, including Mongolian communists.261
Ulanhu facilitated land reform measures in line with the CCP’s “Land Reform Law of
1947” in the IMAR from 1947 to 1948, which resulted in both inter-ethnic and intraMongol violence.262 However, these campaigns were designed so the majority of
violence and persecution was Mongolian against Mongolian in the CCP’s efforts to
redistribute land and eliminate feudalism.263
CCP central leadership became concerned with the level of violence and ended
the land reform campaigns. Mongolians who rebelled against CCP rule were brutally
repressed, as they were greatly outnumbered and poorly organized in comparison to the
CCP.264 The Northeast Bureau of the CCP issued self-criticisms in 1949 over the
handling of land reform in Inner Mongolia, resulting in more lenient policies for
Mongolian nationalities, especially in the pastoral areas.265 This leniency for the “special
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characteristics” of the minority nationalities advocated by Ulanhu was well received by
the central leadership and formed the basis of nationality policies after the founding of
the PRC.266
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
Mao Zedong’s policy toward Inner Mongolia drastically changed from his 1935
Declaration to the time of his death in 1976. The actions and policies of Mao regarding
the IMAR were heavily influenced by both domestic and international factors. The
existence of an independent Mongolian State was problematic for the CCP. As SinoSoviet relations deteriorated during the 1960s, the dual threat of an independent ethnic
Mongolian state and a Great Power adversary on PRC borders resulted in more
oppressive policies within the IMAR. The Mongolians, as a group, were of crucial
importance to the CCP because they were considered a model for other ethnic
communities, such as the Tibetans, whom the CCP did not want to alienate.267 Mao
justified this migration as “Opening Two Doors:” the Mongolians were to welcome the
Han in order to spur economic development and resource management, and the Han were
to support the promise of autonomy within the IMAR.268
The early 1950s was a time of relative tolerance for the minority nationalities by
the CCP’s central leadership. The CCP had trained Mongolian cadres during the early
1940s at the Nationality Institute in Yan’an, and employed them in the IMAR.269 After
the defeat of Japan in 1945, these cadres were critical in fighting the GMD in Inner
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Mongolia and bolstering Mongolian support for the CCP.270 Mongolians suspected either
of collaboration with the Japanese or of supporting the GMD were heavily persecuted by
the Party.271 Mao continued the pre-PRC policy of training minority cadres, and in
November 1949 he claimed it was the solution to the nationality question.272 However,
Han migration remained a critical component of Mao’s policy to develop the minority
areas and further the progress of communist revolution.273
The Common Program adopted by the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC) proclaimed all nationalities as equal, and consequently advocated
for their unity against imperialism as part of the PRC’s “fraternal and cooperative
family.”274 The CCP’s Common Program established the rights of the minority
nationalities to use and further develop their written and oral languages with state
assistance.275 After the founding of the PRC, the CCP employed a legislative framework
for promoting equality of the nationalities. The 1952 “General Program for the
Implementation of Regional Autonomy” and the 1954 Constitution of the PRC promoted
the equal rights of all nationalities and mandated proportional representation in the
legislature.276
The rhetoric of the Common Program appeared to promote equality and unity, but
it was assimilationist, as the “family” the CCP sought to create was determined by Han
Chinese cultural standards. The CCP encouraged and ordered Han cadres to minority

270

Bulag. Op. cit., 121-123.
Ibid.
272
Bulag. Op. cit., 126-127.
273
Sneath. Op. cit., 87.
274
Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-state by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford
CA: Stanford University Press. 2004. Print. 175.
275
Han. Op. cit, 32
276
Ibid.
271

65

regions to avoid “great Han Chauvinism” by learning and respecting the languages and
cultures of the minority nationalities.277 However, due to prejudices, language barriers,
and lack of capacity, the CCP failed to prevent Han notions of superiority and lost
patience for the “special characteristics” of minorities. The CCP, in spite of its
professions of equality and autonomy for minority nationalities, moderated the economic
policies in autonomous areas and insisted that Mandarin be taught.278
The CCP still delivered on some of its early promises to the Mongolians, most
notably the reunification of eastern and western Inner Mongolia, with the merger of
Suiyuan into the IMAR in 1954.279 Central leadership chastised CCP members who were
critical of the merger for contradicting the official autonomy policy.280 Ulanhu strongly
advocated for the reunification of Mongolian lands, and, as China’s Nationality Affairs
Commissioner, he exerted a strong influence on the central leadership.281 During the early
1950s Mao and the central leadership trusted Ulanhu and followed many of his
recommendations regarding the best manner to administer the IMAR. Due to the
influence of Ulanhu, Mongolians were often entitled to twice the amount of land that the
Han Chinese received, as more favorable standards were set to determine the class status
of the Mongolians.282 Class struggle, per Ulanhu’s recommendations, was not pursued in
pastoral areas.283
Consequently, throughout the 1950s, numerous Party members complained about
Ulanhu’s seemingly overly sympathetic position toward the Mongolians, and the rapid
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rise of Mongolians, mainly the Tumed Mongolians concentrated in Western Inner
Mongolia who were loyal to Ulanhu, in the party and government apparatus.284 Within
the IMAR, 3% of the Mongolian population were members of the CCP, whereas only
2.3% of the total population of the IMAR were party members.285 It was not until the
CCP became suspicious of Ulanhu that the central leadership began to more closely
monitor the situation in the IMAR. Many Mongolians were purged in the anti-local
nationalism campaigns beginning in 1957. The IMAR Communist Party purged half its
membership (mostly Mongolians), but many prominent Mongolians managed to retain
their positions within the government and the Party. 286 In 1960, four of the five Party
Secretaries and Deputies within the IMAR were ethnic Mongolians.287 The Ulanhu
faction was not solely Mongolian and he had many Han supporters who were necessary
for his success (since Mongolians were the minority). However, Ulanhu still made it a
point to place Mongolians in true positions of authority. While this was originally
supported by the central CCP leadership under Mao, as the 1950s progressed, and as the
Cultural Revolution began, this was used as evidence of Ulanhu’s disloyalty to the state.
The CCP claimed that the autonomy of all minorities had been achieved with the
success of the revolution, and the Party began to distance itself from the Common
Program’s more tolerant position in 1957.288 During Mao’s 100 Flowers campaign, all
Chinese were encouraged to voice their grievances with CCP policies and governance.
Mao believed that the policies implemented were successful and that criticism would be
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few, but once people were convinced to voice their grievances the volume of complaints
shocked and angered Mao. Mongolians, despite obtaining high levels of representation
within the Party and government, still were critical of the autonomy system. Mongolians
complained that Han cadres exhibited “Great Han Chauvinism.”289 The minority policy
of the CCP was paternalistic in its effort to help develop the “backward” minority areas
to “catch up” with the Han. Instead of ameliorating the existing problems voiced during
the 100 Flowers campaign, the CCP launched anti-rightist campaigns. In areas with large
minority populations, such as the IMAR, these campaigns were anti-local nationalism
campaigns, which heralded the beginning of the assimilationist period of the Mao era, as
the central leadership began to distrust the majority of minority Party members and
cadres, including Ulanhu.
Mao viewed Han migration as an important component of stabilization and
socialist revolution in the IMAR, even though the Han to Mongolian ratio was 4:1 by
1947 and 9:1 by 1960.290 As the more tolerant policies of the early 1950s waned,
migration efforts were more prominent in the CCP’s efforts to “civilize” non-Han
elements. One million Han Chinese arrived to the IMAR between 1958 and 1959
alone.291 The minority regions were not exempt from the policies of the Great Leap
Forward (GLF), and Mongolians were subjected to communization efforts of 1958 that
resulted in famine, suppression of religious expression, and violence.292

289

Sneath. Op. cit., 77.
Sneath. Op. cit., 88
291
Yihong Pan. “Revelations of the Grassland: the Han Sent Down Youths in Inner Mongolia in China’s
Cultural Revolution.” Asian Ethnicity. Vol. 7, No. 3. October 2006. PDF. 225.
292
Mackerras. Op. cit., 151
290

68

Ulanhu attempted to prevent communization of the IMAR’s pastoral lands, an act
that the central leaderships labelled “local nationalism.”293 Mao encouraged the plowing
of pastoral lands during the Great Leap Forward (GLF), and would again during the
Cultural Revolution.294 Ulanhu and other Mongolian Party members, as well as Han Party
members labeled too “sympathetic” to the Mongolians, were purged. Ulanhu was still too
powerful to be removed and retained his multiple positions within the CCP and the
IMAR. Class struggle, which had been avoided when Ulanhu was still trusted by the
center, was pursued beginning in 1960, and Mongolians were excluded from CCP
revolutionary organizations.295 During the 1960s and 1970s, Mao was at odds with the
minority cadres, who had been viewed as critical to socialist revolution and state
construction during the early 1950s.296
The GLF was a complete disaster throughout China. Ulanhu minimized some of
the negative impacts of the GLF in the IMAR, but his influence was weaker, especially in
the recently reunited Suiyuan portion of Inner Mongolia. Central leadership became
increasingly suspicious of Ulanhu’s motives after the mid-1950s and increased its efforts
to erode his power and influence. In 1960, against Ulanhu’s previous recommendations,
class struggle became the CCP’s main approach to resolving the nationality question in
the IMAR.297 In 1963 the party reversed the favorable class designations for Mongolians,
which resulted in significant persecution, especially of Tumed Mongolians who had been
favored by Ulanhu.298 During the late 1950s and 1960s, hostility toward Mongolians
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increased, but this was nothing compared to the mass ethnic persecution of the Cultural
Revolution beginning in 1966. The CCP was also concerned with the deteriorating
conditions in the Soviet Union and the possible appeal of the MPR to ethnic Mongolians,
and it accused the Soviet Union of colonial practices in the MPR in 1963.299 The
international situation was more important than ensuring harmony among Mongolians
and Han, the former of whom were increasingly suspected of disloyalty by Mao.
Mao’s Cultural Revolution policies were developed to ensure continuous
revolution and the creation of Mao’s ideal society, which required destroying the “Four
Olds:” thinking, culture, morality, and customs, and identifying counterrevolutionaries.300 This resulted in mass persecution of Mongolians, especially
Mongolian cadres and Buddhist lamas. Party officials, even if they were Han, that were
perceived as sympathetic to the minority nationalities were purged.301 Chinggis Khan was
denounced, and his mausoleum was smashed by Red Guards.302 Religion was also under
attack during the Cultural Revolution as the practice of Tibetan Buddhism was prohibited
and monasteries were destroyed and lamas were forced to return to lay life.303 Any
expression of Mongolian culture, especially religion, impeded the goals of Mao’s
Cultural Revolution, and was crushed.
Through CCP propaganda efforts, Ulanhu was denounced as the second Chinggis
Khan during the Cultural Revolution and accused of annexing Suiyuan Province in the
1950 as an attempt to rule his own fief.304 Ulanhu reacted to these attacks by reprinting
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Mao’s Declaration to the Inner Mongolians of 1935, which no longer reflected the CCP’s
policies or intentions.305 Mao and his supporters were incensed and the campaign against
Ulanhu intensified.306 Ulanhu would have made an ideal target for the Red Guards of the
Cultural Revolution even if he was not Mongolian. When the Cultural Revolution began
Ulanhu held numerous positions of authority: Chairman of the IMAR, Commander of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) garrison in the IMAR, General Secretary of the
Communist Party in the IMAR, and Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the
PRC.307 Similar to Ulanhu, many Mongolians that managed to maintain their positions
within the party and government during the GLF were persecuted by the Red Guards
during the Cultural Revolution.
In the IMAR, unresolved ethnic tensions between the Han Chinese and the
Mongolians, coupled with the bigoted opinions of the Red Guards toward Mongolians,
resulted in widespread ethnic violence during the Cultural Revolution.308 By the end of
the Cultural Revolution the IMAR received at least 200,000 Han “sent down youth” to
work on communes, or the army operated farms.309 Minority cadres were purged and
replaced by Maoists. Mao discarded Ulanhu’s previous policies that had shaped the
central discourse regarding nationalities.310
The IMAR leaders of the Cultural Revolution focused on the possible existence of
a Mongolian separatist movement, whose identity was still unknown during the early
months of the Cultural Revolution. Charges against Ulanhu increased and he was arrested
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in June of 1966 and sent to Beijing, while assaults and accusations against him continued
in the state controlled media.311 Ulanhu’s presence was not necessary for the CCP to
continue accusing him of acts against the state and using him as a scapegoat for issues
within the IMAR. It was not until after his arrest when the “Strike Down on Ulanhu”
statement was issued in 1967 in which the central leadership officially declared Ulanhu,
who was accused of privileging nationality over class, to be the leader of a Mongolian
separatist movement.312 After this, more direct attacks were launched against Ulanhu in
the state controlled media, accusing him of placing “grassland warlordism” over class
struggle.313 In July of 1968 the Revolutionary Committee of the IMAR (which consisted
of all Han Chinese members) identified the Inner Mongolian People’s Party, which had
been inactive since 1946, as the New Inner Mongolian People’s Party, or Neirandang.
The Revolutionary Committee then accused the organization of attempting to “sabotage”
the Chinese nation.314 Ulanhu was replaced with new leadership determined to identify
and punish splittists and counter-revolutionaries loyal to the Neirandang which, in
reality, had been inactive since 1946 when it was absorbed into the CCP.315
At the time of the Cultural Revolution, only 10% of the IMAR’s population was
Mongolian, and most were suspected of supporting the Neirandang.316 Those persecuted
during the purge from 1968-1969 were predominantly the Mongolian Party members and
cadres trained during the 1940s and 1950s.317 By 1969, Mongolians were mostly
eliminated from local government positions, 5,000 senior Mongolian cadres were purged,
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and all Mongolian PLA officers above the regimental level were removed.318 Portions of
the IMAR were incorporated into neighboring provinces in 1969 as the 1954 merger of
Suiyuan was designated as an attempt by Ulanhu to create a new Mongolian state.319 As
with the Land Reform campaign of 1947 and 1948, the level of violence became so
extreme that the central leadership was forced to intervene toward the latter half of
1969.320 The PLA put down a Mongolian revolt in 1969 and was given control of the
region until 1972.321 Substantial damage occurred as part of the anti-Neirandang purge.
Official figures released in 1979 identified that 16,222 people were killed, 346,000 were
labeled Neirandang members, over 120,000 injured, and 1,000,000 were affected by the
purges. Unofficial sources claim these figures are quite conservative and that the
casualties were far greater.322
Mao became less tolerant of minority characteristics as the CCP established its
authority throughout the PRC. While relying heavily upon the contributions of
Mongolian cadres and Party members to administer the IMAR, most notably Ulanhu,
minority status became a liability and cause for suspicion by the start of the GLF. Mao
sought to channel Mongolian self-determination sentiment into support for a unified
Chinese nation, with mixed results. By the start of the Cultural Revolution suppressing
minority cultures and religion was viewed as the best way to assimilate minority
nationalities.
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Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
When Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader of China in 1978, he
inherited a China alienated from the CCP due to the GLF and Cultural Revolution. In
Inner Mongolia Deng’s challenges included addressing environmental degradation,
especially of the pastoral lands, ethnic inequality, language policy, and political
repression. In the IMAR, where thousands of Mongolians were tortured, maimed, and
killed, the Cultural Revolution was especially devastating due to its ethnic character.323
Deng advocated for more lenient policies and autonomy for ethnic minorities through
legal procedures and economic development.324 While substantial legislative measures
were taken at the state level, no parallel measures were pursued within the party itself to
restore the levels of Mongolian representation to pre-Cultural Revolution levels.325 The
new constitution reflected the shift from communism to nationalism as the basis for CCP
legitimacy, but does nothing to remedy past grievances held by groups such as the
Mongolians. Deng was concerned about repairing the damage of the Cultural
Revolution, spurring economic development, and fostering national unity, but he was not
concerned with the rights of the Mongolians to self-determination.
Ulanhu became a major component of Deng’s administration during the early
1980s.326 Ulanhu had been rehabilitated in 1973 but remained in Beijing and never
returned to a position of power within the IMAR.327 He called for more realistic and
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effective minority nationality policies that encouraged cultural fusion, rather than
assimilation.328 Since this was a time when the Deng administration allowed criticism of
the Cultural Revolution, Ulanhu’s strongly worded views were not condemned. The CCP
condemned the anti-Neirandang campaigns of the Cultural Revolution, even though it
remained a sensitive issue. In addition to restoring some of the purged Mongolian cadres
to some positions of power, the IMAR was also restored in 1979.329 Ulanhu was not
allowed to hold any positions of power in the IMAR government, and no individual has
wielded the same level of power that Ulanhu did.330 The CCP ensured the position held
by Ulanhu at this height of regional power could no longer be held simultaneously, and
Han Chinese were selected for the position of IMAR Party Secretary.331
The CCP also made efforts to redress cultural attacks, specifically those on
Chinggis Khan during the Cultural Revolution, declaring him a Mongolian hero in 1980
and restoring the mausoleum that had been demolished during the Cultural Revolution.332
The Deng era allowed more religious expression in its early years, and by 1992
approximately 100 temples and monasteries had reopened and the number of lamas
increased by 5,000.333 The CCP even released official figures detailing the damage and
death that resulted from the Cultural Revolution, although it remained a sensitive topic
due to its ethnic character.
The 1982 Constitution and 1984 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy yielded
substantial changes in minority nationality policy that recognized more minority rights
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than the government legally had before. Less coercive measures were promised to all
minority nationalities as part of the 1984 Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy, with the
Constitution as a guiding framework for its implementation.334 Language rights were
guaranteed as part of the Constitution, but its language assumed minority languages were
already in use, and lacked a plan for implementing minority language usage alongside
Mandarin.335 The Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy was written to ensure national
unification and reinforce the control over the autonomous regions by the central
government, rather than to improve the human rights conditions of the Mongolians.336
Deng also implemented de-collectivization and privatization measures as part of
the sweeping economic reforms beginning in 1978.337 The 1980s began a period of rapid
economic development throughout the PRC, which extended to the IMAR. 338 Deng
furthered his agenda through the pursuit of what he designated the Four Modernizations:
industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense.339 This had the
desired impact of previous policies, assimilation of ethnic minorities into mainstream
society, by creating development programs that ultimately privileged Han Chinese
culture and language. By the end of the Deng era, these policies were still relatively
successful as living standards among the Mongolians overall were on the rise, albeit at a
slower pace than the Han Chinese.340 These measures were often at the expense of the
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traditional pastoral life practiced by a minority of Mongolians. Additionally, migration
remained a part of Deng’s approach to the region to ensure economic prosperity and
resolve population pressures.341
During the Deng era, the CCP denounced some of its past policies, such as the
GLF and Cultural Revolution, but focused the majority of blame for issues facing the
PRC on the GMD and the Qing Dynasty, especially for the environmental degradation of
the IMAR.342 Deng’s response was to begin reforestation efforts to remedy
desertification.343 In 1983, the first national Grassland Law was issued, which did ban
unsanctioned cultivation and encouraged reverting some farmland to grazing land.344
However, as with many PRC policies, it was neither properly implemented nor managed
and regional and local government and party officials ignored the law in order to attract
investment and business to the IMAR.345 These actions happened within the scope of the
regime’s intensive modernization and reform efforts, and as such, preservation of
traditional pastoral life was never a real priority.
The existence of an independent Mongolia was a source of hope for many
Mongolians during the Mao era, particularly during the Cultural Revolution.346 While
some Inner Mongolians romanticized the MPR, the feeling was not reciprocated by
Mongolians in the MPR.347 During the late 1980s, the CCP was cognizant of growing
nationalist and even pro-democracy movements in the bordering MPR, which motivated
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much of their suspicion regarding the loyalty of the Inner Mongolians within the IMAR
to the Chinese state, despite a lack of evidence of any significant separatist
inclinations.348 The ability of pro-democracy movements organized abroad to pose a
challenge to the CCP’s power in the IMAR was virtually nonexistent, but the CCP had no
way to be certain of this in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union
only heightened fears about the regime’s stability during the early 1990s. The Inner
Mongolian separatist movement was practically nonexistent and never posed a credible
threat, and its attempt to organize was suppressed with little incident due to its lack of
members and resources.349 The only significant self-determination protest by ethnic
Mongolians was in 1981 by Mongolian college students.
On 13 September 1981, over 3,000 Mongolian students marched to Hohhot, the
capital of IMAR.350 The students demanded increased and genuine autonomy for the
IMAR and protested the actions taken during the Cultural Revolution against
Mongolians, most notably the anti-Neirandang purge.351 During the fall of 1981, over
6,000 Mongolian college students protested, with student leaders taking their demands to
Beijing.352 The students demanded greater Mongolian representation in the government,
for the IMAR Party Secretary to be an ethnic Mongolian, an increase in Deng’s education
quota, a restriction of Han migration (in some cases Han deportation), and a return to the
livestock policies of Ulanhu during the 1950s.353 The central government was displeased
with the leniency the regional government and university showed to the students, and it
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replaced officials with more conservative leaders.354 The students were warned that any
future protests would result in punishment, and all future student protests were
repressed.355
While the international coverage of the pro-democracy protests of 1989 focused
on Beijing, there were simultaneous pro-democracy movements in the IMAR (although
these pro-democracy movements were not ethnically homogenous shows of support), but,
importantly, they did not advocate for Mongolian independence.356 Mongolians who
attempted to form independence organizations were arrested in 1991. Hence, a very small
pro-Inner Mongolian independence movement did exist, but its goals did not resonate
with the majority of Mongolians.357 Regional authorities quickly suppressed these
activists with little publicity, and the IMAR was firmly incorporated into China by 1991.
After the suppression of the protests in Tiananmen in 1989, Deng narrowed his
priority in governing to the following: “Stability overrides everything.”358 Factionalism,
which had always been a prominent feature of Mongolian political movements, was
exploited by the CCP, especially the division between the eastern and western IMAR.
From the Deng era onward the promotions tended to fluctuate between Mongolians in the
east and west in order to rotate and not allow one faction to gain too much power.359 With
the fall of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia began the process of democratization,
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holding its first democratic elections in 1990.360 This was a source of concern for the
CCP, but Outer Mongolia did not take significant steps toward democratization, such as
developing a constitution, until the beginning of the Jiang era.361 While it was
concerning, the CCP, through its migration efforts, had created such a large Han
population in the IMAR that it was less concerning in comparison to territories such as
Xinjiang and Tibet.
Deng Xiaoping relaxed previous Mao era policies in the IMAR during the
beginning of his administration. The region had such a large Han population that minority
separatism was not a major concern for Deng in the IMAR. However, Deng still expected
minority discontent to be suppressed as is evident by the replacement of regional leaders
for their failure to dismantle Mongolian protests during the early 1980s. While minority
discontent was not a threat to the CCP in the IMAR, Deng did not believe the CCP
should allow demonstrations that were critical of the autonomy system.
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
By the beginning of the Jiang era there were few if any Mongolian selfdetermination movements within the IMAR. The focus of unrest was generally limited to
economic concerns shared by Han Chinese and Mongolians. The CCP appeared to have
succeeded in subduing a region with a history of resistance to Chinese rule. The minority
regions, despite attempts by the CCP, lagged behind the Han dominated eastern region
economically, and ethnic tensions remained high and unresolved from the Cultural
Revolution. Jiang sought to build national unity through education, propaganda,
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migration, and economic development in the IMAR. Jiang focused on developing the
region’s resources, which negatively affected the small minority of Mongolian
pastoralists, as the Great Western Development strategy focused more on resource
extraction than empowering the region to manage its own resources.362
Jiang’s administration explicitly blamed pastoral and nomadic ways of life for the
rapid desertification and environmental degradation of the IMAR. In 1990, the Lanzhou
Department of Desert Research claimed rural peasants were responsible for 85% of
IMAR’s desertification.363 Four years later, Agenda 21 of the China State Council found
that desertification was a result of over-cultivation, over-grazing and destruction of
vegetation.364 In 2000, Xinhua quoted officials who blamed over cultivation for the
IMAR’s rapid desert expansion.365 According to the CCP, only through abandoning
traditional pastoral practices, and through pursuing economic development and
modernization, could environmental degradation be stopped. Grazing bans were pursued
during the 1990s, and, while Mongolians were relocated and given compensation, they
frequently found this compensation to be inadequate.366
According to Jiang, it was “the task of the Congress to mobilize all Party
comrades and the people of all nationalities to achieve still greater successes in building
socialism with Chinese characteristics.”367 In the reports he issued to three Party
Congresses Jiang referred to the national humiliation inflicted on the Chinese people by
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foreigners and the need for unity.368 However, these statements did not resonate with the
majority of Mongolians, whose most recent humiliation and betrayal was the fault of the
CCP. The reports make no effort to redress the wrongs of the party to the people, and as
such, did not address any of the historical grievances the Mongolians had with the Party.
Jiang pushed for increased access to, and a higher quality of, education to both
advance reform and impart uniform ideological and ethical standards throughout the
entire population.369 Education remained of utmost importance, as Jiang emphasized its
role in creating a society with shared ideals and ethical norms, which included supporting
a unified Chinese State.370 The Party began to emphasize the role of Ulanhu in 1992 as a
part of the Patriotic Education campaigns. While Ulanhu’s death in 1988 passed with
little notice or ceremony, by 1992 the CCP’s Propaganda Department approved the
creation of a mausoleum for Ulanhu as a Patriotic Education base.371
Jiang asserted that the frontier regions, which includes the IMAR, needed to be
opened to the rest of China and developed in order to access their vast natural
resources.372 This had enormous implications for the IMAR’s abundant natural resources
in addition to vulnerable pastoral lands. Due to its communist ideology, the CCP has
always viewed minority cultures and practices, especially nomadic cultures, as
impediments to development and modernization. Jiang referred to integrating the regional
economies with the rest of the Chinese nation, rather than allowing the regions to develop
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their own economies, which was promised in the Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy and
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.373 The Great Western Development
Program, introduced under Jiang in 1999, reinforced the practice of Han migration to the
periphery regions.374 This negated any opportunity at the regional level the IMAR could
have had to control its vast coal and other natural resources.
As with his predecessor, Jiang advocated for economically developing the
minority regions as a key component of the CCP’s attempt to use development to ensure
stability and regional security.375 The language of the report to the Sixteenth Congress
was far less dismissive of the gap between the regions in development and called for
coordinated regional development by explicitly stating that “implementation of the
strategy for the development of the western region bears on the overall situation of
national development, the ethnic unity and stability in the border areas.”376 He concluded
that while economic development was uneven, it was not problematic as the process of
development was a long and arduous process.377
Education increasingly became a component of fostering a shared sense of
national identity under Jiang Zemin’s Patriotic Education campaigns, which aimed at
transcending ethnic boundaries to create an ethnically diverse coalition of Chinese
support for the CCP.378 National unity is one of the three major themes of the Patriotic
Education campaigns, which also included territorial integrity and Chinese tradition and
history.379 While the IMAR and other autonomous regions were allowed to devise their
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own plans for implementing Patriotic Education, it remained subject to central
approval.380
The democratization of the former Soviet Republics was problematic for
communist authoritarian states struggling to claim legitimacy during the 1990s. The
democratization of Outer Mongolia and former Soviet Republics did not legitimately
threaten CCP control in the IMAR, although the IMAR Party Secretary still issued
warnings which asserted splittism was a threat to stability in the IMAR during the
1990s.381 The CCP attempted to incorporate Mongolians into the Chinese nation through
propaganda campaigns that celebrated Ulanhu in an unprecedented manner since his fall
from power during the Cultural Revolution. The Jiang administration also made efforts to
note successes in the minority regions. However, it failed to mention the role of Han
migration and the necessity of knowing Han languages and culture in order to succeed.
Additionally, emphasis was placed on the success that state aid had in fostering economic
development to reinforce the necessity of central government involvement.382
During the 1990s, the Inner Mongolian exile community actively advocated for
democracy in and independence of the IMAR, but they received little support. This was
still a cause of concern for the CCP, which witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union and the
founding of numerous new states from the former Soviet republics. The Southern
Mongolian Democracy Alliance, which works for the independence of Inner Mongolia
from China, was founded in 1995.383 The Inner Mongolian People’s Party, founded in
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1997 in New Jersey, represents Inner Mongolia at the UNPO and was founded in
response to the abuses perpetrated by the Chinese state against Mongolians.384 However,
increased contact with Mongolians outside of the IMAR served to dispel the notion of
pan-Mongolian unity rather than reinforce it.385 As a result, these movements did not gain
international support or momentum.
The lack of political support, coupled with higher levels of prosperity in the
IMAR relative to Mongolia, the disconnect between Mongolians across the border
reduced the majority of pan-Mongolian sentiment left from the Cultural Revolution.
Increased development efforts and migration further secured the status of the Mongolians
as a minority within the region, and they were perceived as less of a threat to the CCP.
The CCP also began efforts to strengthen military and economic ties with the democratic
Mongolia during the mid-1990s.386 By the end of the Jiang era, with the exception of the
herders, most Mongolians were assimilated into the Chinese state and accepted Chinese
rule.
Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
When Hu became the leader of the CCP, inequality between the Han majority and
minority ethnic groups was so vast that it had become cause for resentment and violent
incidents. Inequality and the impact of economic development fuelled discontent among
the Mongolians due to discriminatory hiring practices and the suppression of traditional
pastoral life. Appearances of a united China were of the utmost importance to the Hu
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Jintao regime. The nearly relentless pursuit of economic growth and development also
created an environmental crisis that threatened the livelihood of nomadic groups, such as
Inner Mongolian herders. By 2002, the expansion of the desert impacted the livelihoods
of over 400 million people throughout China, especially in areas such as the IMAR.387
The former MPR had also emerged as a successful democracy by the time of the Hu era,
but it was far less developed economically and its potential appeal to Inner Mongolians
was less of a concern to Hu than it was to Jiang. This prompted actions such as visiting
herders in the IMAR early in Hu’s career.388
With the exception of a small minority of Mongolian herders, the CCP’s policies
were largely successful at incorporating Mongolians into the modern Chinese state. In
2006 the National Language Commission discovered that 71.38% of Mongolians
surveyed spoke Mandarin.389 Mongolian parents recognized Mandarin language abilities,
and superior education created a greater likelihood of success and parents elected to send
their children to Mandarin schools.390 By the Hu era it was common for young urban
Mongolians to have no knowledge of the Mongolian language.391
Hu reaffirmed the CCP’s commitment to a unified multi-ethnic state through what
he called “Thoroughly Applying the Scientific Outlook on Development” in addition to
expanding the Patriotic Education campaign.392 Unlike prior leaders before him, Hu
explicitly mentioned the need to “attach greater importance to training and selecting
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officials among ethnic minorities, and encouraged young officials to work and gain
experience in local communities and in hardship areas.”393 Hu called for the promotion of
“social harmony” and stressed the necessity to balance development and stability.394 The
CCP understood the severity of the unintended consequences of rapid economic growth,
which prompted actions such as visiting herders in the IMAR early in Hu’s career.395
Hu strongly emphasized the need to engage in development scientifically and that
“progress should be made in building a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly
society.”396 This was a cause for concern for Mongolian herders, pastoralism and
nomadic ways of life were blamed for the IMAR’s environmental degradation. Pursuing
modernization through economic development was the solution the CCP pursued,
compared to preserving traditional Mongolian ways of life. He also recommended the
continued implementation of the “master strategy for regional development and fully
leverage the comparative advantages of different regions” through “support of the eastern
region in taking the lead in development” and called for an increase in support for ethnic
minority areas.397 This indicates that Hu did not prioritize meaningful engagement with
the Mongolians concerning economic and environmental matters.
Hu focused on the need for education in his reports to the National Party
Congresses. He recommended that the Party “extend and standardize the use of Chinese
language and should promote the development and flourishing of cultural activities of
ethnic minorities.”398 However, the CCP has pursued the former at the expense of the
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latter. Hu also called for specific attention to the autonomous areas and poverty stricken
regions to ensure education. Hu advocated that the party “should vigorously promote
fairness in education, and ensure balanced allocation of educational resources with a
focus on rural, remote, poor and ethnic minority areas.”399 This position on education
resulted in the continued reduction in using the Mongolian language in the IMAR, and
the necessity of learning Mandarin to succeed.
Hu’s main concern related to Inner Mongolia was accessing its vast resources,
which in the view of the CCP, justified Han migration.400 In the White Paper “Regional
Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China” the rapid rate of urbanization in minority
areas, specifically the IMAR, was depicted as a positive event.401 What it did not mention
was that the pastoral communities were resistant to being relocated, and they found state
compensation to be inadequate. Nor was the state providing appropriate skills training for
relocated pastoralists.
Hu highlighted the CCP’s long and mutually beneficial relationship with
Mongolians by referring to joint Mongol-Han missions to combat the Japanese during the
1930s and 1940s, measures in 1987 that made pastoralists eligible for state assistance,
and the 2005 abolition of taxes on agriculture and animal husbandry as evidence the CCP
represented Mongolian interests.402 In addition to assistance offered to pastoralists, the
high level of economic growth in the IMAR is also mentioned, as the province ranked top
in the country for seven consecutive years, but the CCP failed to mention how uneven
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across ethnic groups this success has been.403 The Mongolians were still the example the
CCP tried to use to other minority groups about a successful partnership with the CCP,
even though they remained a group of great concern.
In 2011, large protests focused on self-determination occurred within the IMAR
for the first time since the student protests in 1981. The majority of these protests were
not separatist in nature, but they were ethnically Mongolian protestors and the CCP
viewed them as splittists. Students protested the treatment of herders after the handling by
Chinese authorities of the death of a herder named Mergen, who was killed in a dispute
with a mining company.404 While IMAR party officials promised justice and arrests were
made in response to the death, police were deployed to end the demonstrations in the
capital of Hohhot.405 This was also coupled with a promise to meet student needs for
Mongolians, such as free tuition and textbooks, and general concerns such as improved
drinking water and agriculture.406 The Hu regime demonstrated a willingness to work
with Mongolians, especially students, to appease certain grievances in regard to
environmental and other issues.
The democratic Mongolian state posed no threat to the territorial integrity of the
PRC. During the Hu era, democratic Mongolia consistently ranked as a “Free” country on
the basis of civil liberties and political rights, but struggled economically. This was a
minimal cause of concern as it contradicted the CCP’s position that democracy was not
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an eastern value.407 However, the CCP sought to minimize the influence of the
democratic Mongolian state in order to maintain its façade of national unity. The CCP
created a state of economic dependence to ensure that the state of Mongolia would
capitulate to its demands. The PRC government exercises heavy influence over
Mongolian trade through the Port of Tianjin.408 By 2010, 51% of foreign direct
investment into Mongolia was Chinese in origin.409 In 2011 the PRC received 91% of
Mongolian exports.410 In addition to exerting an enormous level of influence, if not
outright control over the Mongolian economy, the PRC entered into military partnerships
with the democratic Mongolia during the Hu era.411 By creating such close ties with
democratic Mongolia the Hu regime eliminated any potential threat it could have posed
to the territorial integrity of the PRC.
Under the Hu administration, environmental policy continued to posit blame for
the IMAR’s pollution and land degradation on the past and on the Mongolians. Using
environmental conservation as justification, Hu continued to use migration to stabilize the
region, relocating thousands of nomadic Mongolian herders.412 Coal and other resources
continued to be extracted from the region despite the abuses by companies against the
people and the lands. Hu advocated for western China to be the foundation of Chinese
energy programs in 2010, showing little indication that Hu was committed to reducing
resource extraction or pollution if it could hinder economic development in any way. 413
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Hu Jintao did not have serious concerns about the ability of Mongolians to oppose
the Chinese state. By the start of his administration Mongolians were an absolute
minority. The majority of Mongolians had been integrated into the Chinese state, with
herding communities being the major exception. The focus of the Hu administration was
to continue dismantling herding communities using environmental degradation and the
pursuit of economic development as justifications.
Conclusions:
Figure 3.2 summarizes the self-determination status and autonomy policies of
each of the four leaders examined in this chapter:
Figure 3.2 IMAR Self-determination Framework
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During the twentieth century, Mongolians exhibited a strong sense of nation and a
strong sentiment for national self-determination and nationalism. However, it is a mistake
to equate this with a desire for greater self-determination, or independence, from the
PRC. While some Mongolians may want independence, most realize it is unrealistic and
instead seek genuine autonomy, racial equality, or to accept the status quo. Despite the
Inner Mongolians’ strong sense of nation they lacked the backing of the Soviet Union.
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This, coupled with Mongolians’ divided political affiliations, prevented Inner
Mongolians from developing a self-determination movement strong enough to establish
an independent state.
The IMAR was a high priority for Mao. For him, it was critical in the founding of
the PRC and development of CCP nationalities policies, in addition to Mongolians being
considered a model for the other minority nationalities. This view of many Mongolians
was consistent throughout the administrations of the next three generations of CCP
leaders. This is why the IMAR was never a low domestic priority for any of the four
leaders.
Mao was also concerned about the Soviet Union and the MPR, especially during
the 1960s as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated. Jiang was concerned more about the
aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the democratization of former Soviet Republics
and the MPR. However, over the course of the Jiang era it became apparent that there
was no significant pan-Mongolian movement and the greater level of economic success
in the IMAR reduced the CCP’s concern about pan-Mongolian movements by the start of
the Hu administration. It was still of some concern to Deng, as Mongolians isolated from
Mongolia idealized the independent Mongolian state, but once China opened up and it
became clear this view was not reciprocated, this concern became less prominent. The
slower pace of economic development in Mongolia also made its democratization more
of an irritation to the CCP than a genuine concern by the start of the Hu regime. While
Mongolians do have grievances about economic development favoring the Han, it is
apparent that the IMAR is ahead of Mongolia economically.
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Many Mongolians have consistently had a strong sense of national identity
throughout the PRC’s history. The strength of corresponding self-determination
movements, however, has been lacking. The strongest period of Mongolian selfdetermination movements was the first half of the twentieth century, and even then there
was never a successful pan-Mongolian movement. Mongolians were too small and
divided a population to challenge China, let alone the Soviet Union or Japan at the same
time. Since the Mao era, self-determination movements have either been absorbed into
the CCP or suppressed. Occasional self-determination protests have occurred, but the
majority of Mongolian concerns mirror those of the Han majority. The urban Mongolian
population increased beginning in the 1980s and many were assimilated into the majority
and did not necessarily view the Han Chinese as their enemies. The remaining challenge
is the small minority of Mongolian herders.
The Cultural Revolution was the worst period of self-determination rights for the
Mongolians under the PRC. The CCP has yet to recover to pre-GLF levels of selfdetermination for the Mongolians. This is mainly due to the CCP’s treatment of a
minority of Mongolians, the pastoral herders. The CCP has shown it is willing to work
with student populations and meet the needs of more urban Mongolians, but the
economic and political self-determination rights of pastoral herders are consistently
violated. Legislation under Deng attempted to remedy some of the issues concerning
pastoral herders, but they were never a high enough priority for the CCP to implement or
monitor successfully. Incorporating Mongolians into the PRC challenged the four
generations of leaders because of political, economic and cultural divisions among
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Mongolians. The CCP was still successful incorporating the majority of Mongolians into
the Chinese state by the end of the Hu era with the exception of Mongolian herders.
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Chapter Four: Xinjiang
Introduction:
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established on the 1st of
October in 1955 by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).414 Prior to this, the region was
designated by the Qing leaders as the province of Xinjiang in 1884, and for centuries it
had been known by other names including Turkestan, Chinese Turkestan, etc.415
However, only the Chinese referred to the territory by its Chinese name Xinjiang before
1949.416 By the twenty-first century all but the members of pro-independence
organizations call it Xinjiang, whereas the latter refer to it as East Turkestan or
Uyghurstan depending on their goals.
Qing leaders pursued efforts to control Xinjiang after they first conquered it in
1759. Chinese governments faced enormous administrative challenges in Xinjiang due to
its enormous size and numerous ethnic groups.417 Xinjiang was where Qing courts
banished criminals, which was a punishment second only to execution in severity.418
Many of the region’s Muslims felt the Qing threatened Islam and rebelled against
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imperial rule several times throughout the 1800s.419 The most notable of these rebellions
was the Yakub Beg Rebellion (1864-1877), which resulted in an independent state until
the Qing defeated it.420 After the fall of the Qing in 1911 Chinese warlords, whose
corruption and human rights abuses caused violent uprisings and independence
movements, controlled Xinjiang.421 Once the CCP defeated the Guomindang (GMD), the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “peacefully liberated” Xinjiang in late October of
1949.422
Xinjiang comprises one-sixth of China’s landmass and is an important source of
natural resources, including oil, natural gas, coal, water, and minerals.423 The name
Xinjiang means “new territory,” and Xinjiang is a major security priority for the CCP
because it is the location of Lop Nor, which is a weapons testing site. Xinjiang also
borders several Central Asian countries and Russia.424
Figure 4.1 Map of Xinjiang

Its most pressing border concern was the Soviet
Union (until its fall in 1991). Figure 4.1 is an
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organization (UNPO) map of Xinjiang, which
the UNPO refers to as East Turkestan.
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The Uyghurs are the most populous and well known ethnic group in Xinjiang.
According to the 2000 Chinese census they constituted the fifth largest minority
nationality at 8.3 million.425 The modern Uyghur identity is a relatively new development
and is an amalgamation of various Islamic Turkic oases groups.426 The early twentieth
century was a time of identity building, not just through CCP and Soviet Union measures,
but also by the Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other residents of Xinjiang in resistance to foreign
forces. It was through Soviet efforts that the term Uyghur was identified in 1921 and used
in nationality building enterprises in Xinjiang.427
The term Uyghur, until it was revived in the twentieth century, had not been used
since the fifteenth century when it distinguished Turkic Buddhists (Uyghurs) from Turkic
Muslims.428 As the Uyghurs began to convert to Islam starting in the ninth century, and
completely by the fifteenth century, the term Uyghur was no longer used until Soviet
minority nationality policy-makers decided to use it in 1921.429 Today the majority of
Uyghurs are Sunni Muslims.430 Some Uyghurs practice Sufi Islam, and due to Sufi
influences in the region even Uyghur Sunni Islam has Sufi characteristics.431 In addition
to incorporating aspects of Sufism into mainstream Uygur Islam, it retained
characteristics of traditional Uyghur religious practices.432
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Internal Situation, 1911-1949:
After the fall of the Qing, Governor Yang Zexin managed to retain control over
Xinjiang until 1928.433 Yang ruled by ensuring the population remained divided against
each other through exacerbating regional, religious, linguistic, and other differences in
order to prevent organized resistance to his rule.434 Each warlord after Yang continued
oppressive policies to maintain control of Xinjiang and consolidate their own personal
power. It was in this environment that Uyghur nationalism developed throughout
Xinjiang as a response to hostile Soviet and Chinese forces that violated rights to
religious expression, association, and speech. Uyghur nationalist and other Pan-Turki
movements were not representative of all Xinjiang residents, let alone the Uyghurs, nor
did they resolve differences among the diverse communities.435
Jin Shuren gained control of Xinjiang after Yang’s death and expanded his control
of Xinjiang through incentivized Han migration.436 Jin forbid Muslims from going on the
hajj, restricted mobility, censored media, and exempted Han Chinese from taxes.437 Jin
was overthrown in 1933, and Sheng Shicai became Xinjiang’s military governor.438
Sheng continued Soviet nationalities policies during the 1930s and 1940s.439 This served
to strengthen Uyghur identity as it was accepted and promoted by the state, but also
because the Uyghurs united against what they believed to be anti-Islamic foreign
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influences.440 Indeed, Xinjiang operated as a Soviet satellite for the majority of Sheng’s
leadership, until he unsuccessfully sided with the GMD in 1942 and lost power.441 Sheng
was considered less oppressive than Jin, but he still initiated measures that alienated
many Islamic communities in Xinjiang. Nationalist movements and nation-building
enterprises were pursued by residents of Xinjiang in opposition to Chinese and Soviet
forces.
The first Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan was established in a
rebellion in southern Xinjiang, but it only existed for a few months before it was soundly
defeated in 1934.442 It was considered an “Islamic” government, but how strictly it
actually adhered to Islamic law and practices is debated among contemporary scholars. 443
The Ili rebellion resulted in the establishment of the secular East Turkestan Republic
(ETR) in November of 1944.444 The ETR entered into a peace agreement with the GMD
in 1946 to create a coalition government, but neither side was sincere in adhering to its
terms and the GMD proved more divisive in the areas it controlled.445 However, the
influence of the GMD in Xinjiang was weak. The ETR ended shortly after the CCP’s
victory in the Civil War, when the plane carrying prominent ETR leaders flying to
Beijing to negotiate for the continued existence of the ETR crashed.446 Some claim that
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this was an assassination orchestrated either by Mao Zedong or Josef Stalin (the Soviet
Union supported the CCP’s takeover of Xinjiang), although it has never been proven.447
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
The CCP’s concerns about incorporating the Uyghurs and other Muslim groups
into the Chinese state were justified. The Uyghurs, due to prior interactions with the
Soviet Union and Chinese governments, were among the ethnic minority groups most
likely to oppose the CCP due, in part, to Islamic beliefs and culture.448 Additionally, the
regional governors had been hostile toward communists, which prevented the CCP from
establishing a strong base in Xinjiang. The solution advocated by Mao to incorporate
Xinjiang was to use the PLA to ensure regional stability, develop its resources, and
prevent secessionist activities. The PLA First Field Army “peacefully liberated” Xinjiang
and began to implement the Party’s plan to garner support from its population and secure
the region from internal and external threats.449
During the early 1950s, the CCP, despite relying on the military, was still cautious
about alienating the Uyghurs, many of whom harbored strong anti-Han sentiments due to
decades of abuse under Chinese warlord rule. Additionally, the Uyghurs, whose strong
Islamic identity predated their Uyghur identity, harbored suspicion of communist
antagonism toward religion. While the CCP warned its members and cadres sent to
Xinjiang to avoid “Great Han Chauvinism,” it constantly emphasized the need to correct
the “backward” nature of the minority nationalities. The Party’s policies were
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contradictory and, at their core, asserted Han superiority.450 Despite this, the early
policies were still cautious as they attempted to recruit popular support and co-opt the
region’s elites, but the primary goal was to firmly establish communist rule and
consolidate CCP power.451 Indeed, as the CCP began to consolidate its power toward the
mid-1950s minority representation declined.452 Mao’s early focus was to recruit locals
loyal to the CCP, but he still prioritized consolidating CCP power over ensuring local
representation.
Facilitating Han migration into Xinjiang was a key component of Mao’s strategy
to stabilize the region and develop its economy.453 The CCP almost immediately began
operations to exploit Xinjiang for natural resources such as oil, coal, water, timber, and
minerals.454 The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) was the primary
institution that facilitated migration and economic development projects, and it remains
an active force in development and Han resettlement that the CCP employs. The XPCC
was established in 1954 from the Xinjiang Wilderness Reclamation Army, which had
successfully established Xinjiang’s first farm collectives, facilitated land reform, and
established new state farms.455 By the end of 1954, it had 200,000 members, eight
agricultural divisions, two industrial construction divisions, and one irrigation division.456
The XPCC incorporated members of the ETR’s military, but it was a majority Han
institution.457

Dreyer, June. “China’s Minority Nationalities in the Cultural Revolution.” The China Quarterly. No. 35.
1968. PDF. 98.
451
Clarke. Op. cit., 43.
452
Clarke. Op. cit., 50.
453
McMillen. Op. cit., 65-66.
454
McMillen. Op. cit., 7-8.
455
Clarke. Op. Cit., 46.
456
Clarke. Op. Cit., 46.
457
Ibid.
450

101

The CCP was cautious to slowly co-opt the power of Xinjiang’s Islamic officials
through the China Islamic Association centered in Beijing and the Xinjiang Islamic
Association.458 The Uyghurs are one of many Islamic minorities present within Xinjiang.
The CCP faced an immense challenge as Xinjiang residents were not represented in the
early Party elite during the 1940s.459 They attempted to co-opt local elites, but if any
elites opposed CCP measures, they were suppressed by the military.460 The CCP
recruited former GMD officials, Uyghurs, and the other minorities from different class
backgrounds, but as the CCP became more established in Xinjiang through PLA and
XPCC efforts, it began to evaluate potential cadre and Party Members more closely.461
The initial surge in minority representation declined in the mid-1950s. Including religious
elites was, for the most part, a temporary strategy for Mao, who, true to communist
ideology, regarded religion as superstition.
The most notable Uyghur official from this era was Saifudin who had been
trained in Moscow and served as the Minister of Education in the ETR.462 He quickly
joined the CCP and was a major asset for the Party, due to his prior experience in the
Soviet Union and his willingness to submit to CCP authority.463 Saifudin held positions
within the XUAR government and the CCP, but it was ultimately Wang Enmao who
controlled the military and held true authority.464 Wang, with the approval of central
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leadership, suppressed 7,500 former GMD members, ethnic counter revolutionaries, and
other “bandits” from November of 1950 to May of 1951.465
The expanded influence of the PLA and the XPCC, coupled with the decline in
Sino-Soviet relations, resulted in the CCP becoming less tolerant of the Uyghurs’
“special characteristics.” The CCP was aggravated by complaints from the Uyghurs about
the lack of true autonomy in Xinjiang, Han Chauvinism, and Han migration during the
100 Flowers Campaign.466 Indeed, minority representation already declined from 74% in
1951 to 55% by the end of 1955.467 However, the central leadership, especially Mao, was
still angered by the criticisms and began to openly pursue more assimilationist policies.
The XUAR was founded in October of 1955. In order to reduce the influence of
the Uyghurs, but still satisfy the autonomy requirements for the other ethnic groups, the
CCP divided over 50% of Xinjiang into smaller autonomous units.468 This certainly
appealed to some of the minority ethnic groups, while also serving the CCP’s desire to
reduce the influence of the Uyghurs.469 These divisions indicate that, even in the early
1950s, policies to empower Uyghurs and other minority groups were only pursued to
consolidate CCP power, and genuine attempts to access self-determination were subject
to suppression if they did not align with CCP goals.
Anti-local nationalism campaigns of 1957 focused heavily on reducing the power
and influence of the Islamic religious establishment.470 The GLF escalated the CCP’s
overt attacks on Islam with the closure of mosques and interference with Islamic dietary
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practices due to the establishment of People’s Communes.471 The majority of government
members who were criticized or removed during the GLF were ethnic minorities.472
Uyghurs and Kazakhs, who had proven more resistant to CCP rule, were targeted more
than other ethnic minority groups in campaigns that continued in the GLF.473 The
increased repression of 1957 and the implementation of the GLF resulted in numerous
uprisings, which were suppressed as dangerous acts of local-nationalism.474
The massive failure of the GLF and Mao’s reduced authority within the central
government marked the return of the Party to more moderate policies in 1961, until the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.475 By 1965, minority cadres again
comprised 55.8% of Xinjiang’s cadres, but Han CCP members still monopolized
positions of authority, as evident by the fact there was only one Uyghur Deputy Secretary
out of the six available positions.476 Both the famine that resulted from the GLF and the
persecution of minority beliefs and culture caused over 60,000 Uyghurs and Kazakhs to
flee to the Soviet Union in 1962.477 In addition to large numbers of refugees fleeing to the
Soviet Union, revolts occurred in 1958, which were crushed by the PLA.478 For Mao, a
refugee fleeing to the Soviet Union was unacceptable, as Sino-Soviet relations had
deteriorated. Securing the border and preserving the image of unity were high priorities
for the CCP.
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The CCP was both concerned by and angered with the Soviet Union and purged
minority leaders with Soviet backgrounds and issued anti-Soviet propaganda. However,
Saifudin managed to survive these purges. The Soviet Union began its own campaigns to
appeal to non-Han ethnic groups in Xinjiang about the superior quality of life available to
them in the Soviet Union.479 In response, the CCP closed the border between the Soviet
Union and the XUAR and increased their military presence by moving 200,000 troops
toward the border with the Soviet Union in May of 1962.480
The Cultural Revolution in the XUAR began in August of 1966 as Mao’s Red
Guards sought to eliminate the “Four Olds” of thinking, culture, morality, and customs.481
Attacks on Islam were prevalent, as religion was regarded as superstition. While the
Cultural Revolution resulted in increased ethnic discrimination (especially for those with
Soviet backgrounds), it was primarily a struggle between the Maoists centered in Beijing
and Xinjiang’s power holders, such as Wang Enmao.482 However, minority
representation still decreased by 25% from 1965 to 1975.483 Due to its substantial
resources and the location of Lop Nor, the CCP could never afford to lose control of the
XUAR as it did in other areas of China during the Cultural Revolution. This could be
why the region, although it suffered, did not suffer to the extent of regions such as the
IMAR. Wang was still demoted to Vice Chairman of the new Revolutionary Committee,
and he was removed from Xinjiang in 1969.484
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The XPCC, with approximately 500,000 to 600,000 members by the start of the
Cultural Revolution, became divided between sent-down-youth factions and older
military veteran factions.485 At least 100,000 of the sent-down youth were incorporated
into the XPCC.486 The factionalism of the Cultural Revolution remained unresolved in
the XPCC during the 1970s. The CCP placed control of XPCC operated enterprises under
Party and civilian control.487 Ultimately, the XPCC was disbanded in 1975 as part of the
CCP’s efforts to eliminate radical Maoists from positions of power in the XUAR.488
As late as 1970, intellectuals from the minority nationalities were still subjected to
mass struggle sessions and criticisms.489 Wearing traditional Uyghur dress and hairstyles
resulted in attacks from the Red Guards.490 Mosques were destroyed, Islamic leaders
were forced to raise pigs, and Muslims were forced to work on holidays.491 The violence
escalated to the point where, as Wang Enmao warned, it threatened to destabilize the
region, which caused the central leadership to intervene to stop the Cultural
Revolution.492 The XUAR was too important to allow continued unrest in it, due to
tensions with the Soviet Union, natural resources, and Lop Nor. The central leadership
recognized this, and while the focus was on stability, minority repression was still
rampant.
After the fall of former CCP leader Lin Biao efforts were made to return the
region to its pre-1966 policies, and by August of 1973 the majority of the policies under
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Wang were restored.493 Wang was not returned to power, but Saifudin, who had proven
to be loyal but not too powerful, became First Party Secretary.494 However, the central
leadership diluted the power of Saifudin by creating Second and Third Party Secretaries,
which was unique to Xinjiang. The CCP pursued a policy of collective rule until 1977,
when Saifudin was removed from power for his affiliation with the Gang of Four.495
Xinjiang was critical to the CCP, which was testing weapons at Lop Nor throughout the
1970s, and ensuring regional stability there through a combination of the PLA’s military
presence and shared powers in governing was implemented until the end of the Mao
era.496
Mao highly prioritized Xinjiang both domestically and internationally. The CCP
presence in Xinjiang was minimal, and the religion and culture were dramatically
different from eastern China. Mao sought to establish control over Xinjiang and reduce
the influence of the Soviet Union, which had been greater than Chinese influence during
the first half of the twentieth century. He appealed to minority elites to join the CCP, but
as the Party became more established in the region, the loyalty of minority cadres was
questioned and many were purged. Mao sought to incorporate minority elites, but only if
they strictly adhered to Party rules. This was a temporary measure until more Han
Chinese were transferred to the region.
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Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
Deng’s comments regarding Tibet and Taiwan received more international
attention, but he was still concerned about the status of Xinjiang, as was evident by his
visit to the region in 1981.497 While Deng pursued a more tolerant action plan for
addressing the situation of minority nationalities compared to Mao, the return of Wang
Enmao to the position of Regional Party Secretary in 1981 indicated that the CCP still
considered military solutions to be suitable for Xinjiang.498 Deng reopened the border
between the XUAR and the Soviet Union and reestablished the Xinjiang Islamic
Association.499 This new religious tolerance resulted in an Islamic revival in Xinjiang, but
religious freedom remained restricted if regional or central CCP leaders deemed some
forms of religious expression threatening.500 While Deng attempted to restore fallen
minority cadres from the Cultural Revolution, Han Chinese officials were still entrusted
with regional authority, as minority Party members remained under 40% by 1987.501
The official regional languages returned to Mandarin, Uyghur, Kazakh, and
Mongolian under Deng, but this did not heavily impact citizens’ daily life.502 Access to
Uyghur language schools was not readily available during the Mao era, but access
increased during the Deng era.503 Han students were not required to learn any of the
minority languages, but minority students were required to spend an extra year learning
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Mandarin.504 Consequently, the language policy of the CCP and official actions were
often contradictory throughout the XUAR. Additionally, as travel restrictions were lifted
and the economy developed, knowledge of Mandarin became critical to gaining
employment and achieving a higher standard of living.
Deng initiated measures to spur economic development in the XUAR. During the
1980s, he authorized the equivalent of 4.3 million dollars (USD) for southern Xinjiang
alone, which is a majority Uyghur section of the XUAR.505 Deng also reinstated the
XPCC under conservative military leader Wang Zhen.506 The XPCC was disbanded in
1975 due to factionalism and other issues during the Cultural Revolution.507 While the
XUAR developed rapidly, it did so in a way that privileged the Han, and economic
inequality rose during the 1980s.
The PRC, to some extent, supported Xinjiang’s Islamic revival.508 Muslims were
again able to participate in the hajj in 1979.509 In 1983, less than ten years after the end of
the Cultural Revolution, officials from the XUAR’s Religious Affairs Bureau reported
12,000 active mosques and 15,000 religious officials.510 The state printed copies of the
Koran and the Hadith in Arabic and Uyghur.511 The opening of the borders and a more
hands-off approach to religion in the early years of the Deng era resulted in an increase in
foreign religious influences, such as Wahhabism, in the region.512 This would come to
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dominate the concerns of the CCP in the future, despite the fact most Uyghurs adhere to a
more moderate school of Hanafi Islam.513 The CCP never relinquished total control of
Islam, as the training of clergy was monitored by the state and all clerics are state
appointed.514
Some of Xinjiang’s sent-down-youth returned to the east coast during the Deng
Xiaoping era, although some did so illegally and ultimately returned to Xinjiang when
they were denied basic amenities, employment, and housing under the hukou registration
system.515 Not all protests in Xinjiang during the 1980s were by Uyghurs, instead they
were by Han Chinese who wanted to leave.516 However, Han migration to Xinjiang
remained a priority of the Deng administration, as evident by the reinstatement of the
XPCC in 1981.517
Uyghurs organized demonstrations to express discontent with CCP rule during the
1980s. During the Deng era, minorities were angry because Han Chinese residents
seemed to obtain the better paying and more prestigious jobs.518 Quotas to increase
minority access to education were never properly implemented and comparable measures
to alleviate employment barriers for Uyghur college graduates were poorly implemented,
as they were not designed for the new market economy. Several hundred Uyghur students
protested during the mid-1980s and called for true regional autonomy.519 Uyghurs also
protested the use of Lop Nor for nuclear testing within the XUAR, 25 such tests had
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occurred between 1964 and 1985.520 Uyghurs and other Muslims protested the
publications that were very hostile and antagonistic toward Islam.521
Due to a combination of international and domestic factors, the end of the Deng
era was a time when the Party was deeply concerned by the potential for separatist threats
from Xinjiang. However, the majority of protests during the Deng Xiaoping era were not
focused on independence but rather greater or true regional autonomy, economic
opportunity, freedom of expression, and freedom of religion.522 A major exception to this
was the Baren Uprising in April 1990. Indeed, Baren was the first of what would be many
violent occurrences after the Deng era. Even before the Baren Uprising, the conservative
faction, under Wang Enmao (until his retirement in 1985) and Wang Zhen, was more
influential in Xinjiang policy as evident by “Strike Hard” campaigns, which targeted
religious expression and minority separatism. These campaigns started in 1983, but
became more frequent during the 1990s as part of the CCP’s Xinjiang policy, which
coupled economic liberalization with political repression.523
In April 1990, hundreds of armed Uyghurs in Baren Township attacked local
government offices and fought off the police and the military for several days.524
According to reports from Amnesty International, the revolt was the result of villagers
protesting the closure of a local mosque, whereas the CCP asserted it was a pro-
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independence movement.525 The CCP later claimed separatists had established an “East
Turkestan Islamic Party” (later identified to be the East Turkestan Islamic Movement
(ETIM)) in 1989 and that planning for Baren took place over several months.526 The
incident changed Deng’s position regarding the XUAR to the “three no’s” toward
splittists: no concessions, no compromise, and no mercy.527 The military solution gained
prominence and was not viewed as impeding development in the XUAR, and in 1990
9,000 armed police were sent to support the existing police presence in Xinjiang.528
In the immediate aftermath of the Baren uprising foreign visitors were banned.529
Initial reports attributed the attacks to a “small number of ruffians.”530 The CCP feared
the role of religious extremism in the Baren rebellion, and regional authorities closed 50
religious sites and ceased construction on over 150 mosques.531 The CCP expelled any
foreign imams from the XUAR.532 The Chinese consistently downplayed the severity of
violence in the XUAR during the Deng era. Actions such as increased military spending
and violent suppression by the military and police forces revealed the true level of
concern the CCP had regarding the potential for separatist threats in the region. The
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unrest in Baren was particularly disheartening for the CCP, which had designated it as an
“Ethnic Unity Model Town” in 1984.533
The CCP decided to increase its influence in the less developed areas of Xinjiang
to prevent another Baren. Beginning in 1991 the number of Party cadres in rural and
pastoral areas increased with orders to combat national splittism and illegal religious
practices, while also strengthening education efforts.534 After 1989 the CCP began to
increase its investments in the PLA, a trend that continued even after the Soviet Union
collapsed.535 This set the foundation for increased reliance on military and police forces
to ensure stability and maintain territorial integrity in Xinjiang.
The Deng era began with policies to develop the economy, increase education,
and allow more religious expression, but ended in brutal and violent repression of
sentiments deemed threatening to the state. As unrest increased during the 1980s the
conservative position asserting that tolerance would threaten CCP power became more
influential. Deng proved that even in the reform era the CCP would only allow selfdetermination if it served the goals of the Party and he had no interested in genuinely
empowering the Uyghurs.
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
The CCP led by Jiang was quite concerned about the violent (although small and
poorly organized) separatist activities in Xinjiang. While in its early years Jiang’s
administration downplayed the violent activities of these small groups, CCP actions still
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indicated a much higher level of concern.536 Under Jiang, the CCP increased military
spending and propaganda, especially within the education system, to win over the people
and to legitimize CCP rule in the modern era.537 Apart from the need to maintain national
unity and territorial integrity, the vast oil fields of Xinjiang were of increasing importance
to the Jiang administration, which desperately needed new oil fields in the early 1990s.538
Jiang supported Han Chinese migration efforts to Xinjiang to develop the region’s
resources and ensure stability.539
Jiang’s administration supported measures to further regulate religion in 1994,
and again after Jiang himself visited Xinjiang in 1998, until the end of his
administration.540 Jiang advocated for closer regulation of the recruitment and training of
religious personnel and implemented yearly revision procedures for imams. 541 These
regulations also required all religious officials to profess loyalty to the Chinese state.542
Jiang’s administration further expanded these measures in 2001, making them applicable
to citizens who practiced religion.543 By the start of the Jiang era separatist movements in
the XUAR were becoming increasingly religious in comparison to past movements.544
While the CCP clamped down on Uyghur expression, it also sought out Uyghurs
to incorporate into the state structure. It was the Jiang administration that first esteemed
and then attacked Rebiya Kadeer, the now famous Uyghur activist who is the current
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head of the World Uyghur Congress. During the 1990s, the CCP highlighted the financial
success of Kadeer and she even became a member of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference.545 However, Kadeer became critical of the CCP toward the end
of the 1990s and was arrested in 1999 when she was on her way to meet with members of
the United States Congressional Research Committee.546 Kadeer’s arrest was a result of
the Jiang regime’s attempt to control the Uyghur narrative internationally and suppress
separatism domestically.
Violent incidents such as bombings and stabbings during the early 1990s, and
weapons stockpiling by separatists in Afghanistan and Pakistan were major security
issues for the CCP.547 The CCP, in response to the growing number of bombings and
assassinations beginning in 1993, increased the police and military presence in the
XUAR in order to identify and break up so-called “counter-revolutionary” groups, with
32 being discovered in 1995 alone.548 Deteriorating relations with the Uyghurs and
violent acts resulted in the renewed implementation of Strike Hard campaigns in 1996.549
The Strike Hard campaigns targeted religion by restricting Islamic publications and
closing illegal religious establishments.550
The Yining uprising in 1997 was the most concerning to the CCP since the Baren
uprising of 1990. Approximately 1,000 people revolted in Yining after a Han policeman
attempted to arrest a Uyghur who resisted.551 The participants attacked not just the police
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but ethnic Han individuals and places of business.552 However, it is important to note that
while there was ethnic violence many of the attacks and assassinations of the 1990s
targeted Uyghur and Muslim leaders deemed too favorable to China.553
The Yining uprising was followed by bus bombings in the capital of Urumqi two
weeks later.554 Allegedly, the bombings were in response to the security crackdown
ordered by the central leadership in Beijing.555 Those arrested and convicted of violent
acts during 1997 were executed.556 The CCP continued to transfer troops to Yining well
into 1999 and arrested suspected Islamic separatists.557 The government reported that it
broke up 195 separatist cells in 1998 and 76 in 1999.558 The violence and intimidation of
the Strike Hard campaigns began to yield the CCP’s desired results toward the end of the
1990s, as violent acts by Uyghurs declined.559
The CCP response was heavy-handed, and executions were reported throughout
the Jiang Zemin era.560 While it was Deng Xiaoping who instituted the first Strike Hard
campaign, it was during the Jiang era that they became increasingly common and violent
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in Xinjiang.561 Executions were common, and averaged two per week from January of
1997 to April of 1999 according to Amnesty International.562
The CCP still entrusted the XPCC to oversee many economic development
initiatives in Xinjiang, but local Uyghurs did not trust this organization.563 The already
limited effectiveness of affirmative action policies initiated under Deng was also reduced,
although it was not always high in the region due to marketization forces and
discrimination.564 Migration of Han Chinese to the region was encouraged by the state
and facilitated by the XPCC, but many poor Han Chinese migrated there due to the
economic opportunities in Xinjiang stemming from large central government
investments.565 When Jiang announced the CCP’s intention to decrease the size and
increase the technological capacity of the PLA, he neglected to mention the expansion of
the People’s Armed Police in the XUAR.566 The XPCC would also continue to play an
important role in maintaining regional stability and facilitating economic growth. By
1994 the XPCC was 88% Han and had 2.22 million members, and the CCP provided
84% of the XPCC’s 1.19 billion yuan budget, and 89% of its 1.146 billion yuan 1995
budget.567
The economic divide between the Uyghurs and Han Chinese grew during the
1990s. Educated Uyghurs continued to suffer in the job market due to language barriers
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and discrimination.568 By the end of the Jiang era, universities in the XUAR were only
using Mandarin as the language of instruction and in textbooks, which further elevated
the importance of speaking Mandarin in order to be successful economically in the
XUAR, much to the anger of Uyghurs.569 In 1999, the CCP introduced the Great Western
Development Strategy (GWD), which focused on investing in massive infrastructure
development for the XUAR.570 This move was in line with the CCP’s continued practice
of extracting resources from the region, rather than allowing minority regional leadership
to develop and benefit from their own natural resources.
The CCP began to pressure countries with Uyghur populations to assist in
suppressing Uyghur separatist movements.571 Jiang Zemin sought to strengthen ties with
Turkey, which, due to ethnic reasons, had a strained relationship with the PRC.572 In
1996, the CCP organized the first meeting of the “Shanghai Five” (the PRC, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) to discuss matters of regional security, military
matters, and economic development.573 The organization met every year after 1996 and,
with the addition of Uzbkeistan in 2001, became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO).574
While CCP leaders are accused of exaggerating the Uyghur threat as part of its
foreign policy, legitimate border and terrorism concerns existed during the Jiang era
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relative to Xinjiang. Violent incidents occurred, and while the effectiveness and wisdom
of the CCP’s actions are subject to debate, the fact that there was ethnic violence and
strong resentment toward the state in Xinjiang was true. Chinese concerns about the
XUAR resulted in the creation of the Shanghai Five and its successor SCO, but all
nations involved were deeply concerned by Central Asian Islamic insurgents.575
However, Chinese concerns generally dominated the work of the SCO.
In addition to Central Asian concerns, the fall of Kabul to the Taliban and the
proliferation of Islamic insurgents in Pakistan also posed security challenges for the
central CCP leadership regarding Xinjiang.576 Kabul was of particular concern as the
ETIM headquarters were located there in 1998.577 The United States’ invasion of
Afghanistan forced the ETIM to relocate its headquarters to Pakistan in 2001.578 By the
end of 2001, due to terrorism and separatism, the CCP closed the border between
Xinjiang and Afghanistan and greatly restricted the border between the XUAR and
Central Asia.579
After the terrorist attacks against the United States in New York on 11 September
2001, the CCP moved quickly to join the United States and other countries in the Global
War on Terror.580 The CCP called for assistance in its own struggle against terrorism,
switching its previous position of minimizing the situation in Xinjiang to exaggerating it
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in an effort to garner international support.581 Chinese officials claimed Uyghur
separatists received training from Osama bin Laden and other members of the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and estimated up to 1,000 Uyghurs were fighting as part of the Taliban.582
In 2002 the United States and the United Nations both declared the ETIM a terrorist
organization, which was a product of the efforts of the CCP under Jiang.583According to
the UN and human rights observing bodies such as Amnesty International, this led to an
increase of human rights violations as the CCP exploited its newfound international
support in the fight against terrorism to suppress Uyghur protest, through escalating its
Strike Hard campaign.584 The increase of religious center shutdowns, arrests of Uyghurs
for separatism, and executions of individuals for separatist activities after September
2001 supported the Strike Hard campaign.585
Jiang Zemin sought to suppress Uyghur unrest through Strike Hard campaigns.
After the Baren Uprising, security forces were employed to quell Uyghur discontent,
rather than allowing freedom of expression. The PLA was employed after regional
security forces and armed police failed to suppress the rebellion. Jiang was concerned
about the potential for Islam to undermine loyalty to the Party and pursued measures to
closely monitor and regulate religion to serve the Party’s purposes. The beginning of the
GWOT gave Jiang an opportunity to gain international support for CCP measures in the
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XUAR. Jiang appealed to former Soviet states to support the PRC by opposing Uyghur
separatism. Jiang also developed bilateral partnerships that fostered economic
dependence in order to ensure the cooperation of these new states. Jiang made no effort to
allow Uyghur self-determination. Instead, he pursued a policy of blatant repression.
Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
Under Hu Jintao, the CCP was forced to directly comment about the rise of
separatism and Uyghur discontent as the issue gained international attention especially
after violence in the XUAR increased after 2008. The CCP defended its policies in the
XUAR and reaffirmed its commitment to them. The CCP claimed it was responsible for
the “remarkable improvement in people’s lives.”586 Rather than acknowledging past
Uyghur and East Turkestan independence movements, the CCP asserted that East
Turkestan movements “fabricated an ‘ideological and theoretical system’ on the so-called
‘independence of East Turkestan’ on the basis of the allegation cooked up by the old
colonialists” by extremists.587 The CCP explicitly linked East Turkestan movements to
the Global War on Terror (GWOT), claiming that since the terrorist attacks on the United
States in 2001 East Turkestan groups use human rights, freedom of religion, and their
idea of minority interests to mislead the public and deceive the international
community.588 This rhetoric fueled the CCP’s international victories with the recognition
of the ETIM as a terrorist organization by both the United States and United Nations in
2002.589 The CCP failed to distinguish between violent Uyghur organizations and Uyghur
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groups that advocate for non-violent resistance to CCP oppression and discrimination,
which caused the CCP to alienate some of its new supporters.
Under Hu’s leadership, the SCO played an increasing role in the CCP’s efforts to
ensure regional security. The CCP started to conduct military exercises through the SCO
and on a bilateral basis with SCO member states.590 Through participation in the SCO the
CCP further justified the suppression and execution of Uyghur separatists by linking
them to the GWOT and anti-drug trafficking initiatives.591
While the United States was supportive of the PRC in the early years of the
GWOT, it did eventually become critical of the PRC’s practices as Congress began to
investigate conditions in the XUAR independent of CCP sources. This shift in the United
States’ position was marked by pressing for the release of Rebiya Kadeer in 2005.592
After the release of Kadeer, the United States agreed not to pursue a resolution
condemning Chinese human rights abuses in the United Nations.593
The CCP identified “East Turkestan” forces that it claimed were operating “in and
outside Xinjiang.”594 The CCP stressed that, despite the destructive nature of this force, it
is small and does not represent the interests of the majority of the ethnic groups of
Xinjiang.595 They mentioned that the international community recognized the true nature
of the ETIM and linked the WUC to the organization.596 The Party also blamed the
violence earlier that year, and during 2008 surrounding the Olympics, to East Turkestan
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forces and linked this violence to a slowdown in the region’s economic development
during the 1990s.597
The ETIM, which had been active in small-scale, violent acts during the Jiang era,
was relatively quiet in the early years of the Hu era until 2007.598 The CCP conducted
raids on what it claimed were terrorist cells, but when the CCP issued statements
explicitly identifying the ETIM in these raids in 2007 and shortly thereafter the ETIM
once again became more vocal.599 Small-scale bombings and other acts of violence
occurred throughout 2008, some of which the ETIM claimed responsibility for and some
that the CCP identified as ETIM acts.600
The CCP was concerned with the activities of pro-independence organizations
that had finally managed to organize themselves by the early years of the Hu
administration. Among the most disturbing to the CCP was the founding of the World
Uyghur Congress in 2004, which the CCP asserts is a terrorist organization.601 However,
these organizations struggled to create a unified position representative of Uyghurs and
overlooked the numerous unique identities present within Xinjiang and among Uyghurs
in order to promote their agenda.602 Despite the assertions of these organizations, the
majority of Uyghurs who leave Xinjiang do so due to economic need not political
oppression.603 The Uyghurs are, and have been, a divided people across religion (Sufi
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versus Sunni), territorial loyalties (north versus south), and linguistic, class, and political
lines.604
The CCP remained concerned about radicalization of Uyghurs by foreign
influences. XUAR authorities confiscated Uyghur passports to limit Uyghur movement
aboard.605 The restriction of movement also extended to hajj participant restrictions,
limiting applicants to individuals aged 50 to 70 years old and who were deemed loyal to
the government.606 The CCP also restricted the movements of religious leaders between
provinces and increased efforts to shut down underground religious organizations.607 The
Party intensified travel restrictions around the time of hajj to prevent Uyghurs from
participating.608
While the Hu administration claimed it was tolerant of different religions, it was
in fact tightening control over Islamic expression in the XUAR as early as 2004 with the
continuation of policies enacted during the Jiang era. Limits on religious practice were
also introduced including Ramadan restrictions, prayer prohibitions, and banning of
beards, veil wearing and other overt forms of religious expression.609 Additionally, Party
Members and cadres were forced to renounce their religion, and they were not allowed to
practice it publicly, which substantially severs their contact with the Uyghur
community.610 Not only were Party Members and cadres prohibited from entering
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mosques, but so were children and in some cases women.611 Mosque attendance was
documented and fines issued for violations of these policies.612 The CCP would give
candy to children during Ramadan, offer free meals to Uyghur cadres, and report
individuals who fasted during Ramadan, and these restrictions escalated after violent
incidents began to increase in 2008.613 While the Party highlighted the diversity of the
XUAR and claimed its respect for and support of minority cultures, regulations about
beards and head scarves introduced in 2010 were examples of the Party’s attempt to
suppress expression of Uyghur identity and culture.614
While still struggling to implement GWD in the XUAR, Hu highlighted the rapid
economic growth and increase of production as CCP and regional autonomy successes.615
The CCP justified its policies by noting the eradication of illiteracy, advances in science
and technology, and improvements in health systems that were achieved by CCP policy
initiatives.616 The CCP did not deny the unequal reality of economic development in the
region.617 Instead, it immediately detailed the anti-poverty alleviation campaigns in place
since the mid-1980s and its success in decreasing the impoverished population of
Xinjiang.618 The CCP was generally concerned by the poverty and inequality of the
Uyghurs during the Hu Jintao era. However, their concern was either intersected with
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preventing separatism or was supplanted by it. The government justified demolition of
Uyghur homes due to their location in high poverty areas, such as those in Karamay City,
which also had incidents of ethnic violence.619 Land-grabbing is one of numerous
grievances Uyghurs have against the CCP and Chinese state, as grazing lands are claimed
for development purposes.620 The central CCP issued orders to restrict demolitions, but
these had little effect in reducing Uyghur discontent.621 Uyghurs were still angered by the
relocation efforts and the failure of officials to compensate them for their land
adequately.622
The XPCC, which by 2005 had 2.5 million members, was quite controversial due
to accusations of its continued preferential treatment for the Han Chinese population in
its oversight of the region’s economic development.623 However, the CCP defended the
XPCC and explained that its duty was to “cultivate and guard the frontier areas entrusted
to it by the state.”624 The Hu administration adamantly maintained the XPCC played a
critical role in the development of the region and that the central state had been very
supportive of development in the region.625 Han migration outside of the XPCC
continued as poor Han Chinese sought economic opportunities, and highly skilled
workers were enticed by the XUAR’s oil and industrial trades.
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While the 2008 Olympic protests concerning Tibet and other human rights
concerns received more international attention, Xinjiang was also an area of focus in the
build up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics due to terrorism concerns and increased
demonstrations, especially when the ETIM released a video threatening the Olympics in
March of 2008.626 CCP authorities issued statements that potential terrorist threats were
thwarted in the region.627 Wang Lequan, the CCP Chief in Xinjiang, continued the central
CCP hard-line stance of suppressing the “three evil forces” of “terrorists, separatists, and
extremists.”628 The CCP, due to concerns about terrorist and splittist threats from
separatist organizations, increased security in Beijing and Xinjiang. The enhanced
security resulted in the arrest of 82 people in Xinjiang alone for terrorism plots in the first
half of 2008.629 The build up to the Olympics resulted in increased tension, but it was
minimal in comparison to the unrest of July 2009 and its aftermath.
Protests in Urumqi, the capital of the XUAR, over the beating and killing of two
Uyghurs workers by Han workers at a toy factory in Guangdong Province in June broke
out on 5 July 2009. They were accused of committing sexual violence against a Han
Chinese woman.630 Protests regarding the death of the factory workers and discontent
with Chinese rule occurred in other areas of Xinjiang, but it was only in Urumqi that the
violence resulted in mass death and destruction of property and ethnic violence.631
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In response, the CCP blocked access to the internet and cell phone usage in
Xinjiang.632 Access to SMS messaging was not restored until January of 2010,
international calls were not restored until February 2010, and the internet (with the
typical Chinese restrictions) was not restored until May of 2010.633 The government
instituted a curfew and increased the presence of its armed military police, in line with
Hu Jintao’s threat of “harsh punishment” for those involved in the riots.634 Another Strike
Hard campaign was implemented.635 In the end over 1,400 people were arrested,
primarily in house-to-house searches in the month of July and 35 were sentenced to death
by 2010.636 Additionally, regional leadership, including Urumqi CCP Secretary Li Zhi,
Urumqi Police Chief Liu Yaohua, and regional Party Secretary Wang Lequan were all
replaced in the months following.637
The CCP invited foreign media to Xinjiang almost immediately in what it
described as its effort to provide a clear picture of what caused the riots and disabled
social media.638 Chinese reporting focused on the violence inflicted upon the Han and
blamed the WUC for the unrest, specifically Rebiya Kadeer.639 The CCP maintained this
was proof that the WUC is a terrorist organization.640
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In the aftermath, the CCP defended its policies and pursued a campaign of
repression, propaganda, and economic development. The CCP emphasized the “stagnant”
quality of Xinjiang’s agricultural and pastoral economy prior to CCP intervention and the
special priority Xinjiang was given as part of the CCP’s Western Development Strategy
in 2000.641 However, it failed to note that State Owned Enterprises were the primary
beneficiaries of resource extraction.642 The government approved an additional 10 million
yuan development plan for the region.643 The Party emphasized the economic
transformation of the XUAR and the numerous improvements to Xinjiang’s
transportation infrastructure, as well as the rapid development of Xinjiang’s
telecommunications systems.644
While there is a class of urban Uyghurs who benefitted from policies under the
CCP, they are frequently viewed as traitors by the majority of Uyghurs. This minority of
Uyghurs benefitted from urbanization and class struggle policies dating back to the Mao
era and generally have higher levels of education than most Uyghurs.645 Some Uyghurs
benefitted from more recent Deng era reform policies and support the CCP.646 Uyghurs
who support the CCP are normally cadres, intellectuals, or economically successful that
support CCP, but the majority of Uyghurs harbor grievances against the CCP. Uyghurs
who speak Mandarin and have positive views of the CCP are sometimes called “Chinese
Uyghurs,” in the pejorative sense.647
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The CCP touted the success of social programs in the region, including the
implementation of the nine-year compulsory education law, free education for rural
students, and financial assistance extended by the government to poorer students seeking
a university education.648 It neglected to mention the difficulties economically
disadvantaged minorities still faced in sending their children to school, and the unequal
quality of education in Uyghur language schools versus Han schools. In response to the
accusations of language assimilation, the CCP explicitly stated its annual national college
entrance examinations were printed in Uyghur, Kazak, Mongolian and Mandarin, but the
CCP never addressed the differences in quality.649
Due to decades of rapid development facilitated by the CCP in the XUAR,
environmental degradation became an important issue for Uyghur activists. The GWD
did not alleviate the negative environmental impacts, as Uyghurs still suffered from
negative ailments caused by unbridled development efforts.650
The CCP refuted claims that Uyghurs were not represented in the government by
emphasizing 51.25% of Xinjiang’s cadres were minorities, without specifying the Uyghur
percentage.651 However, UNPO publications asserted that when examining real bodies of
authority, such as the Regional Party Committee, only three of its fifteen members are
Uyghurs and ten are Chinese.652
The Hu era language policies increasingly marginalized minority languages in
education. Mandarin was to be the language of instruction in schools with ethnic
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languages being taught as separate subjects.653 In 2004 the XUAR issued a document
titled as follows, “Decision to Greatly Push Bilingual Education Work,” which detailed
plans for the region to eventually teach all subjects in Mandarin and for minority teachers
to be required to pass a language skills test.654 The CCP also announced plans to merge
50 of the XUAR’s poorer minority schools with Chinese schools.655 This is part of
general Hu era policies to reduce minority language-based education and assimilate
minority nationality students into Han, Mandarin-based education institutions.
Hu Jintao continued Jiang’s policies suppressing religion expression and relied
heavily upon local security forces to maintain order. Despite CCP assertions that it had
nothing but the utmost respect for the religious freedom of all its citizens, the constraints
imposed by the state create a less pluralistic picture. Hu exploited the GWOT to garner
more support for CCP efforts in the XUAR, even after the international community
became suspicious of its true intentions. Chinese anti-terrorism and anti-separatist
campaigns resulted in the violation of Uyghurss right to religious freedom.
Conclusions:
Figure 4.2 summarizes the policy position and self-determination situation for the
XUAR during each generation of leadership.
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Figure 4.2 Xinjiang Self-determination Framework
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None of the four leaders examined placed Xinjiang at a low priority domestically
or internationally. For Mao, the region was a high priority because of its natural
resources, its designation as Chinese territory under the Qing, and the presence of the
Soviet Union directly on the border. As Sino-Soviet relations declined, controlling the
border became more crucial to Mao.
The region was only a moderate concern to Deng due to the presence of the
Soviet Union, as relations between the PRC and Soviet Union were improving until its
fall. For Deng, ameliorating the damage of the Cultural Revolution that alienated many of
the Uyghurs was also a concern. Deng relied heavily upon regional leadership to manage
Xinjiang until the Baren uprising, which made Xinjiang a high domestic priority for
central leadership.
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The region was a high priority for Jiang due to concerns over trans-national
Turkic movements and the desire to increase trade between Xinjiang and the new Central
Asian republics after the fall of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the major concern of the
Jiang era was to suppress both Uyghur separatist movements and any international
support for them, as evident by the founding of the SCO and attempts to improve
relations with Turkey.
Xinjiang was a moderate domestic priority under the Hu administration until 2008
because the Strike Hard campaigns of the Jiang era had reduced violent unrest. Also, the
GWOT enabled the CCP to escalate oppressive campaigns in the region with the blessing
of GWOT partners, or at the very least their indifference. Hu (until the unrest of 2008 and
2009), gave the region a moderate priority internationally because the policies of the
Jiang regime were well established and effective in ensuring state-to-state cooperation in
opposing Uyghur separatism. However, the region became volatile and violent incidents
increased, ensuring that international cooperation and combatting Uyghur separatism
abroad became much higher priorities.
While the Uyghur identity is a relative recent development, nationalist sentiment
and a strong sense of identity among the Uyghurs was present throughout each generation
of leadership. However, the Uyghurs have always been a divided group and the presence
of numerous other minority ethnic groups in the region caused difficulties in forming an
organized resistance movement. As the CCP asserted its control through the PLA, XPCC,
and the People’s Armed Police from the 1980s onward, domestic self-determination
movements became weak. While Uyghur diaspora movements strengthened, especially
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after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is unlikely they represent the majority of Uyghurs
within the PRC. They are overwhelmingly outnumbered and disadvantaged.
None of the leaders analyzed genuinely respected the right to self-determination
by the Uyghurs. Consequently, the situation of self-determination was never lower than a
3. The only reason the Deng era had a 3 ranking was because of the influence of
reformers within the Party who believed less repressive policies would ameliorate the
dire state of Party relations with minorities. However, this faction was purged toward the
end of the 1980s, and every leader afterward pursued a policy of economic development
and political repression.
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Chapter Five: Tibet
Introduction:
The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) was founded in 1965, approximately
fifteen years after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) entered Tibet.656 Prior to the founding of the TAR, Tibet was considered an
inseparable part of China by the CCP and the Guomindang (GMD) because it had been a
territory of the Qing Empire. While this resolved the status of Tibet for the CCP, Tibet
remained a complex territorial dispute, as it was another source of national humiliation
for the Chinese after the Opium Wars. What constitutes Tibet, the historical status of
Tibet, and the rights of Tibetans within the Chinese state are all contested issues. The
Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE), centered in Dharamasala, India, and the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) both claim that Tibet includes
three provinces: Amdo, Kham, and U-Tsang.657 This boundary is called Greater Tibet
(among other names), and the areas outside of U-Tsang are called Eastern Tibet. The
CCP only recognizes the TAR as Tibet, which excludes Amdo and eastern Kham.658
The division of Tibet was not a CCP invention. Rather, the Qing Empire created
the East-Central divide, with the former being administered by chiefs who fell under the
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jurisdiction of a Sichuan governor, and the latter was administered by an amban.659 Qing
influence declined throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the division of
Tibet persisted and Eastern Tibet remained outside of Lhasa’s control, which had been
the administrative capital of Tibet since the seventh century CE under Songtsen
Gampo.660 Figure 5.1 is a map from the International Campaign for Tibet and shows the
territories that comprise Greater Tibet. The light gray line outlines the territory that
comprises Greater Tibet and the TAR is Central Tibet.
Figure 5.1 Map of Central and Eastern Tibet

The administrative hold
over Tibet by Qing authorities
weakened, especially in Lhasa, as
the Qing declined. In 1750
rebellion occurred in Lhasa,
which the Chinese military
defeated.661 After the successful
suppression of the rebellion, the Qing appointed a government under the Dalai Lama to
oversee the administrative affairs of Central Tibet, with Chinese supervision.662 The
Chinese also exerted influence over the selection of high ranking religious officials, most
notably the Dalai Lama, during the eighteenth century.663
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The most well-known aspect surrounding the question of Tibetan selfdetermination is religious freedom, due to the international fame of the Dalai Lama.
However, Tibet’s natural resources (Greater Tibet compromises almost one-third of the
PRC’s landmass), such as land, uranium, gold, iron, lead, and forests, as well as its
position on the border with India, are also critical factors that influence CCP policy
decisions.664 Tibet alone contains approximately 40% of the People’s Republic of China’s
(PRC) mineral resources.665 Furthermore, the PRC has hydro, geothermal, solar and wind
energy resources in Tibet.666
Colonial powers, particularly the British, were very interested in Tibet because of
trade and its close proximity to India.667 The British and Russian empires recognized
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in 1907, but in reality Chinese administrative authority
over Tibet, especially Central Tibet, remained weak.668 The British were less concerned
about Tibet once India became independent in 1947. Prior to 1947, the British sought to
isolate Tibet from Chinese authority, which allowed the government in Lhasa to maintain
Tibetan traditions and authority. Today, many Tibetans resent CCP rule and question the
legitimacy of its claims to Tibet.
Internal Situation, 1911-1949:
Shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the Tibetan government declared
independence from China.669 Traditional Tibetan society was a tenant-landlord serf
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system, in which the aristocracy and monastic establishment exercised political and
religious control.670 The GMD had a small presence in Central Tibet, but was expelled by
the order of the Dalai Lama (who was 12 years old) in July of 1949.671 All Chinese were
expelled in 1913 when the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet with the aid of Nepal.672 This act
fueled CCP suspicions, which continued after the founding of the PRC, that anti-Chinese
foreign influences were active in Tibet.673
The Simla Convention, held in India during 1914, between Tibet, China (until its
representatives withdrew in July 1914), and Great Britain is controversial, as the Chinese
never signed the Convention, which concluded the conference, but the British operated as
if they had.674 Simla was another source of humiliation for the Chinese, even though it
had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, because it effectively eliminated its
influence in Tibet. The imposition of the British on Chinese territory, through the Opium
Wars of the 1800s and control over Tibetan trade, turned the status of Tibet into a
Chinese nationalist issue.
During the thirteenth century, the tradition of monastic leadership over temporal
affairs began when Mongolian leader Godan Khan named Sakya Pandita as regent of
Tibet, and promised to defend Tibet.675 However, leadership over Tibet was fragmented
and closely linked to aristocratic families, who still supported the monastic
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establishment.676 Tibetan monastic communities were not unified, different schools
existed as did factions within each school. The fifth Dalai Lama was granted political
control over Tibet toward the end of the sixteenth century, with assistance from
Mongolians.677
Historically, the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama were frequently at odds with one
another, which certainly described the relationship between the thirteenth Dalai Lama and
ninth Panchen Lama during the twentieth century. The latter was deemed too cooperative
with the Chinese in an effort to expand his own power and influence in Tibet. The ninth
Panchen Lama fled Tibet in 1923, and died in 1937, without returning to Tibet.678 The
GMD exercised considerable influence over the selection of the tenth Panchen Lama, as
People’s Republic of China (PRC) government forces often tried to do throughout
dynastic Chinese history. The ceremony confirming the tenth Panchen Lama was held by
the GMD in Qinghai during 1949.679 However, the Tibetan government and monastic
establishment rejected this decision, stating that the Panchen Lama would have to come
to Lhasa for examination before he could be confirmed. The thirteenth Dalai Lama died
in 1934, at a time of great political and societal upheaval throughout Asia.680 He had
attempted to implement reforms to modernize Tibet, but the conservative monastic
establishment blocked them.681
In 1919, the GMD attempted to re-establish formal links with Tibet, as it sought
to retain all territories that had been claimed by the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese presence
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in Tibet was minimal and the GMD did not exert a strong influence, but its propaganda
detailing how the CCP would destroy religion if it entered Tibet cultivated an atmosphere
of fear and suspicion among Tibetans regarding the CCP and its intentions.682 The CCP
presence in Central Tibet was virtually nonexistent prior to 1949, and the few Tibetan
Party members the CCP managed to recruit were all from Eastern Tibet.683 Prior to 1950,
as the CCP debate escalated about the best way to liberate Tibet, Mao lamented that, “we
have no material base in Tibet.”684 Central Tibet had been effectively independent from
the Chinese for almost forty years, until the PLA began to enter Eastern Tibet in 1950.
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
Mao’s policies regarding Tibet during the early 1950s were the most tolerant
national policies relative to the other autonomous regions and provinces within the PRC.
Mao advocated for patience and respect of Tibet’s “unique” characteristics. However,
Mao’s policies changed as the Tibetans resisted reform and resented the CCP. Mao was
willing to use the PLA to establish control over Central Tibet, but he preferred to
negotiate with the existing leadership in order to “peacefully liberate” the region.685
In 1950 Mao requested that a Tibetan delegation come to Beijing to discuss terms
for unification with China while simultaneously ordering the military to prepare for
invasion, and he warned the Tibetan government about the consequences of resisting the
CCP.686 The Tibetans assembled a delegation, but stalled whenever possible in the
negotiating process, while they attempted to gain international support for Tibetan
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independence, including direct appeals to the United Nations for assistance.687 Tibetan
leaders also debated whether or not to send the Dalai Lama into exile in India to prevent
him from falling under the CCP’s control.688 The government was divided between
conservatives who wanted to resist the CCP at all costs, and moderates, such as Ngabo
Ngawang Jigme, who were more pragmatic and wanted to negotiate.689 It was in this
context that full temporal powers were conferred upon the Dalai Lama before his
eighteenth birthday, in order to address the situation with the CCP.690
Mao heavily emphasized the need for gradualism and tolerance of the culture and
religion in Tibet during the 1950s because of the dramatic differences between Han
Chinese and Tibetan culture, language barriers, and the lack of a significant CCP or PLA
presence in Tibet. However, he still used the military to pressure the Tibetan government.
The PLA entered eastern areas of Greater Tibet and far western Tibet through Xinjiang to
apply additional pressure on the Tibetan leadership.691 The military was instructed to be
respectful of Tibetans in Eastern Tibet, as word would travel to Lhasa about PLA
conduct, and military personnel disseminated propaganda among Tibetan soldiers who
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then returned to Tibet.692 However, troops delayed entering Lhasa in order to give the
Tibetan government time to negotiate with the CCP. The CCP remained cautious about
expanding military operations, but as the Tibetan leadership continued to delay, the CCP
increased the PLA presence around Central Tibet.693 Incidents when the Tibetan military
engaged the CCP were short-lived, as the poorly equipped and trained Tibetan military
was quickly overwhelmed by the PLA.694 By the time the PLA began to move toward
Lhasa, they were met with little resistance when they arrived in September of 1951.695
Fighting was avoided in many areas of Eastern Tibet as the CCP managed to buy off
local leaders.696
The CCP’s early efforts focused on co-opting Tibetan elites, but the CCP also
attempted to appeal to the Tibetan masses in Lhasa and Shigatse. The CCP introduced
new currency with the face of Mao Zedong in an effort to undermine indigenous
currency, while simultaneously bolstering the Tibetan economy.697 The PLA also
provided free medical services, including home visits for Tibetans, which were
immensely popular.698 However, co-opting elites remained the priority and Tibetan
resistance persisted.699
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The “Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” hereafter referred to as the
Agreement, was a major accomplishment for the CCP. The Agreement articulated CCP
policy toward Central Tibet during the 1950s until the Rebellion of 1959. It guaranteed
the “unity of Tibetans” against imperialism and their unification with the Chinese state.700
The Tibetans agreed to submit to the autonomy system proposed by the CCP, rather than
seeking independence, and the CCP gained direct control over Tibet’s external affairs.701
The Panchen Lama, who had supported the CCP, was to have his titles restored and
return to Central Tibet.702 Articles were included to protect Tibetan culture and religion,
but these were all part of the Mao’s gradualist position in Central Tibet. However, they
were not concessions to the Tibetans, but the Agreement stated that no “compulsion”
would be used in implementing communist reforms in Tibet.703
In May of 1951, the CCP announced the Agreement had been signed, which in its
opinion effectively eliminated the question of Tibetan independence.704 The Dalai Lama,
who had not approved of signing the Seventeen Point Agreement at the time, delayed
formally accepting it until October of 1951.705 Some members of the Tibetan government
supported the Agreement as Tibet’s best hope for survival, as the daily affairs and
religious life of Tibet remained relatively unaffected by the Agreement. The government
was, however, divided about the Agreement and resisted implementing it during the early
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1950s.706 While the CCP agreed there would be no compulsion regarding reforms, it
certainly attempted to compel the Dalai Lama to accept the Seventeen Point Agreement.
The CCP sent Zhang Jingwu as a representative of the central CCP leadership to deliver a
hard copy to the Dalai Lama in July of 1951 on his way to Lhasa.707
During the early 1950s, conflict between the CCP and members of the traditional
Tibetan government remained, especially with the two prime ministers Lukhangwa and
Lobsang Tashi. They denied the PLA access to grain reserves in order to force the CCP
to reduce the military presence in Lhasa.708 The CCP asserted that it was Lukhangwa and
Lobsang Tashi who organized the Tibetan People’s Association, which opposed both the
CCP and Tibetan government, the latter for its weakness in resisting Chinese control.709
In 1952 members of the Tibetan People’s Association demonstrated outside the homes of
Tibetan officials who cooperated with CCP efforts in Lhasa.710
Mao deemed the 1952 demonstrations unacceptable, but he remained cautious in
addressing the protests and the actions of the two prime ministers. That spring the CCP
pressured the Dalai Lama to remove the prime ministers, so it would appear to be a
decision of the Tibetan government, rather than the product of CCP pressure.711 The CCP
planned to elevate less antagonistic officials, most notably Ngabo, in the local
government structure.712 The Dalai Lama issued the order to remove the prime ministers
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on the 27th of April, thereby removing the two strongest opponents of CCP rule in Tibet
from their positions of authority.713
The security situation continued to deteriorate, which prompted the CCP to
restrict religious expression by banning the February 1954 prayer festival, even in Central
Tibet, which was the location of popular demonstrations in 1952.714 The majority of
Tibetans in Lhasa harbored strong anti-Chinese sentiments, and the presence of the PLA
was a massive source of discontent and burdened the local economy.715 Additionally,
Tibetans from Eastern Tibet, who were not granted the same leniency as Tibetans in
Central Tibet, revolted against the CCP throughout the early 1950s. Many fled to Central
Tibet with stories of CCP policies.716
Control of the Panchen Lama was a critical component of early CCP policy in
Tibet.717 Mao decided against dividing Tibet into separate areas of influence under the
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, understanding that, since the fourteenth Dalai Lama was
the most influential figure in Tibet, any appearance that the CCP was trying to reduce his
status would only alienate Tibetans. Rather than exploiting the existing divide between
the two, he sought to resolve the dispute between the two lamas and their administrative
bases. While still dedicated to ensuring the loyalty of the Panchen Lama, Mao prioritized
gaining the support of the Dalai Lama in the 1950s, and Mao was cautious to avoid any
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appearance that the Party viewed the Panchen Lama as equal to, or superior to, the Dalai
Lama. Mao stressed that the Party was to “make every possible effort to use all suitable
means to win over the Dalai Lama and a majority of the upper strata” in order to “achieve
the long-term goals of transforming the Tibetan economy and polity gradually without
spilling blood.”718 The Panchen Lama’s return to Tibet was delayed due to instability and
the need to assuage existing concerns about CCP manipulation of the Lama hierarchy.719
The CCP expended great efforts to impress and show the utmost respect for the
Dalai Lama in August of 1954 when he arrived in Beijing to participate in the National
People’s Congress (NPC).720 The trip was a great success for the CCP, as the Dalai Lama
was both charmed and impressed by the CCP while in Beijing. The meeting ended with
the Dalai Lama named as the head of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet
Autonomous Region (PCTAR) and, in the immediate months following his return to
Tibet, he adopted a more cooperative and conciliatory approach toward the CCP.721
In addition to wooing elites, early CCP efforts were focused on increasing
Chinese access to Tibet. Mao was deeply concerned by the fact there were almost no Han
Chinese in Tibet.722 Additionally, Mao knew the CCP would need to develop Tibet’s
transport infrastructure to ensure that the military would be able to move supplies and
eventually become self-sufficient.723 Mao believed that the population of Tibet was too
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sparse for development and planned for increasing the population, which certainly
implied Han migration.724 Mao employed caution whenever possible in regard to Central
Tibet and was willing to reverse or pause troop movement, emphasizing that while the
end-goal was to implement the Seventeen Point Agreement, forcing it would cause more
damage to the CCP’s long-term goals.725
Even after the Dalai Lama’s productive meeting with the CCP in Beijing, unrest
throughout Greater Tibet remained.726 Mao continued to stress the need for strict
adherence to the policies of gradualism and tolerance in Central Tibet, and the Chinese
maintained positions of true authority.727 The CCP paid for repairs to monasteries that
were bombed when it suppressed uprisings to ameliorate discontent in Eastern Tibet.728 It
was not until the revolt of 1959 that acts of unrest were enough to influence the CCP to
abandon its policy of gradualism, especially in Central Tibet. The 1959 Rebellion began,
as many episodes of unrest throughout Greater Tibet did, in the East. In 1958, in Kham,
a revolt broke out that was brutally suppressed by the PLA, which caused many Tibetans
to flee to Central Tibet.729

“Mao Would Lift Tibetan Population: He Urges Rise to 10,000,000, Not Indicating if Chinese Migration
is Planned.” New York Times. 25 November 1952. Electronic. Accessed 4 June 2015.
725
Trumbull, Robert. “Tibet Ruler Bars Red China Flag; an Anti-Communist Party Emerges.” New York
Times. 28 November 1953. Accessed 4 June 2015. “Reds Said to Cut Tibet Force.” New York Times. 25
November 1953. Electronic. Accessed 4 June 2015.
726
“Uprising in East Tibet Reported; Chinese Losses Termed Heavy: Reds Said to Raze Several
Monasteries—Bid the Dalai Help Curb Revolt.” New York Times. 29 June 1956. Electronic. Accessed 4
June 2015.
727
“Red China Removing Its Aides From Tibet.” New York Times. 11 October 1957. Electronic. Accessed
4 June 2015.
728
“Reds Pay for Rebuilding Monasteries in Tibet.” New York Times. 18 March 1958. Electronic. Accessed
4 June 2015.
729
“Revolt Called Widespread.” New York Times. 25 March 1959. Electronic. Accessed 4 June 2015.
“Revolt Reported Spreading.” New York Times. 23 March 1959. Electronic. Accessed 4 June 2015.
“Tibetans Declare Peiping Pact Void: Leaders Sign a Declaration of Independence—Revolt Reported
Widespread.” New York Times. 25 March 1959. Electronic. Accessed 4 June 2015.
724

147

Their stories exacerbated existing tensions in Lhasa, which erupted with the
March Rebellion of 1959. Mao was aware of the volatile situation in Eastern and Central
Tibet. In January of 1959 he advised the CCP Tibet Work Committee that, “…it is
inevitable that a great showdown will occur. Only then can problems be thoroughly
resolved.”730 Mao recognized the danger of the Tibetan rebels, and while he was
concerned, he believed that revolution would result in greater support for the CCP in
Tibet, as long as regional authorities properly addressed and channeled popular uprisings
and discontent731 Mao considered the revolt as an opportunity to the CCP’s “democratic”
reforms ahead of schedule in Tibet, even before the revolt was suppressed.732
The Dalai Lama was invited to the Tibetan Military Headquarters for a
performance on the 10th of March in 1959.733 Fearing for his safety Tibetans protested
and violence broke out between the demonstrators and the PLA. The Dalai Lama fled for
India on the 17th of March as the situation deteriorated.734 The CCP had enjoyed a more
cordial and cooperative partnership with the Dalai Lama, and Mao was still intent on
cooperating with the Dalai Lama, so he ordered that PLA forces allow the Dalai Lama to
flee.735 When the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa, the Tibetan government denounced the
Seventeen Point Agreement.736
In response, the central government disbanded the Tibetan government on the
28th of March, transferred all governing powers to the PCTAR (even though the Military
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Headquarters under Zhang Guohua retained true power), and named the Panchen Lama
its acting chair.737 When the government was disbanded, the CCP adamantly maintained
the Dalai Lama had not fled of his own free will.738 The CCP replaced Dalai Lama aides
with the Panchen Lama’s aides on the PCTAR, but the Dalai Lama himself maintained
his positions in the NPC and PCTAR.739 Even when the Dalai Lama released statements
confirming that he fled willingly, the central leadership maintained that they were false
claims and he was being held under duress.740 It was not until December 17th of 1964
that the State Council of the PRC officially denounced the Dalai Lama as a traitor and
removed him as chairman of the PCTAR.741
Mao’s policy of gradualism was over. Beijing immediately began to implement its
communist reforms in Central Tibet, which included eliminating the Tibetan system of
serfdom and land redistribution.742 The impact on the Tibetan Buddhist religious
establishment was immediate, as it lost land, labor, and revenue. Landowners determined
to have not participated in the 1959 Rebellion were compensated for their land.743 Unrest
and violence persisted throughout Tibet into the 1960s, and the Party decided to slow
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communization in Central Tibet in 1961.744 Despite abandoning the gradualist approach,
reforms were implemented at a slower pace due to the massive failure of the Great Leap
Forward (GLF) throughout the PRC and the delicate state of Tibet’s economy. The PLA
maintained a heavy presence in Tibet as border tensions with India increased, to suppress
rebels, and to prevent more Tibetans from entering India.745 Restrictions on religion were
implemented, reducing the Buddhist clerical population from 114,000 in 1958 to 18,104
by 1960 and the number of functioning temples and monasteries from 2,711 to 370.746
The Panchen Lama, who had a greater history of cooperation with the CCP than
the Dalai Lama, became the main spokesperson for the CCP in Tibet, and he condemned
foreign influences for the 1959 rebellion and other incidents of unrest.747 Any opposition
to democratic reforms, with the support of the Panchen Lama, was dismissed as the work
of “a handful of reactionaries.”748 However, the Panchen Lama was only allowed to
function in support of the CCP and did not exercise any true authority.
The CCP blamed the international community, which it denounced as “foreign
imperialists,” for the 1959 Rebellion and specifically targeted India as “expansionists.”749
Mao explicitly blamed the United States, Great Britain, and India at a high-level meeting
in Hangzhou in April, claiming the three countries were “making all kinds of noises and
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engaging in a big anti-China chorus opposing China’s suppression of the rebellion.”750 At
the Politburo meeting on the 25th of March in Shanghai, members of the central
leadership agreed the international community, particularly India, had played a role in the
rebellion. For his part, Mao had always been suspicious of the Indian government.751
Tensions between the governments of the PRC and India were tense as Tibetans, even in
the early 1950s, sought Indian support for independence or fled to India for asylum. The
Nonaggression Pact signed in April of 1954 was a victory for the CCP’s Tibetan
policy.752 After the pact was signed Sino-Indian relations improved and trade between
Tibet and India increased.753 However, relations declined after the Dalai Lama fled to
India.
The Dalai Lama and his supporters appealed to the United Nations, as well as
India, the United States, and other states to gain support against the CCP.754 The CCP
condemned the United Nations’ resolution about Tibet as illegal, calling it “another
criminal act of the United States government.”755 The CCP suspected that foreign forces
were aiding Tibetan rebels. Throughout the 1960s the Chinese continued to accuse the
Indian government of supporting the Dalai Lama and causing political unrest in Tibet.756
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The culmination of reforms in Central Tibet resulted in the foundation of the TAR
on the 1st of September in 1965, with Ngabo as Chairman.757 By this time the Panchen
Lama and other officials were being dismissed from posts in Tibet. The fall of the
Panchen Lama in 1964 was the most significant of these dismissals, as he was the Tibetan
spiritual leader the CCP consistently relied upon, especially after the flight of the Dalai
Lama. The betrayal of the Party by the Panchen Lama was another major blow to Mao’s
previous policy of gradualism in the TAR, as the CCP failed to incorporate the two
highest religious officials into the new governing structure the CCP was building in
Tibet.
The Panchen Lama had become critical of the central government’s policies in the
TAR and Eastern Tibet and expressed these views in the 70,000 character petition
submitted to the central leadership in 1962.758 It was not the first time the Panchen Lama
was critical of state policies; in fact, his views had been welcomed by the central
government prior to the petition.759 Propaganda efforts to denigrate the character of the
Panchen Lama began in 1962 after the petition was received.760 Mao described the
Panchen Lama as a “rock on the road to socialism” and his petition as “a poisoned arrow
aimed at the heart of the Party.”761 The Panchen Lama was no longer included in regional
meetings, or the NPC, and was officially removed as the TAR’s leader in December of
1964.762
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When the Cultural Revolution began in Tibet, regional leadership tried to monitor
and slowly implement the Cultural Revolution in the TAR.763 Factionalism among the
Red Guards nearly destabilized the TAR as violence spread outside of Lhasa, especially
in Nyemo.764 Local Red Guard organizations formed in Lhasa, with Chinese and Tibetan
participants, while regional leadership attempted to control the Cultural Revolution and
prevent mass organizations, local Red Guard groups still developed.765 In addition to
local organizations forming, Red Guards from other parts of China began to arrive in
Lhasa in September of 1966.766 Fearing the potential of the Red Guards, especially from
outside of the TAR, to de-stabilize the region, Zhang Guohua, who controlled the
regional Party and Military Headquarters, appealed to Beijing to have them removed, a
request that Zhou Enlai approved, but Jiang Qing blocked.767 Mao ordered the military to
take control of the region in 1967 as violence escalated, but it took years for the military
to subdue the Red Guards.768
The monastic establishment, which had lost its power and authority, was further
degraded during the Cultural Revolution through the physical destruction of temples and
religious paraphernalia.769 Red Guards forced Tibetans to destroy the temples.770 The
Gyenlo, the Rebels, faction exploited the resentment of Tibetans regarding the formation
of People Communes to gain support and attack the regional leadership as well as rival
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Red Guard factions.771 Gyenlo exploited the religious beliefs of the Tibetan people
through the nun Trinley Chodron in 1969, resulting in a period of mass death and terror
in Nyemo, near Lhasa.772 The leaders of the incident were arrested, some, including
Trinley, were executed in 1970.773 Regional leaders who advocated for using the military
to regain control of the region, such as Ren Rong, were promoted.774
By the end of the Mao era, the early policy of gradualism was completely
abandoned because of flight of the Dalai Lama, the purge of the Panchen Lama, and the
failure of the Seventeen Point Agreement. Tibetan religion and culture were violently
suppressed from 1959 until the end of the Mao Era. The majority of Tibetans were
resentful of CCP rule and, despite anti-Dalai Lama propaganda and religious repression,
were still loyal to the Tibetan Buddhist establishment.
Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
Deng Xiaoping, who had worked in the Southwest Military Bureau during the late
1940s and 1950s, had extensive experience and insight regarding Tibet. Advocating for a
return to more tolerant policies as part of his efforts to undo the damage of the Culture
Revolution, Deng was heavily influenced by his protégé, Hu Yaobang, until his disgrace
and dismissal in 1987.775 As a result, the Deng era heavily emphasized alleviating
poverty, relaxing religious controls in the TAR, and reevaluating the position of the Dalai
Lama in Tibet’s future.
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The Deng administration wanted to reach an agreement with the Dalai Lama in
which he could return to Tibet, under certain conditions. This was part of Deng’s remedy
for the damage caused by the oppressive policies of the Mao era. The Dalai Lama was
supportive of the reforms pursued by Hu Yaobang. Informal dialogue between the two
occurred, and Hu sent Dalai Lama points about his return to Tibet that the Dalai Lama
ultimately found disappointing. Deng wanted to use the Dalai Lama as a figurehead to
legitimize CCP rule in Tibet, but Deng was opposed to granting him any political
authority. The Dalai Lama’s return to China would be allowed, but he could not live in
Tibet (although he could visit as much as he wanted), and he would not be allowed to
hold a position of regional authority.776
After his visit to Tibet in 1980, Hu Yaobang became dedicated to alleviating
poverty and improving the autonomy system in the TAR. He began the practice of
hosting Work Conferences about Tibet in order to focus on growing the Tibetan economy
and eliminating poverty. The First Work Conference in 1980 established the early Deng
era position regarding Tibet: regional autonomy and representation of minorities needed
to be pursued, Tibetans were to be exempt from certain taxes, and Tibetan religion and
culture were to be revived.777 The Second Work Conference on Tibet, overseen by Hu
Yaobang in Beijing in 1984, decided Tibet would be opened up to other parts of China to
spur economic growth.778 This had unintended consequences, such as increased Han
Chinese migration and uneven economic development. This problem was not unique to
Tibet, as Deng sought to open up the PRC to foreign investment.
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Hu started to remove Han Chinese from the region in order to increase Tibetan
representation, but the economic policies agreed upon at the Work Forums increased
migration, which could not be stopped due to rumors of opportunity in Tibet across
Mainland China. The policies benefitted many economic migrants and Han Chinese
within the TAR, but not the majority of Tibetans. Consequently, rising economic
inequality sparked protests and riots during the late 1980s.779 As the overall political and
social situation declined in the 1980s, Deng decided to abandon the policy of toleration
advocated by Hu Yaobang and encouraged Han migration to improve Tibet’s economy.
While Hu could not have acted without Deng’s approval, it was the former who would be
blamed for unrest in Tibet. During the early 1980s, the Party sought to reduce its
influence in the personal lives of all citizens, but losing control over the economy and
migration in Tibet was unacceptable to Deng Xiaoping. The policies of toleration
advocated by Hu were viewed as a de-stabilizing force as the 1980s progressed.
As part of the cordial exchanges with the Dalai Lama during the early 1980s, the
Dalai Lama was invited to send a delegation to investigate conditions in Tibet. This
decision reflected how misinformed the central leadership was regarding the actual status
of Tibet and the success of CCP reforms there. Conditions were underreported and
misrepresented by Ren Rong and other members of the regional leadership to downplay
the economic and political conditions of Tibet. Ren was still highly regarded and trusted
by the CCP because of his support for using the military to restore order during the
Cultural Revolution. The delegation sent by the Dalia Lama arrived for visits in 1982 and
1984.780 The Party was confident the Dalai Lama would be impressed with its progress in
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Tibet. This was also Deng’s chance to impress upon the Dalai Lama that the CCP did not
need him to win the support of the Tibetan people for Chinese rule. However, Deng was a
pragmatist and wanted the Dalai Lama’s support, as it would facilitate the ability of the
CCP to implement its policies.
The reception in Eastern Tibet was an overwhelming display of support for the
Tibetan delegation and the Dalai Lama, as well as an opportunity for Tibetans to express
their discontent with Chinese rule. Each visit by the delegation was followed by antiChinese demonstrations. After receiving reports of the delegation’s reception in Eastern
Tibet, the CCP decided it might be too dangerous to allow the delegation to reach the
TAR and consulted Ren Rong about whether or not the delegation should continue.781
Ren assured the CCP that there would be no problem in the TAR, and Ren had even
approved measures to appeal to Tibetans not to boo and attack the delegation in the
weeks prior to its arrival.782 This highlights the level of disconnect between the CCP
leadership at all levels with Tibetans. The second delegation was removed due to what
the CCP claimed was a violation of the agreement not to contact foreign media.783
Overall, allowing the delegations into Tibet was a source of embarrassment for Deng, and
it proved to be the exact opposite of what Deng had hoped for concerning relations with
the Dalai Lama.
Discussions with the delegations and communications with the Dalai Lama
yielded few results. After the mid-1980s, the Dalai Lama and the TGIE sought more
international support, rather than engagement with the CCP. The delegations to Tibet
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were part of CCP efforts to ensure the Dalai Lama would only return to Tibet under CCP
conditions, but the continued popularity of the Dalai Lama, in Deng’s mind, prevented
this. That the Dalai Lama immediately resumed an international campaign only bolstered
Deng’s suspicion of the Dalai Lama and his new position regarding Tibet. The Dalai
Lama renounced his claim for Tibetan independence, but his refusal to claim Tibet had
always been a part of China was not enough for the CCP to allow meaningful dialogue
with the Dalai Lama to occur.784
After the mid-1980s, unrest spread throughout Greater Tibet. Tibetans were
angered by the lack of progress in CCP talks with the Dalai Lama, who continued to
appeal to the international community rather than the Chinese state.785 Monks who
demonstrated in support of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence during the late
1980s were arrested, causing more monks and Tibetan laity to organize demonstrations
for their release. Abandoning the plan to engage the Dalai Lama, Deng decided to use the
Panchen Lama in an effort to garner Tibetan support for the CCP. The Panchen Lama
was sent to the TAR in 1988 to placate the monks. Offers of compensation and funding
for monasteries was not enough to reduce the resentment, and protests continued after the
Panchen Lama arrived. The death of the Panchen Lama in January of 1989 created
another obstacle for the CCP in Tibet, which lost its highest Tibetan religious official
who supported CCP rule.786 The CCP immediately created a search team for his
reincarnation that eliminated the influence of the Dalai Lama in the identification
process.
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Wu Jinghua, who had been appointed as the head of the CCP in Tibet prior to the
dismissal of Hu Yaobang, was removed from power in 1988 and replaced with Hu
Jintao.787 Wu tried to maintain the more tolerant policies of Hu Yaobang, but failed to
remedy the political unrest and demonstrations by religious leaders and was dismissed.
Wu was an ethnic Yi, and his appointment had fostered hope that the CCP would soon
appoint an ethnic Tibetan as regional Party head.788 The appointment of Hu Jintao
marked Deng’s return to maintaining true regional power under Han Chinese Party
members and suppressing religious expression. Hu Jintao is Han Chinese, which
dispelled any notion that the Party would appoint a Tibetan as regional Party head. Hu
also did not make overt efforts to appeal to minority culture and religion as his
predecessor Wu Jinghua.
On March 5th in 1989 the largest anti-Han demonstration since the 1959
Rebellion broke out, which focused on the arrests of monks, economic inequality, Han
Chinese migration, and religious repression. In response to the 1989 Uprising martial law
was declared on the 8th of March until May of 1990, and foreign journalists and
diplomats were banned from the TAR.789 Protests, on a much smaller scale, occurred
after martial law was lifted through the end of the Deng era, but the CCP casually
dismissed them in the media as the work of “a tiny handful of separatists.”790 The CCP,
after the 1989 Uprising, became more suspicious about the true loyalties of Tibetan
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cadres and Party members and increased their propaganda efforts denouncing the Dalai
Lama.791
Illiteracy and economic inequality remained unresolved issues during the Deng
era, with the latter increasing due to Deng’s economic reform policies.792 By 1991, the
CCP began to send thousands of young Tibetans to other parts of China in order to
receive education in an effort to foster state loyalty and prepare them to spur economic
growth upon returning to Tibet.793 The focus on improving the economy remained, but
state loyalty was emphasized over religious tolerance toward the end of the Deng era.
Han migration to the TAR was increasingly emphasized as the solution to the CCP’s
problems. Deng stated to former American President Jimmy Carter that the CCP would
no longer delay Han migration to Tibet to appease the special characteristics of Tibet.794
The CCP was infuriated when, in 1989, the Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel
Peace Prize. Deng’s position on the Dalai Lama was similar to Mao’s—that is, he would
only be useful to CCP purposes if he could be controlled. The Dalai Lama’s refusal to
accept all of the CCP’s terms for his return to Tibet resulted in the Party abandoning
negotiations and denouncing the Dalai Lama for separatism and for creating unrest in
Tibet. By the end of the Deng era there were enormous economic and social problems in
Tibet, which were major sources of Tibetan discontent with CCP rule and Tibetan
support for the Dalai Lama.
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Despite these persistent problems concerning the needs and grievances of the
majority of Tibetans, the CCP had successfully created a loyal group of Tibetan elites
who occupied positions in the government, were loyal to Beijing, and genuinely opposed
Tibetan independence.795 In addition to this minority, an increasing number of Tibetans,
who still resented aspects of CCP rule, had benefitted from the reforms and saw no other
viable alternative for Tibet’s future, other than to remain a part of China.796
During the early 1980s, Deng reversed some Mao era policies restricting religion
that resulted in a religious revival in Tibet. Deng coupled this with opening up Tibet to
allow for economic development, but this resulted in increased Han migration and
uneven economic development. Tibetans became increasingly discontent with remaining
restrictions on religion and free speech, in addition to uneven economic development.
Once Tibetan unrest became violent Deng reverted to policies of suppression and used
force to maintain order in Tibet. Self-expression was only tolerable if it served the Party’s
purposes.
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
Jiang Zemin inherited a Tibet with a leadership vacuum. A Panchen Lama was
lacking, and there was no sincere hope for the Dalai Lama to return under CCP terms.
Jiang had to address the severe economic situation, most notably economic inequality, as
well as the political animosity the majority of Tibetans harbored toward the CCP. Jiang
emphasized the CCP-approved history of Tibet and claimed that, prior to CCP rule, Tibet
“was even more dark and backward than in Europe in the Middle Ages.”797 Jiang sought
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to control the narrative regarding the history of Tibet and the Dalai Lama through media
campaigns as well as Patriotic Education.
Jiang continued to host Tibetan Work Conferences, with the third in 1994 and the
fourth in 2001. By the start of the Jiang administration the Party was concerned by the
slow rate of economic growth in the TAR and economic inequality between Tibetans and
other ethnic groups, most notably the Han and the Hui.798 The Third Tibetan Work
Conference focused on “two major tasks,” improving the Tibetan economy and fostering
political stability, in order to instill a sense of loyalty among Tibetans to the Chinese
state, rather than to the long exiled Dalai Lama who had remained more popular than the
Party well into the Jiang era.799 The CCP agreed to allocate funding for modernization
efforts in Tibet and invested 4.86 billion Chinese yuan for construction projects.800 The
Fourth Tibetan Work Conference, held in June of 2001, focused on comprehensive
modernization, which expanded the plan of action agreed upon during the Third Tibetan
Work Conference.801 After 2001 the central government facilitated more investment in
the Tibetan economy as a solution for Tibet’s developmental and economic challenges.802
While pursuing development and modernization in Tibet, the Jiang regime
maintained that it respected the culture and religion of the Tibetan people.803 The CCP
cited its bilingual Tibetan education system as evidence of its respect for the Tibetan
language and its efforts to continue promoting the use of Tibetan.804 The CCP also touted
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its efforts with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) to preserve various cultural heritage sites in Tibet.805 The Party’s official
position of respecting the Tibetan language did not reflect the reality that Mandarin
remained the language of economic prosperity. Consequently, discrimination against
Tibetans in the job market continued, as did ethnic tension and Tibetan resentment of the
CCP.
The issue of the Panchen Lama was prominent for Jiang, as the search committee
assembled during the Deng administration sought to identify and confirm the eleventh
Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama controversy of 1995 confirmed CCP suspicions that
the Dalai Lama could not be trusted and wanted to undermine Chinese unity. The CCP
wanted to control the process, ideally with no influence from the Dalai Lama.806
However, the search committee had indirect contact with the Dalai Lama regarding the
search and alerted him of its selection, Gedhum Choekyi Nyima, before the Party
announced it.807 While the CCP wanted to eliminate the influence of the Dalai Lama, the
search committee informed the Party that the Panchen Lama needed to be confirmed by
the Dalai Lama for Tibetans to accept him as legitimate.808
The Dalai Lama upset CCP plans by publicly recognizing the search committee’s
selection as the legitimate reincarnation of the Panchen Lama.809 Six months after the
Dalai Lama’s announcement, the CCP officially rejected Gedhum Choekyi Nyima as the
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eleventh Panchen Lama due to the Dalai Lama’s interference.810 Gedhum Choekyi Nyima
was placed under house arrest, and the head of the original search committee was
condemned as a traitor to the Chinese state.811
Beijing authorities met with Tibetan leaders (leaders recognized by the CCP, not
the Dalai Lama or TGIE) and presented three different candidates to participate in the
golden urn drawing for the Panchen Lama. Gyaincain Norbu was identified as the
eleventh Panchen Lama through this procedure.812 It was not until 1999 that the CCPapproved Panchen Lama, escorted by a heavy police presence, moved to the Panchen
Lama’s historical home in Shigatse.813 Prior to his arrival in Shigatse, the CCP
implemented campaigns in monasteries encouraging the monks and nuns to accept
Gyaincain Norbu as the eleventh Panchen Lama.814 These efforts regarding the Panchen
Lama were part of the massive Patriotic Education efforts Jiang expanded throughout the
PRC.
Publicly, the Jiang regime maintained that the Dalai Lama would be welcomed
back if he declared that Tibet was, and always was, a part of China.815 The Dalai Lama
had abandoned his quest for Tibetan independence in the 1987 Strasbourg address, and
again in 1997 when he acknowledged Tibet was a part of China.816 However, this was not
enough to appease Jiang. Many Party members did not trust the Dalai Lama and the Dalai
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Lama would not admit Tibet had always been a part of China.817 This contradicted the
CCP position and the Dalai Lama was still too dangerous to be allowed to return to Tibet.
Jiang asserted patriotism to the Chinese state as a precondition for becoming a lama, and
indicated that the Dalai Lama may not even be replaced after his death.818 By the end of
the Jiang regime in 2002, the CCP allowed a Tibetan delegation to visit China, although
it was deemed a personal visit by the Chinese government, despite members of the
delegation meeting with officials in Shigatse.819 These visits were different from those
conducted during the 1980s. Unlike Deng Xiaoping, Jiang’s administration never entered
into serious negotiations with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. Rather, the sole purpose
of these visits was to improve the CCP’s image.
Patriotic Education was to create loyal Chinese citizens, which included lamas
and monks. Patriotic Education was proposed during the late Deng era, but it was Jiang
who implemented these campaigns on a large scale and in autonomous regions. In Tibet
these campaigns not only sought to instill loyalty to the Chinese state, but also to reduce
the influence of religion and the Dalai Lama, particularly among Tibetan youth, as the
older generation had been dismissed as too reactionary during the Deng era.820 These
educational campaigns were still extended to adults, and even to government officials and
Party members.821 Jiang asserted that the CCP respected the right to practice religion, so
long as citizens’ religious practices and expressions were, what the Party deemed,
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“normal.”822 However, education, and other propaganda initiatives pursued by the CCP,
attacked religious expression by promoting atheism and disparaging the traditional
Tibetan monastic establishment. Tests were administered for monks and nuns regarding
Patriotic Education materials, and those who failed were defrocked.823 As a result, over
10,000 were defrocked.824
Jiang Zemin sought to expand the Party’s control over Tibetan religion,
education, and administration. Jiang implemented measures to closely regulate
monasteries and ensure monks and nuns were loyal to the Party in order to quell Tibetan
nationalist sentiment. However, monasteries remained the center of what Jiang
considered to be separatist activities. The Party facilitated migration into Eastern Tibet
and enhanced efforts to increase the Han population in the TAR. Jiang did not consider
allowing genuine autonomy as evident by his restrictions of religious freedom, control
over monastic establishments, and efforts to reduce the influence of Tibetan language and
culture.
Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
Hu Jintao’s response to irredentist threats in Tibet from 2002 to 2012 was
influenced by his experience suppressing the Tibetan Uprising in March of 1989. He
continued and expanded many policies implemented under Jiang Zemin. The Beijing
Demonstrations of 1989 overshadowed other crises, such as the Tibetan Uprising, which
Hu Jintao was pivotal in putting down. Hu’s actions in Tibet saved his career with the
Party and resulted both in his recognition by Deng and in his subsequent rise to power.
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Hu Jintao’s Tibet policy was unapologetic for the grievances harbored by
Tibetans toward the CCP. During the Hu regime, the CCP continued to emphasize the
history of Tibet prior to “peaceful liberation” and the cruelty of the serf system under the
Dalai Lama.825 The regime publicly extolled the success of the autonomy system in the
TAR.826 Hu’s administration in 2004 noted the following:
…at present, of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Standing
Committee of the People's Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region,
Tibetans and people of other ethnic minorities make up 87.5 percent; of
the members of the Standing Committee of the Regional People's
Congress, 69.23 percent; of the chairman and vice-chairmen of the Tibet
Autonomous Region, 57 percent; and of the Standing Committee members
and members of the CPPCC Tibet Committee, 90.42 percent and 89.4
percent, respectively. Of the functionaries of the state organs at the
regional, prefectural (city) and county levels, Tibetans and citizens of
other ethnic minorities make up 77.97 percent; of the people's courts and
people's procuratorates at the regional, prefectural (city) and county levels,
they make up 69.82 percent and 82.25 percent, respectively.827
The Hu administration failed to admit that, while Tibetans were represented in the
government apparatus, there was a lack of Tibetans in true positions of power within the
regional CCP. The local government remained the voice of the Party. It did not exercise
true authority and served only to legitimize Chinese rule in Tibet by validating Hu’s
claim that the autonomy system truly represented Tibetan interests. Hu viewed Patriotic
Education as critical to ensuring stability and loyalty throughout China. These campaigns
were escalated after instances of violence in 2008, as work teams were sent to rural
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Tibetan areas.828 This was part of the Party’s effort to extend its influence into parts of
Tibet in which its presence was minimal in an attempt to supplant loyalty to the Dalai
Lama with loyalty to the CCP. Resistance to the Patriotic Education campaigns and the
rigorous system of testing it entailed resulted in imprisonment.829
Education continued to be an area in which the Party struggled. Due to
marketization, education, although universal, became expensive in urban areas and
facilities were lacking in rural areas. Some Tibetans even illegally sent their children
across the border into India and Nepal for education.830 The decreased use of the Tibetan
language in school facilities also contributed to Tibetan youths seeking education in
bordering nations.831
Hu continued to support Han Chinese migration to Tibet in order to promote
economic development and political stability. Eastern Tibet already had large numbers of
Han residents. By 2008, the territory regarded by the dissident community of Greater
Tibet had 6,000,000 Tibetans and 7,500,000 Han Chinese.832 When criticized for its Han
migration policies the CCP dismissed these accusations as absurd because the CCP only
recognized the TAR as Tibet, which had a population of approximately 2,660,000 people,
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92% of whom were Tibetans.833 Regardless of the criticisms, Hu sought to increase the
number of Han in the TAR in order to speed up the economic development of the
region.834
While the government had implemented quota systems in the government and
educational system since the Deng regime, Tibetans still struggled economically,
especially in comparison to the Han and the Hui.835 The CCP sought to improve the
economic conditions of Tibet through continued investment in infrastructure, but the
projects caused other issues, as Tibetans lost their homes and failed to receive adequate
compensation.836
Publicly, Hu Jintao entertained the option of discussions with the Dalai Lama, but
he never intended for sincere and effective dialogue to occur. The TGIE found these talks
to be unproductive, which was what the CCP intended. These talks were for appearances,
especially in 2008 as protests regarding Tibet broke out in the build-up to the Olympics.
While the talks occurred, the Party and regional leadership both maintained the position
that the Dalai Lama had betrayed Tibet and the Chinese state when he fled to India in
1959.837 Hu, and the rest of the CCP, remained suspicious of the Dalai Lama’s true
motivations, not believing he had abandoned Tibetan independence.838 In addition to
accusing the Dalai Lama of trying to destabilize Tibet and fragment the Chinese state, the
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CCP accused him of supporting “evil cults,” such as Falun Gong.839 In 2008, while
violence raged throughout Tibet, the CCP blamed the Dalia Lama but agreed to talks with
Tibetan envoys from the exile community.840 The Hu regime often stated that the Dalai
Lama had no place in the future of Tibet, which proved the futility of the dialogue
between the Tibetan envoys and the CCP in 2008 and 2009.841
During the Hu regime, the CCP strongly emphasized its dedication to protecting
the culture and religion of Tibet.842 It assigned 570 million Chinese yuan to restore and
maintain Tibetan cultural heritage destinations from 2006-2010.843 The Tibetan language
was identified as “a member of the Han-Tibetan language family.”844 However, Tibetans
still believed the CCP’s policies marginalized the Tibetan language, and protests against
education policies continued in 2010.845 Protests regarding language policies and
education were frequent in the Eastern Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Gansu in 2010.846
The CCP asserted that religion was part of Tibetan culture and as such was protected by
the state.847 However, it banned images of the Dalai Lama, and threatened to confiscate
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the land of residents who violated the ban.848 Religious regulations focused heavily on
monasteries and religious officials, since they often inspired popular demonstrations and
anti-government protests. Self-immolations increased during the Hu regime as protests
against Chinese rule grew more common place in Lhasa, Qinghai, Gansu, and Sichuan. In
2011, the Party pursued additional measures expanding political reeducation, prohibiting
public celebration of TGIE elections, and restricting the mobility of monks.849
Despite its claims to protect Tibetan culture and religion, religious materials,
especially those related to the Dalai Lama, were designated as anti-state materials,
leading to house raids and arrests.850 Patriotic Education campaigns in monastic
establishments that forced monks and nuns to recognize the CCP’s selection for Panchen
Lama as the legitimate Panchen Lama were expanded.851 The CCP continued efforts to
control monasteries by creating rules, through Order Number 5 of the State
Administration for Religious Affairs, which endowed the state with the ultimate authority
to approve lama reincarnations.852 Patriotic Education required monks and nuns to
denounce the Dalai Lama, which resulted in resistance from monks and nuns.853
The continued devotion of the majority of Tibetans to the Dalai Lama and to
Buddhism generally constituted separatist activities in the eyes of CCP leaders, who
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became increasingly concerned with Tibetan separatist threats.854 Party efforts focused on
quelling separatist notions within monastic establishments.855 Public security forces
heavily monitored monasteries. Monks and nuns who were deemed too threatening were
expelled and replaced with those regarded as loyal to the state.856 Chinese authorities
imposed sieges in 2011 around monasteries in Sichuan due to self-immolations in protest
of the CCP.857 Three months into the siege of Kirtit over 300 monks were detained and
sentenced to political reeducation.858 Self-immolations were more common in Eastern
Tibet than the TAR and continued to be a major issue confronting Hu.
The Beijing Olympics served as a source of national pride for the Chinese people,
which activists used to draw attention to the status of Tibet. Consequently, March of 2008
was the most violent period in Tibet since the late 1980s, for which the CCP blamed the
Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Clique, for trying to destabilize Tibet.859 Ethnic violence
occurred throughout Lhasa, as Tibetans attacked Han and Hui places of business.860
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Lhasa was locked down, and the Party increased police and military forces in the TAR to
restore order.861 As with previous violent incidents, foreign journalists were banned from
Tibet, and the CCP blamed the foreign media for biased coverage.862 Protests began in
Lhasa but quickly spread to Sichuan and Qinghai, with as many as 2,000 monks and laity
protesting in Qinghai alone in March of 2008.863 Internet censorship was increased to
block foreign web pages.864 The police conducted raids confiscating materials deemed
threatening to the state, such as pictures of the Dalai Lama, and a curfew was enacted in
Lhasa.865 Curfews were implemented for monks and travel restrictions were imposed on
Tibetans during the Olympic Games, with some monks and nuns being under constant
surveillance.866 Paramilitary police arrested Tibetan leaders, and security personnel used
force against crowds.867 After 2008, security forces were increased in Tibet every March
around sensitive anniversaries throughout the rest of the Hu era.868
Authorities authorized “patriotic activity” in the form of a rally in support of the
Olympics, but Tibetans were not welcome.869 Authorities closely regulated the torch
ceremony in Tibet, and attendance was strictly monitored. Tibetans were allowed to
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attend, but only if they held positions within the government or were deemed loyal to the
state.870 Patriotic Education was intensified in the immediate aftermath of the 2008
March riots and demonstrations.871 Strike Hard campaigns were pursued in January of
2009, and Lhasa security forces raided almost 3,000 homes and detained over 5,000
individuals for questioning.872 This was not successful in quelling discontent, and protests
continued as monks and nuns still resisted Patriotic Education.873 As the sixtieth
anniversary of the founding of the PRC approached and unrest persisted, security was
increased in Lhasa and restrictions were placed on visas.874
Despite its concerns regarding Tibet, the CCP lauded its achievements in Tibet
while “laying bare the lies of the Dalai clique” during the sixtieth anniversary of Tibet’s
“peaceful liberation” in 2011.875 Tibetan independence was dismissed as “part of
imperialist aggressors' attempt to carve up China.”876 The CCP focused on what it
considered to be the success of the autonomy system, citing 2007 figures that 94% of
deputies elected directly or indirectly to peoples’ congresses were not Han but Tibetan or
other nationalities.877 After the violence of 2008 and until the end of the Hu regime, more
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restrictions were introduced in Tibet that restricted access to information, especially
information concerning the Dalai Lama.878
Hu Jintao sought to control the monastic establishment, eradicate loyalty to the
Dalai Lama and create loyalty to the CCP. Hu continued the Patriotic Education
campaigns under Jiang, which created backlash from monks and nuns. This, coupled with
Tibetan activists using the 2008 Olympics to draw attention to the Tibet question,
resulted in violent unrest from 2008 to 2012. Hu used public security forces and laid
siege to monasteries in an attempt to gain control over the region. Han migration to both
Eastern and Central Tibet continued, as the Party sought to ensure regional stability
through creating a Han majority. Hu suppressed Tibetan identity in order to pursue
regional stability rather than allow legitimate self-determination.
Conclusions:
Figure 5.2 summarizes the self-determination situation for the first four
generations of CCP central leadership regarding Tibet.
Figure 5.2 Tibet Self-determination Framework
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Tibet was a high domestic priority for all four generations. The drastic cultural
and political differences between Tibet and China were the most concerning for Mao as
he sought to gradually incorporate Central Tibet into the rest of China. The remaining
three generations of leadership were less concerned about cultural differences between
Tibetans and other nationalities and more concerned with ameliorating Tibetan
resentment toward the CCP. The location of Tibet on the border of India, and the interest
of the international community, made Tibet a high international priority for every leader
except Jiang. Deng still prioritized Tibet as an international issue, but he viewed it more
as a domestic issue, having never recognized the TGIE as a foreign entity. All
negotiations were a matter of domestic affairs for Deng. However, the CCP had not
sufficiently reduced the support of other countries for Tibet to a level where Tibet could
be a moderate or low international priority until the end of the Deng era.
Tibetans always had a strong sense of nationhood and a desire for selfdetermination due to the influence of Tibetan Buddhism (despite the different schools)
and elite disagreements on every aspect of Tibetan identity. This sentiment has persisted
and been strengthened by CCP efforts to eliminate religion in the TAR. The movement
for Tibetan self-determination was strong during the Mao era because the PLA had a
minimal presence in Tibet and the CCP was not well established in Central Tibet. Both
the departure of the Dalai Lama and the establishment of the TGIE weakened organized
domestic self-determination movements. During the reform era monasteries were the
center of domestic self-determination movements, but the CCP, PLA, and People’s
Armed Police, were established forces in the region. Consequently, these selfdetermination movements are unable to be categorized as strong.
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The CCP never genuinely respected the religious identity of the Tibetans, as
evidenced by its efforts to exploit religious leaders to gain support for CCP rule,
propaganda efforts, and Party ideology. Any instance of religious tolerance was an effort
to solicit support for the CCP from the Tibetans. There was no genuine support for
Tibetan self-determination. Whenever religious expression became too threatening to the
Party, it was brutally suppressed. This began on a large scale during the Cultural
Revolution and is why Tibet has had a self-determination ranking of 5 at some point
during each generation of leadership. By the Jiang era, religion was deemed too
threatening to the state, and the Party never wavered from this position and sought to
eliminate religious expression. This is why Jiang and Hu are consistently ranked at 5 for
self-determination status. Mao and Deng attempted more tolerant policies, but ultimately
abandoned gradualist policies, which is why their rankings fluctuate from 3 to 5
depending on context. Mao’s early efforts to implement a gradual and tolerant approach
in Central Tibet did not extend to Eastern Tibet, which is why he has a self-determination
ranking of 3 until 1959, instead of a 2. Self-determination status in Tibet only fell under a
5 when central leadership believed it could be channeled into support of the Chinese
state. Once central leadership realized Tibetans did not accept the CCP and still supported
the Dalai Lama, self-determination violations became more frequent and intense.
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Chapter Six: Conclusions
Introduction:
The concluding chapter assesses each leader’s actions regarding all five cases,
discusses the framework applied, the accuracy of the hypotheses, and provides a brief
assessment of Xi Jinping’s likely future actions regarding self-determination and
territorial disputes in each case. The actions of the leaders analyzed in chapters two
through five were actions expected of leaders within a Leninist party. The consistent
Leninist approach to minority nationalities makes forecasts regarding the future policymaking processes of Xi Jinping and his eventual successors possible.
Leadership Analysis:
Mao Zedong, 1949-1976:
The figure below summarizes Mao’s approach to self-determination in each case.
Figure 6.1 Mao Zedong Self-determination Framework
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Mao highly prioritized each case internationally and domestically, with the
exception of Taiwan. This was due to the need to reunify China under the borders
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established by Qing officials. China had already lost Outer Mongolia with the declaration
of the Mongolian People’s Republic, so the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needed to
act quickly to prevent the loss of any more territory. The peoples within these territories
all had strong self-determination sentiments, which Mao wanted to channel into a unified
Chinese identity. The greatest challenge for Mao was Tibet due to the strength of Tibetan
self-determination movements and a lack of CCP influence. This was the reason Tibet’s
“special characteristics” were tolerated in comparison to the other cases. Until the mid1950s, Mao advocated tolerance of minority cultures and characteristics as a general
policy. However, this was done with the intent to consolidate CCP power; it was not done
out of respect for self-determination rights.
Mao adhered to the Leninist approach and never intended to respect minority selfdetermination rights indefinitely. This is why CCP policies were often contradictory and
not effectively implemented. When the tolerant approach proved too slow or ineffective
in spurring the socialist society Mao sought, he switched to more radical policies to
assimilate minority nationalities. The great exception to this assimilationist approach of
the Mao era was Taiwan, which never fell under the direct administration of the CCP.
Improved relations with the West and the need to maintain stability in territories already
under CCP control prevented more radical policies from being pursued in order to resolve
the Taiwan question.
Mao’s general approach to minority nationalities was to promise more autonomy
than he intended to allow, which caused numerous contradictions between CCP promises
and the actual self-determination status in autonomous regions. When minority
nationalities were angered by the contradictions within the autonomy system and the
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privileged status of Han Party members, Mao responded by becoming openly
assimilationist.
Deng Xiaoping, 1978-1992:
The figure below summarizes Deng’s approach to self-determination in each case.
Figure 6.2 Deng Xiaoping Self-determination Framework
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Deng prioritized Tibet highly both internationally and domestically. Xinjiang was
not a high domestic priority until the Baren uprising in 1990. Xinjiang, prior to 1990,
Taiwan, and Inner Mongolia were all moderate priorities both domestically and
internationally. Deng’s primary focus was to restore faith in the CCP through reform,
and this was not unique to contested territories and minority areas. Tibet was a special
case for Deng, largely because of Hu Yaobang’s role and the persistent belief that Tibet
had unique characteristics. Similar to Mao, once the stability of the region was
threatened, these characteristics were no longer adequate justification for a more tolerant
approach toward Tibet.
Domestic self-determination sentiment was strong in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang,
and Tibet because of the religious persecution, and cultural suppression under the Mao
era. While religious suppression occurred in Inner Mongolia, religion was a less critical
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component of Mongol identity in comparison to the importance of religion in Xinjiang
and Tibet. Religious revival during the early Deng era occurred because of the less
invasive policies pursued by the CCP. Self-determination movements were strong in
Taiwan, because it remained outside the direct administration of the CCP, which would
have prevented democratization on the island. Since there was no moderate or strong selfdetermination movement in Xinjiang, it was less of a priority for Deng, at least until the
Baren uprising when it became apparent that even weak, poorly organized movements
could still pose problems for regional stability.
Deng experimented with a return to reform and prior autonomy policies.
However, the purge of Hu Yaobang coupled with ethnic unrest, especially in Tibet and
Xinjiang, caused Deng and the Party to abandon policies with the potential to allow for
self-determination. Deng never intended to allow greater self-determination. However,
this did not prevent the peoples in each case from attempting to access their right to selfdetermination in the early reform era. Once Deng and the CCP realized selfdetermination sentiment would not result in greater appreciation for the CCP and its
reform agenda, and could not be controlled by the Party, Deng became more
assimilationist. This was preferred to allowing nationalist movements, which challenged
the autonomy system to grow.
Jiang Zemin, 1992-2002:
The figure below summarizes Jiang’s approach to self-determination in each case.
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Figure 6.3 Jiang Zemin Self-determination Framework
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Jiang was intent on maintaining both one-party rule under the CCP and the
territorial integrity of the PRC. Jiang highly prioritized each region domestically because
of pro-democracy movements and other demonstrations at the end of the 1980s, the fall
of the Soviet Union, and general discontent with the Party. Tibet was only a moderate
priority because Jiang sought to minimize the role of Tibet as an international question,
and the CCP was successful in strengthening international relations, despite continued
sympathy for the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama dominated the international debate
regarding Tibet, but the CCP had successfully secured recognition from the majority of
countries that Tibet was a part of China. Therefore, its international status was secured
even if its domestic status was tenuous. As Jiang had no legitimate aspirations to engage
the Dalai Lama, the Party diminished the Tibet question internationally and confined the
situation to domestic politics. Jiang by no means dismissed Tibet internationally, but it
was just not a high priority. Jiang highly prioritized creating economic and military ties
with countries bordering the territory of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Economic
development with the new Soviet Republics and Russia was established as the best way
to ensure border security and eliminate international support for separatist movements.
Jiang prioritized all regions at moderate or high levels due, in part, to the high
levels of domestic self-determination sentiment present in each case. Jiang attempted to
channel this sentiment toward the development of a unified Chinese identity through
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Patriotic Education campaigns. Jiang thoroughly undermined movements that sought
greater self-determination, preventing the formation of any strong self-determination
movements. He never entertained notions of reform, and as such there were few
vacillating self-determination status rankings. As Jiang consolidated Party rule, he also
created consistent practices and policies to suppress expressions of self-determination
deemed threatening to the Party. Self-determination violations were more prevalent and
intense in Tibet and Xinjiang because of the smaller population of Han Chinese and
because of strong religious identities in these regions. Unlike Taiwan, the two regions
were under CCP administration. Inner Mongolia was under the direct administration of
the CCP, and it had a majority Han population.
Jiang did not make concessions to minority nationalities. Unlike Mao and Deng,
there was no period in which Jiang was not openly assimilationist. Jiang did not fear
international isolation due to CCP human rights violations. Western nations had lifted
sanctions after Tiananmen Square, and proved more interested in greater economic
cooperation with the PRC than improving the human rights situation in China. Jiang also
reinvigorated Chinese nationalism through Patriotic Education and propaganda, ensuring
the majority of Han Chinese supported the PRC territorial integrity under CCP rule.
Hu Jintao, 2002-2012:
The figure below summarizes Hu’s approach to self-determination in each case.
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Figure 6.4 Hu Jintao Self-determination Framework
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Hu Jintao placed the two most internationally well-known territorial disputes,
Taiwan and Tibet, at the highest priority, but territorial integrity was never a low priority.
The role of the Olympics influenced the change of priority for Xinjiang in 2008, and the
Olympics influenced CCP policies for Tibet, though Tibet was already a high priority.
Xinjiang was exploited to curry international favor during the Global War on Terror
(GWOT), but the region itself was not a high priority for Hu until ethnic violence broke
out there. However, through a combination of economics and diplomacy, the region was
firmly under CCP control.
Domestic self-determination was strong in all cases throughout the Hu era.
However, the CCP increased its military and police power, which undermined the ability
for any territories under CCP control to have strong self-determination movements.
Taiwan’s political leadership under Ma appealed to many CCP interests to improve
Cross-Strait relations, but this did not diminish the power of self-determination
movements on Taiwan, as its democracy is still fully in control of the island through
legitimate democratic elections. However, it did influence the actions of its leaders as
evident by Ma’s presidency.
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Self-determination status between the Hu and Jiang eras was consistent. In
regions without an overwhelming Han majority, coupled with the presence of strong
religious identities, the self-determination status ranking is a 5. This shows evidence that
the Party has found a consistent approach to minority groups whose access to selfdetermination is deemed threatening to the Party. While violent repression increased in
Tibet and Xinjiang after 2008, the situation was already at a 5, and there was no higher
ranking to reflect that escalation.
Hu was unapologetic for his assimilationist minority nationalities policies. China
was a major international power and no state or institution posed a significant challenge
to its repressive policies. Hu was in line with the second phase of Leninist minority
nationalities policy and his policy decisions are evidence that the CCP has firmly
established its authority in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Taiwan remained outside
of CCP control, but Hu continued to implement the CCP’s gradual plan, while preventing
any possibility of Taiwanese independence. What remains to be determined is when the
third phase of the Leninist system will be implemented: preventing nationalist influences
within the Party.
Framework Discussion:
The framework applied in this thesis has several strengths. The field of selfdetermination studies is broad, and narrowing it down is a tremendous task. The
framework I introduce is the first step in narrowing the scope of self-determination
studies in a manner that allows for meaningful comparative analysis. It isolates the
important variables of self-determination sentiment and strength of self-determination
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movements in assessing state priorities. However, future work using this framework
needs to overcome issues in the self-determination status ranking.
The greatest weakness was accounting for escalation in the violation of selfdetermination rights when the ranking is already at a 5. This was most problematic in the
cases of Xinjiang and Tibet under Hu Jintao. It is true that the escalation of violent and
oppressive policies toward Uyghurs and Tibetans increased after 2008, but the selfdetermination status was already at a 5 and could not increase, despite the increase in
oppressive conditions.
In the case of Taiwan, when self-determination movements on the island were
weak and subjected to Japanese and then GMD rule, the domestic priority for the CCP
was low. The GMD did not want to separate from China, and during the Mao era, rather
than contesting the autonomy of Taiwan, which political party was the legitimate
representative of China was the contested matter at issue. International politics made the
island a high priority, but from a secessionist standpoint the island was not a threat. As
the strength of self-determination movements grew on Taiwan during the Deng era, it
became a higher CCP priority. As the strength of these movements became more evident
through successful democratic elections, especially during the Jiang and Hu eras, the
domestic priority became higher.
In the case of Taiwan, as the strength of self-determination movements
strengthened, the domestic priority increased, as did the self-determination status ranking.
This indicates that the violation of self-determination rights was a common feature of
CCP policy. This is not the case in Inner Mongolia. Once domestic self-determination
was weakened during the Deng era, it became less of a domestic priority. However, the
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CCP still views the IMAR as a model for Xinjiang and Tibet, which influences CCP
policies regarding Mongolians because of the potential impact minority unrest could have
on Xinjiang and Tibet. Domestic self-determination sentiment was consistently strong,
but the movements were not. Self-determination status after Mao had less to do with both
the internal conditions of the region and more to do with the implications of successful or
unsuccessful minority nationality policies throughout the PRC, especially in Xinjiang and
Tibet, due to the historical importance of Mongolians to the success of the CCP. The
CCP had control of Inner Mongolia to the point where suppressing minority discontent
was easy, but necessary, in order to prevent its spread to other minority regions.
In the case of Xinjiang, similar to Inner Mongolia, self-determination movements
were weak after the Mao era, but the response of the CCP, increasingly, was to restrict
the autonomy and self-determination rights of the Uyghurs. The domestic and
international priority alternated between moderate and high, but self-determination
sentiment remained strong no matter the priority, self-determination status, and strength
of self-determination movements. The CCP successfully weakened domestic selfdetermination movements, but, as the generations of leadership progressed, this did not
result in greater self-determination rights.
Tibet is unique among the cases, as it was always a high domestic priority and the
strength of self-determination movements was never diminished to the point of being
weak. Tibetans are not able to challenge the CCP in Tibet, but Tibetans activists are able
to gain popular support through the role of monasteries in both Eastern and Central Tibet.
Religious identity and the monastic establishment in Tibet, despite decades of CCP
efforts to eliminate both, still influence the majority of Tibetans. The Dalai Lama,
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although not active in domestic efforts, is the symbol and rallying point for Tibetan
discontent. None of the other self-determination movements in the other cases have such
a charismatic leader who creates such popular support and adoration. The CCP became
more assimilationist, especially after it had established international recognition of its
right to Tibet and control through domestic security and political and administrative
institutions.
The framework verified that the CCP has continued as a Leninist party and
consistently applied the basic principles of Leninist nationalities philosophy. This is not
as relevant in the case of Taiwan, which remains outside of CCP control. However, it
suggests the conciliatory approach of the CCP toward Taiwan will be limited, and selfdetermination will not be respected on Taiwan if the CCP ever gains direct administrative
control of the island. The Leninist model advocates for members of central leadership to
promise minority nationalities autonomy in order to co-opt minorities into the communist
state, but withhold genuine autonomy. Once the Party has established effective control
over minority areas the next phase of the Leninist model is assimilation. The cases of
Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet were under direct administrative control of the CCP,
but it still was in the process of consolidating its power over the minority nationalities in
the three cases. The Mao and Deng eras display a shift in self-determination status
between 3 and 5 because the CCP vacillated between the initial phase of appealing to
minority nationalities and the more assimilationist phase. There is no precise
measurement for when the third phase will begin, which is why there are inconsistencies
in the Mao and Deng eras. However, by the Jiang and Hu eras, with control of the three
cases firmly established both domestically and internationally, the assimilationist phase
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can begin with little to no deviations. This is why the self-determination status of the Hu
and Jiang eras was always 4 or 5, with no shift. By the Jiang era the CCP was firmly in
the assimilationist phase, what remains to be determined is when it will enter the next
phase.
Hypotheses:
Hypothesis One: In my first hypothesis I expected to find that the CCP’s first
response to irredentist threats would be through implementing propaganda efforts that
promoted the idea of national unity. These propaganda efforts were intended to control
the narrative regarding the status of minority nationalities and prevent the use of force to
preserve territorial integrity.
Figure 6.5 Hypothesis One Assessment
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This hypothesis proved true in every case, with the exception of Mao and Taiwan.
This is because Mao’s initial focus was on completely defeating Chiang Kaishek and
after the start of the Korea War. The status of Taiwan was not a major issue for national
unity during the Mao era, as the legacy of winning the Civil War and the success of the
revolution, in addition to Mao’s charisma, were enough to establish legitimacy. It is not
until later that the issue became a matter of territorial integrity. The CCP continued its
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propaganda efforts, but it coupled them with military or police suppression if perceived
separatist threats or unrest occurred.
Hypothesis Two: When testing hypothesis two, I expected the CCP, after the mid1950s and until the pro-democracy protests and widespread civil unrest of 1989, would
be less restrained in authorizing the use force to quell internal separatist threats.
However, as the PRC gained a more prominent role in international politics and engaged
Western states with greater regularity, the CCP was more restrained in authorizing the
use of force due to its desires not only to ease international tensions but also to attract
foreign businesses.
Figure 6.6 Hypothesis Two Assessment
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The assessment of this hypothesis is complicated due to the division in time. What
this hypothesis tests, is once the CCP gained control over the territories by the mid1950s, with the exception of Taiwan, was it less restrained in the use of violent means to
control the four territories examined. The second part tested by this hypothesis is whether
or not the CCP was more restrained in its use of force against minority nationalities after
1989, when the CCP increased efforts to integrate into the international community.
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This held true for Mao in the cases of Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and most of
Tibet, who, until the mid-1950s, was restrained in using violence to subdue minority
regions, opting instead for “peaceful liberation” whenever possible. While the PLA was
heavily involved, violence against people in each region was discouraged. The shelling of
Taiwan, while an act of violence, was far more restrained than embarking in an invasion
to reclaim the territory. This had less to do with Taiwan itself and more to do with, first,
vanquishing the GMD and, second, Cold War international politics. For these reasons,
Mao always exercised restraint regarding the use of force to resolve the Taiwan question,
and, consequently, this hypothesis is false.
This hypothesis for Deng regarding Taiwan was also false, as Deng always
advocated restraint in using force against Taiwan. This continued to be false after 1989,
as it was a continuation of Deng’s previous policies specific to reunification with Taiwan,
with little regard to international politics. It was also false for Inner Mongolia. Restraint
was employed by regional leaders due to the lingering effects of the Cultural Revolution,
and, after 1989, international relations did not factor into the matter concerning the use of
force. This hypothesis is also false in the case of Xinjiang, because Deng increased the
use of violence in the region in response to the Baren uprising of 1990. However, Deng
shifted from relying on the PLA to the People’s Armed Police and other public security
forces. This is also false in the case of Deng in Tibet, as Deng advocated for more
tolerance and understanding of the special characteristics of Tibetans in order to remedy
the damage of the Mao era. After the fall of Hu Yaobang, there was restraint in the use of
force until 1989 when Hu Jintao declared martial law.
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This hypothesis was also false for each case during the Jiang era. Jiang’s use of
force was never shaped by the potential impact it could have on international politics or
foreign investment. Rather, Jiang sought to control the narrative when forced was used,
rather than to avoid it. Increased reliance was placed on police and security forces rather
than the PLA for every case except Taiwan. Jiang did not use force against Taiwan
because the island never declared independence. Had Taiwan ever declared
independence, he most certainly would have used force.
This hypothesis was false in each case of the Hu era. Hu sought to control the
narrative about the use of force, but international relations did not factor into his decision
to use or not use force. Hu was prepared to use force against Taiwan if independence was
declared, regardless of the risk of a Great Power war with the United States. Combatting
terrorism was a common explanation for force in all the other three cases, especially
Xinjiang. However, blaming hostile external forces for fostering unrest was a common
explanation for the use of force in Tibet. Hu proved willing to blame the international
community for causing the CCP’s violent responses.
Hypothesis Three: In my third hypothesis I expected the central leadership, in line
with its Leninist tendencies, to refrain from policies that would grant the titular
nationalities actual autonomy. Reforms implemented would be unlikely to increase
access to self-determination rights for the majority of Uyghurs, Tibetans, or Mongolians,
as it would be deemed threatening to CCP rule.
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Figure 6.7 Hypothesis Three Assessment
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Each leader examined in each case never intended to empower minority peoples
to access their self-determination rights in a genuine way. There was no true attempt to
increase access to autonomy in any case. All four leaders adhered to the Leninist method
of addressing nationalities that I outlined in chapter one. This is why contradictory
policies were issued and legislation articulating autonomy rights was not properly
implemented. The only potential challenge to this tendency was Deng in Tibet during the
early 1980s because of the role of Hu Yaobang. However, embracing Hu Yaobang’s
reform agenda was a product of Deng’s pragmatism. Hu Yaobang himself was not
willing to endorse meaningful political reform, much to the disappointment of the Dalai
Lama and other members of the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE).
Hypotheses: Concluding Remarks:
Hypothesis one proved true in all four cases for all four leaders. This hypothesis is
likely to remain accurate during the fifth and sixth generations of CCP leadership. The
role of social media is likely to increase the use of propaganda as the CCP attempts to
combat information sharing at the grass-roots level. This hypothesis will likely be true in
other authoritarian states struggling with transitional governments, legitimacy crises, and
ethnic tension.
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Hypothesis two completely failed in every case during the Deng, Jiang and Hu
eras. The hypothesis proved true only in the cases of Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang under
Mao. This is significant because it reveals that engagement with states that have a history
of advocating for human rights will not improve the human rights situation within
powerful authoritarian states. The West has proven unwilling to sanction states that
violate minority rights if they have economic and regional security interests. This
indicates that Western states are unlikely to pursue any action beyond verbal or written
condemnation of human rights abuses in such states. As long as Western states continue
this practice the international community will be unable to influence the CCP to respect
the self-determination rights of minority nationalities.
The third hypothesis proved to be completely true, which is what would logically
be expected in a state governed by a Leninist party. However, a party does not have to be
Leninist to make promises to minority groups that it has no intention of keeping. This
hypothesis highlights that the CCP and other parties cannot be trusted to genuinely
empower minority nationalities. For minority ethnic groups within authoritarian states, in
which grass roots organization, without state approval, is nearly impossible, the
likelihood for any minority based rights movements is minimal.
Xi Jinping and the Future of Self-determination:
It is unlikely that Xi Jinping would have been selected to lead the CCP and the
PRC if he did not intend to continue assimilationist policies in the autonomous regions.
Xi Jinping, born in 1953, is the son of CCP revolutionary veteran, Xi Zhongxun.879 Xi
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rose to prominence due to his pro-business and anti-corruption reputation.880 He became
the head of the CCP in November of 2013 and president of the PRC in March of 2013.881
His advocacy for the “Chinese Dream” by “rejuvenating the Chinese people” has gained
popular support from the majority of Chinese people.882 Xi, similar to the previous four
generations of leadership, is dedicated to ensuring one-party rule of the PRC under the
CCP. Xi Jinping emphasizes combatting corruption more than any of his predecessors,
apart from that he has maintained consistent policies in line with Hu Jintao.883 This
implies that the CCP has settled into a common and consistent plan of action regarding
minority nationalities, which will likely continue through the fifth and sixth generations
of CCP leadership. Xi continues the second phase of the Leninist model concerning
minority nationalities, but he could start the third phase of preventing nationalism from
controlling the Party.
Taiwan:
“The two sides can consult with each other on equal basis under the principle of
‘one China,’ and reach a reasonable arrangement,” Xi Jinping stated regarding CrossStrait Relations.884 This was just one of numerous statements issued by Xi about his
intent to continue creating closer economic and cultural ties with Taiwan. He will
certainly seek to do this, as economic integration and peaceful means continue to be
preferred to violent confrontation. The protests in Taiwan over closer ties with China
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were of interest to the CCP, but they did not alter the course of Cross-Strait relations,
which has been increasingly cooperative.
Even after Ma stepped down as head of the GMD, his successor has proven quite
cooperative with Beijing. However, Xi is not a reformer and will not abandon military
options for reunification. Cross-Strait tensions will escalate before and during the 2016
elections, but Taiwanese voters understand the implications of pursuing independence
and the situation on the island will likely remain the same. Beijing will demonstrate its
strength, even though Taiwanese voters will not risk antagonizing the CCP anyway.
Inner Mongolia:
The CCP has successfully incorporated the IMAR and eliminated any legitimate
threats to CCP rule from the region. The region is still an area of concern because it
borders Russia and democratic Mongolia, and the Party fears unrest in the IMAR could
have implications for other regions with ethnic tension.885 However, this has not resolved
ethnic tension or the desire of ethnic Mongolians, particularly herders, for selfdetermination and the preservation of traditional Mongolian life.886 Regional leadership
has continued to prosecute Mongolian herders and farmers who oppose mining
companies in land-grabs, rather than protecting the cultural and economic rights of
Mongolians.887 The policy of prosecuting Mongolians, rather than protecting their land
rights, as long as the regional leadership effectively manages it, will not draw much
attention from the central CCP leadership.
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Xi Jinping will continue to have an interest in the IMAR because of its vast
natural resources. The central leadership has already identified prominent members of the
sixth generation of leaders for central Party leadership, most notably Hu Chunhua, former
Party Chief of the IMAR, whose heavy-handed approach to ethnic unrest placed him in a
position of high esteem with the central leadership.888 The central leadership will
continue to extract resources from the IMAR. Continued resource extraction will cause
protests and demonstrations by herders, which regional security forces will suppress.
Xinjiang:
After a violent attack on an Urumqi railway station Xi stated his policy toward the
XUAR: “The battle to combat violence and terrorism will not allow even a moment of
slackness, and decisive actions must be taken to resolutely suppress the terrorists'
rampant momentum.”889 Xi has continued the policy of blaming religious extremism for
the violence in the XUAR, rather than place the blame on the policies of the CCP.890
There is little indication that Xi will deviate from the policies of the Hu and Jiang eras,
especially after the implementation of more Strike Hard campaigns in June of 2013.891
Xi will continue to strengthen economic and military ties with Central Asian
countries that border the XUAR and Russia. Simultaneously, Han Chinese migration will
continue in an effort to develop and extract resources, while ensuring loyalty to the CCP
through a Han majority population. The CCP will continue to monitor and restrict
religious expression in the XUAR during the Xi regime in the name of combatting
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terrorism. There is little chance of genuine autonomy or access to self-determination
rights for the Uyghurs under Xi Jinping.
Tibet:
In 2011, prior to ascending to the head of the CCP and to the presidency of the
PRC, Xi stated that he would “smash” separatism linked to the Dalai Lama.892 Xi is
unlikely to engage in any meaningful political dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives. The CCP blames the Dalai Lama, and the Dalai Lama Clique, for unrest
in Tibet. What will be critical in the future of the region will be how the CCP addresses
the death of the Dalai Lama, who is now 80 years old. The Party will assert its right to
select the successor to the Dalai Lama. The selection of the Panchen Lama in the 1990s is
a good indicator for the CCP mindset regarding the selection of high-ranking religious
officials in Tibet. The CCP has already stated that, in selecting the Dalai Lama’s
successor, it would use the same method employed to select the eleventh Panchen Lama,
to select the fifteenth Dalai Lama.893
The situation in Tibet remains volatile under Xi, who seeks to develop the region
and dilute the strength of Tibetan religion and cultural identity.894 The amount of distrust
the majority of Tibetans harbor toward the CCP will not be resolved under Xi Jinping,
who will maintain the policies begun under Jiang that were continued under Hu. If the
CCP selects the successor to the Dalai Lama, the majority of Tibetans will never accept
the selection. The inevitable passing of the fourteenth Dalia Lama, if it occurs during the
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Xi era, will be a time of violent unrest within Eastern and Central Tibet. Democratic
elections for representatives of the TGIE—as well as the anniversaries of the 1959
rebellion, 1989 protests, and 2008 Olympic protests—will also be periods of tension and
repression. The monastic establishments will remain the center of domestic selfdetermination movements, and they will remain the targets of CCP regulations.
Conclusion:
The CCP has proven unwilling to allow minority nationalities their right to selfdetermination. Party leadership only entertained allowing greater access to selfdetermination if it would bolster CCP legitimacy. The assimilationist policies pursued
instead of self-determination have caused human rights violations and unrest. However,
these policies enabled the CCP to incorporate Inner Mongolia into the Chinese state and
subdue the majority of ethnically based self-determination protests in the region. This
implies that the CCP method of repression, economic development and Han migration
will work if implemented over an extended period of time.
The CCP will continue to attempt to reduce the influence of religion in Tibet and
Xinjiang and use Patriotic Education as part of its efforts to create loyal citizens in both
regions. Xinjiang will become a greater concern to the Party due to its vast natural
resources and the CCP’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Economic
development, although uneven, will remain a major component of CCP efforts to gain
minority support. Economic cooperation will also remain the major component of the
CCP’s long-term plans for reunification with Taiwan. However, the CCP will continue to
strengthen its domestic security forces and the PLA in order to maintain order in
territories currently under its control and to prevent Taiwanese independence.
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